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ABSTRACT
THE PEDAGOGY OF MEDICAL HUMANITIES: USING LITERATURE AND THE
VISUAL ARTS TO HELP FUTURE CAREGIVERS MAINTAIN THEIR
COMPASSION AND RESILIENCE
Lisa Higgins Shugoll
November 18, 2015
In this dissertation I argue that medical humanities education for students
considering careers in healthcare should begin at the general undergraduate level and
should have two primary objectives, (1) providing tools that will help students foster
therapeutic, compassionate relationships with their patients, and (2) providing strategies
that will help students maintain healthy habits of mind that afford resilience against
compassion fatigue. I assert that in order for students to practice compassion for
themselves and others three core objectives must be met. (1) Students must be exposed
to the fundamentals of bioethics in order to understand the virtue of compassion itself,
(2) they must develop expertise in the tenets of narrative medicine in order to fully
comprehend the causes of suffering in their patients, and (3) they must be introduced to
the practice of mindfulness as a means of self-care. The following chapters suggest that
literature and the visual arts offer the most effective means of teaching these concepts and
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present a pedagogy that incorporates traditional academic theory as well as practical
application of knowledge.
Chapter one introduces the tenets of narrative medicine through the study of Frida
Kahlo’s 1932 painting, Henry Ford Hospital. This chapter considers the formal,
contextual, and expressive elements of Kahlo’s painting as they are related to Rita
Charon’s concepts of narrative competence and narrative practice. Chapter two explores
the concept of empathy, a prerequisite to compassion, using short stories by Eudora
Welty and Richard Selzer. This chapter addresses the problems of alterity and the
presence of unconscious biases that create obstacles to empathy. Chapter three uses
ancient and modern dramatic literature to introduce the fundamentals of bioethics. This
chapter argues that virtue, as well as principles, can be taught in the classroom and
suggests a process for moral reflection. Chapter four introduces the concepts of
mindfulness and creative “flow” and suggests that engagement with and creation of fully
abstract visual art helps students experience and practice the healthy states of mind that
provide resilience against compassion fatigue. Chapter five presents a case study that
attests to the importance of the medical humanities pedagogy described in this
dissertation.
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INTRODUCTION

Medical Humanities is a relatively new academic field that seeks ways of
integrating the humanities into a medical education curriculum that is, of necessity,
increasingly scientific and technological. The perceived benefits of a more inclusive
education for healthcare practitioners are myriad, but there is little agreement among
scholars about specific goals and objectives of medical humanities pedagogy.1 Originally
developed for medical students, the scope of medical humanities education has expanded
to include practitioners in all aspects of healthcare. For this reason the terms Medical
Humanities, Humanities and Healthcare, and Health Humanities are often used
interchangeably. For the purposes of this dissertation, the traditional and more familiar
nomenclature of Medical Humanities will be employed even though the suggestions for
pedagogy are intended for students interested in any type of caregiving profession. This
dissertation affirms that Medical Humanities education should, in fact, begin at the
general undergraduate level and be available to any student considering a career in
healthcare.

1Robert

Martensen, “Thought Styles among the Medical Humanities: Past, Present, and Near-Term
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The field of Medical Humanities is, by definition, a multidisciplinary domain.
For this reason, there is little in the way of cohesive ideology or suggested pedagogy,
especially at the general undergraduate level. In my own work I have come to regard
providing students with the tools to develop and maintain a sense of compassion for their
patients and themselves as the most important objective for undergraduate medical
humanities education. In this regard it is important to understand compassion as
something more than a vague, ill-defined feeling, and instead consider it a skill that must
be practiced and carefully maintained by all who choose to enter the field of healthcare.
Understanding and maintaining the virtue of compassion is imperative for the
formation of therapeutic caregiving relationships and also for preventing caregiver
burnout. This dissertation asserts that in order for students to practice compassion for
themselves and others three core objectives must be met. (1) Students must be exposed
to the fundamentals of bioethics in order to understand the virtue of compassion itself,
(2) they must develop an expertise in the tenets of narrative medicine in order to fully
comprehend the causes of suffering in their patients, and (3) they must be introduced to
the practice of mindfulness as a means of self-care. The following chapters suggest that
literature and the visual arts offer the most effective means of teaching these concepts and
present a pedagogy that incorporates traditional academic theory as well as practical
application of knowledge.
The primary sources explored in this dissertation have been selected for their
effectiveness in demonstrating various elements of narrative, bioethics, and mindfulness,
while simultaneously addressing many areas of healthcare in which there is
dissatisfaction among both consumers and practitioners. This selection does not represent
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the entire reading and viewing list for an introductory medical humanities course, which
would certainly include factual, evidence-based texts in addition to the sources discussed
here. Many of the literary and artistic works discussed in this dissertation are familiar to
scholars of medical humanities and are included because the current discourse contains
lacunae or misinformation that warrant further study and clarification.
There is much debate among scholars of medical humanities about the difficulties
in evaluating the effectiveness of programs designed to teach behaviors and virtues
generally considered unquantifiable. Some scholars and clinicians believe demonstrating
positive outcomes in a quantitative empirical manner is the only way to make medical
humanities fully acceptable to clinicians,2 while others find such attempts to measure
outcomes reductive and not particularly informative.3 Because most undergraduate
students are not yet practicing caregivers, we must assess their understanding of the
concepts presented and their ability to relate those concepts to lived experience. In this
regard, I concur with the conclusions of Shapiro et al., who posit, “students’ increasing
emotional awareness, self-reflection, and capacity to grasp ambiguity might be
considered as proxy outcomes for actual patient interaction skills.”4
The formation of therapeutic relationships between caregivers and their patients is
likely the single most important aspect of healthcare, not only in terms of making sound
clinical decisions that truly benefit the patient,5 but also in preventing malpractice

Catherine Belling, “Sharper Instruments: On Defending the Humanities in Undergraduate Medical
Education,” Academic Medicine June 2010 85, no. 6 (2010): 938.
3 Ayelet Kuper, “Literature and Medicine: A Problem of Assessment,” Academic Medicine Academic
Medicine 81, no. Suppl (2006): S133.
4 Johanna Shapiro et al., “Medical Professionalism: What the Study of Literature Can Contribute to the
Conversation,” Philosophy, Ethics & Humanities in Medicine 10, no. 1 (June 2015): 6,
doi:10.1186/s13010-015-0030-0.
5 Samantha A. Batt-Rawden et al., “Teaching Empathy to Medical Students,” Academic Medicine 88, no.
8 (2013): 1171.
2
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lawsuits and caregiver burnout.6 At the core of such relationships is the virtue of
compassion, defined by researchers at Stanford University as:
A complex multidimensional construct that is comprised of four
key components: (1) an awareness of suffering (cognitive
component), (2) sympathetic concern related to being
emotionally moved by suffering (affective component), (3) a
wish to see the relief of that suffering (intentional component),
and (4) a responsiveness or readiness to help relieve that
suffering (motivational component).7
This definition is useful to the pedagogy of medical humanities because each
component of compassion presents a unique educational opportunity and objective. The
cognitive and intentional components, an awareness of suffering and a wish to see it
relieved, ask that the caregiver go beyond what is initially apparent and seek to
understand the causes of suffering that may not be evident in the physical exam (PE) or
history of present illness (HPI). This type of attention requires an expertise in the
elements of narrative. The affective component is predicated upon an emotional response
that has traditionally been discouraged in medical caregivers.8 Genuine emotional
connection is crucial to the creation of therapeutic relationships, however, and part of
medical humanities pedagogy must consist of helping students explore and understand
their own capacities for emotional response. (I will argue that an empathetic concern is
preferable to a sympathetic concern, and the subtle differences between these terms will
be explored later in this introduction.) The motivational component of compassion,
Mark Crane, “Why Burned-out Doctors Get Sued More Often,” Medical Economics 75, no. 10 (May 26,
1998): 210–18.
7 Hooria Jazaieri et al., “A Randomized Controlled Trial of Compassion Cultivation Training: Effects on
Mindfulness, Affect, and Emotion Regulation,” Motivation and Emotion 38, no. 1 (February 1, 2014):
23. Italics original.
8 Jodi Halpern, From Detached Concern to Empathy: Humanizing Medical Practice (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 17; Rita Charon, Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 6.
6
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responsiveness and readiness to relieve suffering, requires caregivers to have confidence
in their ability to mitigate a patient’s suffering. This confidence should extend beyond
technical or scientific expertise and include a caregiver’s willingness and ability to
remain emotionally present without sacrificing his or her own well-being.
The dictionary definitions of empathy, sympathy, and compassion are all
remarkably similar, but for the purposes of this dissertation, and for medical humanities
in general, it is important to clarify the terms. Compassion has previously been defined,
but empathy and sympathy need further specification. As Dr. Jodi Halpern has noted,
physicians have been attempting to differentiate these terms since the 1950’s, at which
time sympathy was considered a misguided impulse to “conflate self and other,” whereas
empathy was seen as intellectual concern without emotional involvement.9 This
distinction persists in modern healthcare where conventional wisdom encourages “an
intellectual rather than emotional form of knowing”.10 Halpern disagrees with that
precept, however, and states, “[T]he function of empathy is not merely to label emotional
states, but to recognize what it feels like to experience something.”11 Halpern refers to
the practice of clinical empathy as “emotional attunement” and stresses that this is not
simply a vicarious experiencing of the patient’s emotions, but rather an imaginative
reconstruction of the patient’s situation that allows and encourages emotional resonance
between caregiver and patient.12 Sympathy, on the other hand, has been described as
“feeling ‘for’ another person rather than feeling ‘with’ another person,” which places
emphasis on the feelings of the observer (or caregiver) rather than those of the other (or
Halpern, From Detached Concern to Empathy: Humanizing Medical Practice, 18.
Jodi Halpern, “What Is Clinical Empathy?,” JGI Journal of General Internal Medicine 18, no. 8 (2003):
670.
11 Ibid., 671.
12 Ibid.
9
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patient).13 In these terms, sympathy emphasizes the difference between self and other
rather than attempting to form a mutual understanding. In the pedagogy suggested by
this dissertation, empathy will be understood as a prerequisite to compassion.
Pellegrino and Thomasma consider compassion “a virtue of special importance in
the medical relationship,” and define it as “the capacity of physicians to feel something of
the unique predicament of the patient, to enter into the patient’s experience of illness and,
as a result, to suffer vicariously the patient’s anxiety, pain, fear (and so on).”14 This
definition primarily addresses the affective, or empathetic, component of compassion, but
is illuminating because it confirms that Pellegrino and others consider this aspect
critically important.15 Unfortunately, this aspect of compassion is also the one most often
avoided and least often taught.
The idea of suffering as the patient is suffering is frightening to many caregivers
who worry that such an emotional response will compromise objective decision-making.
Pellegrino argues, however, that “objective medical good” is “the lowest order of patient
good,” and that only decisions made with compassion will be truly beneficial to the
patient.16 Caregivers may also fear that such deep emotional engagement with patients
will lead to compassion fatigue and emotional exhaustion on the part of the caregiver.
This dissertation suggests that cultivating a practice of present moment awareness helps
maintain a healthy emotional well-being in caregivers.

Jane Stein-Parbury, Patient & Person: Interpersonal Skills in Nursing, 4th ed. (London: Churchill
Livingstone, 2009), 141.
14 Edmund D. Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993), 25.
15 Howard M. Spiro et al., eds., Empathy and the Practice of Medicine: Beyond Pills and the Scalpel
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Halpern, From Detached Concern to Empathy: Humanizing
Medical Practice; Batt-Rawden et al., “Teaching Empathy to Medical Students.”
16 Pellegrino and Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice, 25.
13
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The skilled practice of narrative medicine, the tenets of which have been
developed primarily by Rita Charon, is the cornerstone to compassionate caregiving.
Caregivers who are able to elicit a patient’s narrative, empathize with the patient in a
healthy and productive manner, and verify their understanding of the patient’s story are
able to ascertain causes of suffering that may not be readily apparent. While the precepts
of narrative competence have traditionally been explicated using literary texts, chapter
one of this dissertation offers Frida Kahlo’s 1932 painting, Henry Ford Hospital, as a
means of exploring both the intellectual and affective elements of narrative engagement.
This chapter considers the formal, contextual, and expressive elements of Kahlo’s
work as they are related to Charon’s concepts of narrative competence and narrative
practice. The ideas of David Freedberg, Walter Benjamin, Roland Barthes, and Alain de
Botton provide theoretical frameworks that explore the power of visual art to elicit an
emotional response in the viewer, and this emotional response is discussed as a means of
allowing students to reflect on the process of empathic engagement.
Chapter two continues the discussion of empathetic engagement, but considers the
concept of alterity and the presence of unconscious biases that create obstacles to
empathy and subsequently affect the quality of healthcare in the United States. This
chapter acknowledges issues of healthcare disparity, specifically the presence of a “status
syndrome”17 affecting the overall health of certain segments of the population, and the
continued presence of racial bias and microaggression that affect healthcare delivery.18 I

M. G. Marmot, “Status Syndrome: A Challenge to Medicine,” JAMA 295, no. 11 (March 15, 2006):
1304–7, doi:10.1001/jama.295.11.1304.
18 Joshua Miller and Ann Marie Garran, Racism in the United States: Implications for the Helping
Professions (Belmont, CA: Thompson Brooks/Cole, 2008).
17
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propose that education of individual caregivers should provide tools for recognizing
unconscious biases and countering attitudes that perpetuate status syndrome.
The critical theories of Hans Georg Gadamer and Louise M. Rosenblatt offer
useful insights for literary exploration and are presented in chapter two as justification for
a pedagogy that encourages close reading and self-reflection rather than structural
analysis of a text. In addition, Peggy McIntosh’s ideas regarding white privilege and
willful ignorance19 are used to consider the ethical implications of this type of narrative
engagement.
The primary sources examined in this chapter are two short stories, Eudora
Welty’s 1941, “A Worn Path,” and Richard Selzer’s, “Imelda,” first published in 1982.
“A Worn Path” is explored as a metanarrative exemplifying the practical differences
between sympathy and empathy, and an unconventional interpretation of “Imelda” is
suggested, one in which allegory and myth are used to illuminate the presence of hubris
in otherwise altruistic caregivers. Both works allow readers to reconsider initial
interpretations in which unconscious biases and paternalism may be present.
Chapter three uses two works of dramatic literature, one ancient and the other
modern, to introduce the fundamentals of bioethics. The study and practice of bioethics
utilizes the tenets of philosophical inquiry to address the myriad dilemmas induced by
extraordinary developments in modern medical treatment and research. There are
multiple theoretical approaches to bioethics, and this chapter considers four in particular.
Virtue ethics places premium importance on the moral character of medical practitioners,
arguing that caregivers should possess specific virtues such as compassion, discernment,

Peggy McIntosh, “White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack,” Independent School 49, no. 2
(Winter 1990): 31.

19
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trustworthiness, integrity, and conscientiousness, in order to provide competent, ethical
care.20 Principlism, arguably the theory most often taught and applied,21 proposes four
principles – autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice – that should guide
ethical decision making in healthcare.22 Casuistry rejects the idea that a single unified
theory can be applied to all ethical dilemmas, and suggests a case-by-case approach that
relies on precedents and previously established paradigms.23 Narrative Ethics argues that
proficient use of any ethical theory requires narrative competence, best learned from the
study of literature.24
This chapter affirms, “To teach ethics is not to teach the difference between right
and wrong, but to make students feel more comfortable facing complex moral
decisions,”25 and argues that virtue, as well as principles can be taught in the classroom.
Sophocles’ Greek tragedy, Philoctetes, first performed in 409 BCE,26 provides an
excellent vehicle for exploring the concept of duty, and the presence of conflicting moral
obligations. This play also introduces students to the concept of a moral exemplar, and
allows them to consider the attributes they will seek in caregiver role models. Margaret
Edson’s 1999 Pulitzer Prize winning drama, W;t, provides a stunning example of nonethical behavior, and asks students to consider the consequences of the absence of
compassion in healthcare. I will argue that W;t contains inconsistencies and inaccuracies
Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009), 40.
21 Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver, and K. Danner Clouser, Bioethics: A Systematic Approach (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 17.
22 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 12–3.
23 David DeGrazia, Thomas A. Mappes, and Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, Biomedical Ethics, 7th ed. (New
York: McGraw Hill, 2011), 33.
24 Howard Brody, Stories of Sickness, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 175, 179.
25 Eunice Kapplinger and Susan Ray-Degges, “Can Ethics Be Taught or Is It Too Late?,” Journal of
Interior Design 24, no. 1 (1998): 49.
26 John Carlevale, “Education, Phusis, and Freedom in Sophocles’ Philoctetes,” Arion: A Journal of
Humanities and the Classics 8, no. 1 (2000): 28.
20
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in its portrayal of modern healthcare, but that it nevertheless contains important lessons
for caregivers. Both dramas provide consummate opportunities for students to practice
moral reflection and to consider what might constitute a personal reflective equilibrium in
the presence of a complex moral dilemma.
Chapter four addresses the high rate of burnout and compassion fatigue in
healthcare workers by first distinguishing between burnout and compassion fatigue and
then suggesting methods for teaching healthy habits of mind that have been shown to
mitigate compassion fatigue. I argue that simple stress reduction is not sufficient to
combat the emotional and psychological effects of compassion fatigue and that attention
must be paid to healthy mental processes that can prevent maladaptive coping
mechanisms. This chapter introduces key concepts of mindfulness – present moment
awareness, non-judgment, and sustained attention – using Dr. Ronald Epstein’s “8-fold
teaching method to improve the capabilities of health professionals by fostering four key
habits of mind.”27 Epstein’s methodology is adapted for the classroom and used to elicit
contemplation of Wassily Kandinsky’s 1924 Blue Painting. Attention to Kandinsky’s
use of color and form allow a type of metacognition in which students consider their own
thought processes and emotional reactions to the work.
Psychology professor Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi has described a beneficial state of
mind called “flow,” in which a person becomes so deeply engaged in an activity that time
is distorted, attention is fully focused, and “there is order in consciousness.”28 The
creation of nonrepresentational works of art often allows students to experience this state

Ronald M. Epstein, “Mindful Practice in Action (II): Cultivating Habits of Mind.,” Families, Systems &
Health: The Journal of Collaborative Family HealthCare 21, no. 1 (2003): 11.
28 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (New York: Harper Perennial
Modern Classics, 2008), 6. Italics original.
27
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of flow. Once the characteristics of this state are experientially understood and its
therapeutic value realized, students might feel encouraged to find activities that allow
them to access this state on a regular basis. Specific practices that maintain a healthy
state of mind are crucial for caregivers hoping to remain compassionate throughout their
careers and this chapter suggests ways of allowing students to personally experience the
beneficial practices of mindfulness and flow.
Chapter five presents the artwork and healthcare narrative of Andrew Marsh, a
gifted artist who suffers chronic pain as a result of damaged discs in the cervical,
thoracic, and lumbar regions of his spine. His experience with the healthcare community
demonstrates the profound necessity for healthcare practiced with narrative competence
and compassion, particularly in the case of chronic pain and other conditions for which
traditional medicine still has surprisingly little to offer. The treatment of chronic pain
relies heavily on opioid (narcotic) medications, which raises ethical concerns about the
relationship between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry.
Marsh’s case also represents a situation in which caregivers are faced with the
challenge of developing a beneficial relationship with a patient whose thoughts on his
own well-being are often in conflict with the recommendations of the medical
community. A scenario in which medical options for the relief of suffering are limited
and the patient’s lifestyle choices seem risky is one that many caregivers would find
frustrating. Developing healthy habits of mind allows caregivers to remain emotionally
present in a therapeutic way while simultaneously preventing compassion fatigue.
Finally, Marsh’s artwork offers the viewer a brilliant visual representation of
physical pain, thereby providing caregivers with some means of understanding an
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experience that “does not simply resist language, but actively destroys it.”29 This chapter
suggests the use of standardized pain assessment forms constrain patient narratives and
may therefore subvert the practice of narrative medicine.
The overall goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate the ways in which literature
and the visual arts can be used to teach the fundamentals of narrative medicine, bioethics,
and mindful self-care to general undergraduate students considering careers in the
demanding field of healthcare. It seeks to provide tools that help future caregivers form
therapeutic relationships with their patients and care for themselves in ways that prevent
compassion fatigue. The field of healthcare changes moment by moment with new
advances in technology and pharmacology, exponentially increasing the vast amount of
knowledge healthcare providers must absorb and retain. If we begin by teaching future
caregivers to place equal value on knowledge that promotes healthy relationships and
mindful self care, we stand a much greater chance of imbuing the healthcare community
with compassionate, resilient practitioners who enjoy their work and make a positive
difference in the lives of their patients.

Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1985), 4.

29
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CHAPTER ONE
THE PEDAGOGY OF NARRATIVE COMPETENCE AND MINDFUL EMPATHY

“Along with their growing scientific expertise, doctors need the expertise to listen to their
patients, to understand as best they can the ordeals of illness, to honor the meanings of
their patients’ narratives of illness, and to be moved by what they behold so that they can
act on their patients’ behalf.”30
Rita Charon, MD, PhD

In the above quotation, Rita Charon describes a particular kind of expertise, one
that encompasses each of the four components of compassion – cognitive, affective,
intentional, and motivational. It is an imperative of medical humanities education to help
students develop the kind of expertise she describes. Narrative medicine, “medicine
practiced with the narrative competence to recognize, absorb, interpret, and be moved by
the stories of illness,”31 is a prerequisite for healthcare practiced with compassion
because it is through the patient’s narrative that the caregiver comes to understand the
true nature of the patient’s suffering. The compassionate caregiver must be skilled at
eliciting and interpreting such narratives, but must also experience an empathetic
response to that narrative. As mentioned in the introduction, it is an empathetic, rather

30
31

Charon, Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness, 3.
Ibid., vii.
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than sympathetic concern that should comprise the affective component of compassion.
Like compassion, empathy can be seen as having more than a single component.
Roughly speaking, the cognitive component of empathy involves understanding another’s
perspective and being aware of his or her feelings, and the affective component involves
sharing in those feelings.32 In a study of the practice and efficacy of teaching empathy to
medical students, Batt-Rawden et al., have noted that most attempts focus on the
cognitive component of empathy, viewing it as a skill that can be developed and
measured.33 This chapter argues that the affective component of empathy is equally
important and can also be taught. Without the affective component, empathy is nothing
more than “detached concern,”34 which is the traditional, and poorly functioning, model
for patient-caregiver relationships.35 The affective component of empathy is often a
spontaneous response, but it can also be intentionally cultivated. Either way, the
emotional aspect of empathy requires mindful awareness and attention on the part of the
caregiver if it is to be used on the patient’s behalf.
This chapter offers suggestions for teaching the elements of narrative competence
and the cultivation of mindful empathy using Frida Kahlo’s 1932 painting, Henry Ford
Hospital [Figure 1]. It begins with a brief synopsis of the origins of narrative medicine,
and then explores the work of David Freedberg and other theorists who have studied the
power of visual art to evoke an empathetic response. It examines key theories of
narrative in general, and finally considers Rita Charon’s elements of narrative medicine

Mohammadreza Hojat et al., “Physician Empathy: Definition, Components, Measurement, and
Relationship to Gender and Specialty,” American Journal of Psychiatry 159, no. 9 (September 1, 2002):
1563, doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.159.9.1563.
33 Batt-Rawden et al., “Teaching Empathy to Medical Students,” 1173.
34 Ibid., 1171.
35 Halpern, From Detached Concern to Empathy: Humanizing Medical Practice, 15.
32
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as they are represented in Kahlo’s painting. Close engagement with this work of art
allows students to examine the nature of their own empathetic response and to understand
the elements of narrative as universal in nature while simultaneously unique to every
patient.
The genesis of narrative medicine can be dated to 1972, when Joanne Trautmann
Banks was appointed professor of Literature and Medicine at the Hershey Medical Center
of Pennsylvania State University.36 Banks was a literature professor and Virginia Woolf
scholar who believed the study of literature had “life enhancing” benefits. Perhaps
because she was the mother of a disabled son who spent a great deal of time in the varied
environments of healthcare, Banks wished to share these benefits with students of
medicine.37 The purpose of Banks’s course, and of similar courses later instituted at
medical schools throughout the country, was to provide future doctors with some means
of understanding pain and suffering from the patients’ perspective.38
Rita Charon expanded upon Bank’s original intentions for the study of literature,
and in 2000 founded the Narrative Medicine program at Columbia University. Charon is
a professor of clinical medicine at Columbia, and also holds a PhD in English Literature.
What began as a way of allowing young medical students some means of understanding
the patient’s experience of illness and suffering, now includes the development of
“narrative competence . . . a sophisticated knowledge of how stories work” that enables a
caregiver to “follow the patient’s narrative thread, identify the metaphors or images used
Jones, Anne Hudson, “Reflections, Projections, and the Future of Literature-and-Medicine,” in
Literature and Medicine: A Claim for a Discipline, eds. Delese Wear, Martin Kohn, and Susan Stocker
(McLean, VA: Society for Health and Human Values, 1987).29.
37 Oransky, Ivan “Joanne Trautmann Banks,” The Lancet , vol. 370 no. 9584 (2007).
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(07)61148-9/fulltext
38 Charon, Rita. “Literature and Medicine: Origins and Destinies,” Academic Medicine vol. 75, no. 1
(2000). 23.
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in the telling, tolerate ambiguity and understand the story in light of others told by this
teller.”39
Like Rita Charon, Howard Brody holds both an MD and PhD. He is a professor
of philosophy and family practice medicine at Michigan State University and has also
made significant contributions to the theory and praxis of narrative medicine. Brody has
noted that the relationship between caregiver and patient is inherently narrative in nature,
often beginning with a “chief complaint” or “chief concern” (CC) as related by the
patient,40 and culminating in a case history, which is the story of disease as seen from the
caregiver’s perspective.41 Narrative medicine is a means of practice that mandates
attention to the narratives of both patient and caregiver, and considers these narratives the
primary means through which diagnoses are made and treatment is offered. This type of
practice does not, in any way, exclude the scientific and technological aspects of
medicine that continue to create enormous strides in the reduction of disease and
promotion of health, but simply asserts that unless a healthcare practitioner understands
what a specific illness or injury actually means to the patient, it is almost impossible to
deliver care that promotes the well-being of the patient and, consequently, of the
caregiver.
Frida Kahlo lived within a physical body that betrayed her at every turn, and
images of her own body figure prominently in many of her paintings. Sidonie Smith has
suggested, “Life writing about the body has also enabled people to confront the destiny of
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the ill or impaired body, their own or someone else’s,”42 and it seems evident that Kahlo
created her autobiographical paintings as a means of confronting her own failing body
and of expressing the ways in which being embodied in an unreliable and pain-riddled
physical self complicates the quest for identity and wholeness.
When she was six years old, Kahlo contracted polio, and although she recovered,
her right leg atrophied and she walked with a limp for the rest of her life.43 When she was
eighteen, Kahlo was badly injured in a bus accident. A medical report from 1926 lists the
following injuries and complications resulting from the accident, “fracture of the third
and fourth lumbar vertebrae, triple fracture to pelvis, approximately eleven fractures to
right leg, dislocation of left shoulder, stomach wound due to metal rod entering left side
and exiting by the vagina, causing damage to the left lip of vulva. Acute peritonitis.
Cystitis. . . . Three months in Red Cross Hospital. . . . [immobilized] for nine months in a
plaster corset.”44
The medical record, an impersonal catalog of injuries and illnesses, does not
begin to express the emotional suffering that accompanied Kahlo’s physical trauma.
Kahlo spoke of the accident as the moment she lost her virginity.45 It is unlikely Kahlo
was simply referring to a physical change caused by the horrific injury; she is certainly
lamenting the loss of innocence, and loss of the future she had planned. After spending
one month in the hospital, Kahlo spent three additional months on bed rest at her home.
Kahlo had hoped to become a doctor, but began painting during this period of
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44 Ibid., 122.
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convalescence. Her bed was affixed with a canopy that held a mirror as well as an easel,
and some of her earliest paintings were self-portraits.46
In 1931, after years of chronic pain, Kahlo’s doctors recorded evidence of a
previously undiagnosed congenital spinal malformation such as scoliosis, or perhaps
spina bifida occulta.47 Kahlo wore spinal corsets, both plaster and metal, off and on in an
effort to ease the pain and also underwent a series of lumbar punctures with injections of
Lipidol, a contrast agent injected into the spinal fluid in order to make it visible on x-ray.
Evidently these procedures were done in an effort to obtain some sort of concrete
diagnosis. In 1946 four lumbar vertebrae were fused using bone from her pelvis and a
metal rod.48
Kahlo married the artist Diego Rivera on August 21st, 1929.49 Later that year she
underwent an abortion due to the “unfavorable position” of her pelvis, which doctors
believed made it impossible for her to carry an infant to term.50 In spite of her tumultuous
relationship with Rivera, or perhaps because of it, Kahlo eventually wished to have a
child with her husband.51 By the time she became pregnant again in 1932, Kahlo had
worked through some of the ambivalence she had long felt regarding motherhood and
later told her doctor, “At that time I was enthusiastic about having the child after having
thought of all the difficulties that it would cause me.”52 Kahlo was placed on strict bed
rest in an effort to maintain the pregnancy, but she miscarried after four months.53
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While still hospitalized after the miscarriage, Kahlo began preliminary sketches
for Henry Ford Hospital. The artist depicts herself lying in a hospital bed incongruously
placed in a desolate landscape. In the distant background she has rendered the Ford
Motor Company plant where her husband was working on sketches for the murals he
would later paint for the Detroit Institute of Arts.54 The focal point of the painting is the
hospital bed, isolated in the midst of a barren landscape and giving visual form to the
loneliness and isolation often experienced in times of illness. Kahlo lies naked and
completely exposed on the bed; her physical frame is very small in relation to the bed
frame and the surrounding environment. Her nakedness and her smallness present the
viewer with a portrait of complete vulnerability; Kahlo seems at the mercy of the
elements both within and outside the hospital. The bed is tilted at an odd angle and
Kahlo lies very close to the near edge. This distortion of the picture plane places the
patient in a precarious position and conveys the fear of being at the edge of a precipice
both physically and emotionally. It is a visual rendering of disorientation, fear, and grief.
An empathetic understanding of the emotions conveyed in Kahlo’s painting
requires students to become deliberately and intentionally engaged with the work,
accepting it as a means of gaining insight into the patient experience. Some familiarity
with the details of Kahlo’s life, both medical and personal, may be helpful in forming an
empathetic connection to the painting, but are probably not necessary for all students
because the work alone is visually captivating.
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In The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response, David
Freedberg considers the “psychological and behavioral” responses to art,55 and provides a
strong theoretical framework for understanding the emotional power of Kahlo’s painting.
Throughout the text Freedberg explores three factors he sees as essential to the affective
power of an image: familiarity, particularity, and vividness.56
In his discussion of familiarity, Freedberg examines the use of art in the middle
ages to influence the attitudes and behavior of young children, an effect he attributes to
the children’s ability to identify with, or see themselves “mirrored” in the works of art.57
He continues this discussion by analyzing the use of images to connect earthly and divine
realms, and notes that when such images take human form, “worshipers may as a
consequence venerate the object and confuse it with what it stands for . . . what is
familiarly known cannot be invested with powers that are proper to the sphere of
transcendence.”58 In such cases a strong empathetic connection to an image may become
idolatrous, but human forms are nevertheless used to “shape the divine” because the
human form is “most intimately known to us.”59 Freedberg cites Freud’s concept of
transference in explaining the human tendency to feel an emotional connection to both
objects and beings in which we perceive qualities with which we are familiar.60 The
simple presence of the human form in a work of art might engender only the barest sense
of empathy, but Kahlo’s rendition may evoke an immediate and much stronger response
in students who have undergone similar experiences of fear or grief in the face of illness
David Freedberg, The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991), xix.
56 Ibid., 196.
57 Ibid., 5.
58 Ibid., 65.
59 Ibid., 190.
60 Ibid., 191.
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or injury. For those who have not, a closer exploration of the painting offers much to
consider.
Kahlo invites familiarity by painting a single, large tear near her left eye. As with
all of her self-portraits, Kahlo’s facial expression is rather stoic and enigmatic. Kahlo
removes whatever questions might arise about her emotional state, however, with the
presence of a universal symbol of sadness. The tear is familiar to any viewer who has
ever cried, and thus it elicits immediate comprehension. It is also stylized, however,
larger and whiter than would be realistic. This draws the viewer’s attention to its
importance in the painting and to the fact that we are being asked to pay particular
attention to Kahlo’s grief.
Freedberg describes particularity as those elements of a work of art that remove it
from the realm of the general, and make it utterly unique and distinctive.61 In
considering the influence of particularity, Freedberg discusses the art form of ex votos,
works created as expressions of gratitude for divine intervention. He notes, “In every
case, manufacture and figuration is predicated on a strict concept of distinctiveness and
accuracy.”62 Victims of severe illness or injury offer votive works as visual
representations of the gratitude they feel toward divine forces or beings that intervened
and enabled the victim to survive. These works are meant as gifts of thanks to the
intercessor, and also as reminders that gratitude is owed and should be continuously felt.
In order to generate this emotion of thankfulness, the votive must represent the “event
from which the devotee was saved” as accurately as possible.63
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Henry Ford Hospital is not an ex voto, but it bears many similarities to the
form.64 It is small and painted on a metal plate, and while Kahlo is certainly not
expressing gratitude for surviving the miscarriage, or for any other evident reason, she
nevertheless seeks to share her experience as accurately as possible. Though we can and
should draw inductive conclusions from her work about the trauma of miscarriage in
general, she clearly wants the viewer to understand her very particular experience. She
makes this evident with the inclusion of the incongruous industrial backdrop and the
objects she paints tethered to her body. These objects will be more closely examined as
elements of Kahlo’s narrative, but here we must acknowledge the stylized image of an
oversized male fetus, one that bears a resemblance to Kahlo’s husband. This figure
reminds the viewer that Kahlo is not grieving the loss of some unknown entity to which
there was no deep attachment, but rather the loss of a child, already recognized with
particular traits of form and character. This is, arguably, the deepest sort of grief.
As Walter Benjamin notes in his famous essay, The Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction, “The manner in which human sense perception is organized,
the medium in which it is accomplished, is determined not only by nature but by
historical circumstances as well.”65 Here we must note that society at large no longer
responds to visual art the way it did in the past. Freedberg puts this more specifically,
“We may no longer have much leisure to contemplate the images before us, but people
once did; and they turned contemplation into something useful, therapeutic, elevating,
consoling, and terrifying. They did so in order to attain a state of empathy; and when we
64Andrea
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examine how they did so, a brilliant light is cast not only on the function of images but on
a potential that for many of us remains to be activated.”66 Freedberg is here referring to
the medieval practice of using images to bring to mind the lives of saints and Biblical
figures in order to inspire faith and righteous living in the worshiper.67 Although we
seldom use images in this way today, their power to inspire and to engender strong
affective responses has not been lost; it simply requires a specific type of attention. In
this age of instant access to all manner of information and the attendant impulse to
engage in multiple tasks simultaneously, the desire to devote undivided attention to a
single image is perhaps uncommon, but this type of sustained, focused attention is a
necessary component of empathetic engagement, whether with a work of art or a fellow
human being. Classroom contemplation of Kahlo’s painting provides an opportunity to
encourage students in this process.
W. J. T. Mitchell has noted that, although true contemplation of images may be
rare in today’s society, we are still a visual culture. “The idea that images have a kind of
social or psychological power of their own is, in fact, the reigning cliché of contemporary
visual culture. . . . There is no difficulty, then, in demonstrating that the idea of the
personhood of pictures is just as alive in the modern world as it was in traditional
societies.”68 Borrowing a term from post-colonial theorists, Mitchell proposes a
“subaltern model” for examining the power of images and suggests “that we not confuse
the desire of the picture with the desires of the artist, the beholder, or even the figures in
the picture.”69 What Mitchell seems to be suggesting is a personification of the picture
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itself that would return certain rights that have been usurped in our tendency to consider
only the desires of the artist and viewer. This type of esoteric theorizing is of limited
value in the pedagogy of medical humanities, which seeks the immediate and practical
benefits of study, but it nevertheless underscores the notion that it is possible to be moved
by images even when we know nothing about the artist or the subjects in the painting. In
the case of Henry Ford Hospital, the potential for empathetic engagement is strengthened
because we have some familiarity with its context and therefore a more directed approach
to the interpretation of its symbols.
When assisting students toward empathetic engagement with Kahlo’s painting, it
might be useful to explore Roland Barthes’ notion of studium and punctum, conceived as
he was attempting to understand the peculiar power of certain photographs, and recorded
in Camera Lucida. Barthes describes the studium as a cultural or human quality of a
photograph that allows the viewer to “participate” in, or at least feel a general connection
with or interest in the picture. The viewer actively seeks this element in the photograph
being considered.70 The punctum, on the other hand, is the “element which rises from
the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me . . . A photograph’s punctum is
that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me).”71 What elements
of the painting are easily “relatable,” (to use a term often employed by students), and
what elements are piercing, or more difficult to hold in our thoughts?
In Art as Therapy, Alain de Botton and John Armstrong attempt to address the
question of what art should do for its viewers. They describe seven ways in which art “is
a therapeutic medium that can help guide, exhort and console its viewers, enabling them
Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Refelctions on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill
and Wang, 1981), 26.
71 Ibid., 27.
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to become better versions of themselves.72 In discussing the function of “Sorrow,” the
authors note that art may encourage “a profound engagement with sadness . . . It tells us
that sorrow is written into the contract of life.”73 And yet, few people would seek a
deliberate engagement with sadness. As Freedberg reminds us, the affective power of art
is often rejected or repressed because of its power to disturb.74 In her 2003 study of war
photography, Regarding the Pain of Others, Susan Sontag writes, “The photographs are a
means of making ‘real’ (or ‘more real’) matters that the privileged and the merely safe
might prefer to ignore.”75
At some point, when considering Henry Ford Hospital, the viewer may be forced
to decide whether to stay with the work and feel the sorrow expressed within it, or to
disengage. Obviously, this is a choice made many times every day in the world of
healthcare. Compassionate care requires empathetic engagement, and future chapters of
this dissertation will discuss healthy ways of accomplishing this, but here, the goal is
simply to encourage students to commit to a close encounter with Kahlo’s work and to
pay attention to the experience of emotional engagement.
Traditional medical wisdom prescribed an emotional detachment from patients,
which was believed to foster rational decision-making. Recently however, practitioners
and scholars have begun to argue that, “by allowing patients to move them, physicians
gain access to a source of understanding illness and suffering that can make them more
effective healers. Learning to skillfully empathize with patients is therefore not an
ornamental aspect of medical training, but is as critical as learning to perform technical
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procedures.”76 In her discussion of trauma art, Jill Bennett differentiates between “crude
empathy,” which is grounded in affinity and involves “feeling for another insofar as we
can imagine being that other” and empathy based upon “feeling for another . . . that is
characterized by a distinctive combination of affective and intellectual operations.”77
This type of empathy requires an engagement that is more intellectual than emotional.
Even if there is nothing in Kahlo’s work that stimulates an emotional response, for
example, it is still possible to make a cognitive choice to consider the represented
experience of being alone and vulnerable. This type of cultivated rather than spontaneous
empathy is required of caregivers in cases where it is difficult or impossible to form an
emotional connection with a patient; it allows the caregiver an alternative to emotional
detachment or withdrawal. In addition, this type of empathy is nonjudgmental; it is not
about becoming emotionally attached to a patient and thus perhaps making inappropriate
decisions, it is rather a form of engagement that attempts to understand, respect, and take
emotional part in the patient’s journey through illness.
In his essay, “What is Empathy and Can it Be Taught?” Howard M. Spiro
concludes, “If empathy depends on experience, then that is the area in which novels,
fiction, stories, and paintings can enlarge empathy. Clinical tales, as Oliver Sacks calls
them, are the most important; to look at a painting is, however, sometimes to be
fooled.”78 Henry Ford Hospital is both a clinical tale and a painting. As a clinical tale,
the story of one patient’s hospital experience, it offers the seasoned clinician an
enlightening story of miscarriage, one that might never have been previously considered.
Halpern, From Detached Concern to Empathy: Humanizing Medical Practice, xix.
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As a painting, it offers the uninitiated a vicarious experience that could serve as a means
of understanding suffering.
Eric Larson and Xin Yao have studied the concept of “emotional labor” as it was
developed and explained by Arlie Russell Hochschild in The Managed Heart: The
Commercialization of Human Feeling in 1983. The techniques presented in the book
were designed to help people working in the service industry increase profits by behaving
sympathetically and hospitably in all situations.79 In adapting the concepts for
physicians, Larson and Yao define emotional labor as “the process of regulating
experienced and displayed emotions to present a professionally desired image during
interpersonal transactions . . . For a physician, emotional labor uses psychological
resources to engender personal cognitive and affective changes to project an empathic
image for the patient.”80 Using the techniques of emotional labor to express empathy
requires acting; “Individuals can either fake their emotional display by forging facial
expressions, voice, or posture or they can try to alter their internal experience and act on
emotions they actually experience. The former is called surface acting and the latter deep
acting.”81 Deep acting is similar to method acting in that it involves using memories and
imagination to generate emotions that might be comparable to the emotions the patient is
experiencing.82
Larson and Yao make it clear that their suggestions are not designed to enable
unfeeling caregivers to dupe their patients, but instead are intended to be of assistance in
times when a true emotional connection with a patient is difficult. They also point out
Eric B. Larson and Xin Yao, “Clinical Empathy as Emotional Labor in the Patient-Physician
Relationship,” JAMA 293, no. 9 (March 2005): 1100.
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that with practice over time, empathetic engagement comes more naturally and requires
less acting.83 Even so, there remains something distasteful about suggesting that
caregivers use acting techniques to fake empathy. It seems manipulative and dishonest; a
deliberate undermining of the trust patients must be able to place in their caregivers.
Caregivers who are unable to feel a genuine, unmanufactured connection to their patients
will not be able to provide compassionate care and must seek to understand the
underlying reasons for this disconnect. Compassion fatigue is a serious concern in
modern healthcare and is dealt with more fully in chapter four of this dissertation.
When using art and literature to explore the emotional nature of empathy, we are
not asking students to manufacture emotion, but simply to pay attention to their own
responses as they work to understand the experience being portrayed. Caregivers who
seek to engage empathetically with their patients are doing so in an effort to practice the
affective component of compassion. It is important for caregivers who have never
experienced serious illness to have some means of understanding what their patients are
going through and for seasoned caregivers to be reminded of the non-scientific side of
caregiving. Using art and literature to practice empathetic engagement allows caregivers
a means of responding with sincerity to patients whose experiences are completely
unfamiliar.
Thus far this chapter has considered empathetic engagement between caregiver
and patient as a crucial aspect of medicine practiced with narrative competence and has
examined Henry Ford Hospital as a tool for investigating and practicing such
engagement. I will now turn to the place of narrative in narrative medicine, and will
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consider the painting from the viewpoint of narrative theory and as an expression of
Charon’s narrative features of medicine.
The development of narrative competence requires practice in recognizing the
elements of narrative and also an understanding that illness narratives are rarely
straightforward. Some theorists emphasize the narrative element of plot, “a teleological
sequence of events linked by some principle of causation: that is, the events are bound
together in a trajectory that typically leads to some form of resolution or convergence,”
but this emphasis ignores the fact that, “many narratives resist, elude, or reject this model
of plot and its explicit assumption of narrative unity, cohesion and teleology.”84 Illness
narratives in particular are resistant to emplotment precisely because the elements that
provide cohesion and purpose to daily living have been disrupted. “The universal desire,
or need, for a story with temporality, causality, and some limited predictability for the
future is thwarted by an impending illness, and part of the suffering that characterizes
sickness is the result of living with a broken story.”85 If, as Jerome Bruner argues,
humans utilize narrative not only to represent reality but also to construct it,86 the
patient’s story of illness must be seen as an attempt to reconstruct a reality into which the
experience of illness can be incorporated. Holmgren et al., see the ultimate goal of the
medical caregiver as “helping the patient craft a new or amended narrative that can
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explicate the symptom or sign, provide a plausible causal chain, and begin to demystify
the future.”87
It is a fair point to assert that Henry Ford Hospital is not a narrative painting.
Unlike Masaccio’s Tribute Money, for example, which presents three distinct and
progressive events in time, Kahlo gives us only one moment, so, conventionally
speaking, there can be no plot. I would argue that Henry Ford Hospital does in fact tell a
story, and does contain a plot with causal relationships, but that it follows a pattern
common to illness narratives in that the plot is not readily apparent. It is, in the way of
postmodern narration, fractured and disjointed, with elements that appear to be unrelated.
If Kahlo were to describe the meaning of each of the symbols she has chosen to paint, the
plot might become clear, but she is, of course, not available to share her insight with us.
We can, however, take the information evident in the work itself and construct a
provisional understanding of the narrative Kahlo created about her experience.
In explicating his theory of narrative construction of self, Paul Ricoeur uses
Aristotle’s concept of mimesis to describe the process of emplotment. Ricoeur divides
mimesis into three phases: mimesis1 is prefigured time, the period when the events of
everyday life are experienced, but not yet been formed into narrative, mimesis2 is
configured time, during which we structure the events of our life into a story with cause
and effect, and mimesis3 is refigured time, during which we have assigned meaning to
our story, which in turn, shapes the way we view and interpret the world around us.88
This concept of narrative construction is particularly useful when considering illness
narratives, where mimesis1 might be thought of as the period before the illness or injury,
Holmgren et al., “Terminology and Praxis: Clarifying the Scope of Narrative in Medicine,” 254.
Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, vol. 1 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1983), 54–77.

87
88

30

when daily life was perhaps comprehensible and predictable. The attempt to make sense
of the situation in terms of causality and consequence occurs during Ricoeur’s mimesis2,
and mimesis3 is the period of time in which a patient seeks to find meaning in her altered
state, perhaps reorders her priorities, and reconsiders her thoughts on the future. This is
an extreme simplification of both Ricoeur’s theories and the process of coming to grips
with a life altering illness or injury. In reality, the different periods co-exist, overlap, and
may not be linear, but like Elisabeth Kübler-Ross and her stages of grief, Ricoeur
provides a useful frame of reference for deciphering a narrative that may initially appear
incoherent.
In acknowledging both the potential benefits and the difficulties of practicing
narrative medicine, Charon considers the issues that separate the sick and the well,
caregiver and patient. She identifies four types of division:89 1) The relation to mortality
2) The contexts of illness 3) Beliefs about disease causality and 4) The emotions of
shame, blame, and fear.90 Charon posits that these divisions often prevent the kind of
trusting, transparent, nurturing relationships that would allow caregiving to function at its
best and notes, “For the sick patient to accept the care of well strangers, those strangers
have to form a link, a passage between the sick and the healthy who tender care. We
need to see the chasms clearly if we want to bridge them.”91
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Charon also identifies five narrative features of medicine that must be recognized
and understood by caregivers hoping to engage meaningfully with their patients: 1)
Temporality – having to do with time, and the passage of time as experienced by the
patient 2) Singularity – the unique and un-reproducible nature of every narrative 3)
Causality/contingency – the desire to find a causal relationship for illness or injury 4)
Intersubjectivity – the self in relationship to others, and 5) Ethicality – the responsibilities
that come to a caregiver as a result of hearing a patient’s story.92
In Henry Ford Hospital, Kahlo has painted six objects surrounding her
hospital bed. Each of the objects is tied to a red ribbon (many critics have noted the
resemblance to blood vessels) that Kahlo holds against her abdomen. A closer
examination of these objects reveals the ways in which they illuminate both the
chasms that divide caregiver and patient, the elements of narrative medicine, and
Ricoeur’s ideas about the narrative construction of self.
Perhaps the most incongruous object of the six is the snail painted in the
upper right corner of the work. It floats in the sky, as do the other objects, but
appears to be moving toward Kahlo with its neck extended and its antennae raised.
Although the snail can be seen in Christian art and has been variously identified
with St. Jerome, Jesus, and the Virgin Mary,93 the meaning of Kahlo’s snail is far less
esoteric. “The snail, Frida once explained, refers to the slowness of the miscarriage,
which, like a snail, was soft, covered and at the same time, open.’”94 Kahlo’s
inclusion of the snail is the element that renders this painting narrative in nature
Ibid., 39–58.
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International, n.d.), 376.
94 Herrera, Frida: A Biography of Frida Kahlo, 144.
92
93

32

rather than a series of symbolic associations. When she includes the element of
temporality, Kahlo is recounting a story although, as is common with illness
narratives, the story is fragmented and non-linear.
Narratologist Gérard Genette divides the element of temporality into three
components, order, duration and frequency. Order refers to the chronological
sequence of events that make up a story. Frequency refers to the fact that the
events of a story may be repeated, or described in different ways by various
characters. And duration compares the length of time it takes for an event to occur
with the length of time it takes for a narrator to describe it. In other words, a
narrator may take several minutes to describe a split-second occurrence, or may
spend only a moment describing a decade of life. 95 This mutability of time often
comes to the forefront in a narrative of illness so it is not surprising that Kahlo
chooses to represent temporality in her work. Margaret Edson makes a similar
observation of temporality in W;t, when the character of Vivian Bearing,
hospitalized near the end of her battle with ovarian cancer, remarks, “You cannot
imagine how time . . . can be . . . so still. It hangs. It weighs. And yet there is so little
of it. It goes so slowly, and yet it is so scarce.”96
Charon recognizes temporality as an element of narrative medicine, but I
would argue that it is often also a cause of division between patient and caregiver
that goes beyond the issue of mortality. Healthcare providers confront issues of
temporality when struggling to answer the question, “How long have I got, Doc?” or
when dealing with complaints about the length of time patients spend in waiting
95
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rooms, but they must also understand that any illness or injury may serve to alter
the patient’s experience of time passing. For Kahlo, time slowed to a snail’s pace as
the biological sequelae of her miscarriage unfolded and this altered sense of
temporality was a significant feature of her dreadful experience.
At the foot of her bed Kahlo has painted an autoclave, a piece of equipment
used for sterilizing medical instruments. According to Herrera, Kahlo explained to
friends that the autoclave represented, “the mechanical part of the whole
business,”97 and as such, we may connect it with Charon’s narrative element of
intersubjectivity. It is not possible to know with certainty what aspects of her
experience Kahlo found “mechanical,” but there is no shortage of evidence to
suggest that many patients find their medical experiences indifferent and
objectifying. When seen through the lens of intersubjectivity, the autoclave serves
as a reminder that medical encounters are often seen as cold and impersonal. It is
unlikely that students viewing the painting would recognize the device as an
autoclave, especially since the type pictured is long obsolete, but if asked to describe
it they might use terms such as dark, heavy, and perhaps frightening. Its somewhat
ominous appearance reminds the viewer of the fear and dread that accompany
disruptions of physical integrity.
Kahlo has also painted a plastic model of the female reproductive system and
the bones of the female pelvic girdle. In healthy women, the reproductive organs
and the pelvic girdle function in tandem to create a safe environment for the growth
of a fetus. The depiction of these bones and organs outside her body, existing only as
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plastic models connected to her with symbolic cords, underscores the acuity with
which she felt their failure to function properly within her body and illustrates the
narrative element of causality.
As Charon has noted, “The engine of narrative is its urge to make sense of
why things happen, its longing to find or imagine connections among things, either
through motive or cause.”98 Kahlo has established a connection between the
accident she suffered as a teenager and the failure of her pregnancy. In
acknowledging this connection, she is also forced to accept that this miscarriage is
not an isolated, randomly occurring incident, but that miscarriage will likely be the
result of any pregnancy she experiences. The damage to her internal bones and
organs is permanent and in spite of extensive medical intervention, their full
functionality has not been restored. It is impossible, of course, to judge the veracity
of Kahlo’s interpretation of causality, but that is not the point. The point of
developing narrative competence is learning to understand the ramifications of
illness or injury from the patient’s perspective.
These objects also serve to illustrate Kahlo’s experience of mimesis2, or the
reconfiguration phase of her narrative construction. In seeking a cause for her
miscarriage she acknowledges the injuries to her reproductive system and orders
the events of her earlier life into a narrative that explains the situation in which she
now finds herself.
The pink and purple orchid lying beneath Kahlo’s bed is connected to her
interpretation of causality, but also illustrates the singularity of her experience. In
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bloom, the orchid represents sexuality, beauty, and fecundity, but here the flower
lies wilted and dying, cut off from its life source. For Kahlo, perhaps the belief that
she would never be able to bear a child also brought about changes in her selfperception. It is possible that here she is showing the viewer her thoughts about
what it means to be a woman, a wife, a lover. In the period of mimesis3, or
refiguration, Kahlo perhaps abandons her idea of what the future might hold and
questions the nature of her relationship with her husband.
In an effort to comprehend and recover from a severe and debilitating illness of
his own, Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan studied autobiographical illness narratives in order to
understand “continuity, its disruption, and the various ways of coping with the latter.”99
He notes, “Motivated by a conscious or unconscious desire to (re)establish continuity
between present and past, these narrators tend to emphasize elements of their past history
that they did not stress before the illness, to create new connections among events, to
change the balance between foreground and background, etc.”100 In Kahlo’s visual
narrative, she grapples with current and future complications that have been caused by
past events. Rimmon-Kenan also explores the difficulty in crafting a story of illness that
respects traditional narrative conventions of coherence and continuity. He believes the
postmodern exploration of the fragmented nature of reality and identity offers a far better
framework for the construction of illness narratives.101 His insights support the
contention that Kahlo’s work is narrative in nature even though it is not a continuous,
linear construct.
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In discussing the benefits of narrative competence and of being willing to
enter into the world of another, Hilde Lindemann Nelson writes, “An inherent
relationship exists between empathizing with others and grasping the complex
truth of a situation, the multiple views from which a single event might be seen. . .
We come to see that the truth of a moral experience lies in the aggregate of
subjective realities, transformed by the reading mind through reflection, that
reveals the sum of what matters in a specific human situation.”102 Eric J. Cassell has
attempted to describe the nature of suffering and notes, “Suffering occurs when an
impending destruction of the person is perceived: it continues until the threat of
disintegration has passed or until the integrity of the person can be restored in
some other manner. . . . suffering extends beyond the physical.”103 In reflecting upon
the objects Kahlo has chosen to include in her painting, we come to understand that
the source of her suffering goes even beyond the loss of a single child and includes
the loss of a future in which bearing children is a possibility. Comprehending this
aspect of the painting is not possible without a thorough exploration of each symbol
Kahlo chooses to incorporate into her narrative.
Floating directly above the bed is the male fetus that Kahlo painted
disproportionately large in relation to herself. There is tendency in the medical world,
and in society at large, to treat miscarriage as a less devastating loss than the loss of a
child that has already been born. Kahlo forbids this attitude when she depicts her fetus as
a fully formed infant with recognizable features who floats away from the mother that
Hilde Lindemann Nelson, Stories and Their Limits: Narrative Approaches to Bioethics (New York:
Routledge, 1997), 193.
103 Eric J. Cassell, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), 32.
102

37

lies grieving for him. From the perspective of narrative medicine, Kahlo reminds her
viewers of the ethical responsibilities incurred as a result of learning her story, of the
imperative to remain open-minded and free of assumption.
In this painting Kahlo has rendered all the aspects of suffering that accompany the
unwanted termination of a deeply desired pregnancy. She has given visual form to the
emotional trauma of physical failings, to the fear and frustration engendered by an
unfamiliar and often threatening medical environment, and most importantly, to the
feelings of loneliness and isolation that almost always accompany unspeakable grief.
In her examination of the techniques authors of fiction use to create empathy in
their readers, Suzanne Keen differentiates between empathy for particular characters and
“situational empathy.” “Situational empathy, which responds primarily to aspects of plot
and circumstance, involves less self-extension in imaginative role taking and more
recognition of prior (or current) experience.”104 When asking students to attempt some
type of empathetic engagement with Henry Ford Hospital, it is obvious that few of the
women and none of the men will be able to access a personal experience of miscarriage.
Even though Kahlo’s work provides invaluable insight into that particular kind of grief, it
is nevertheless important to remember that any experience of illness or injury has the
potential to cause great sorrow. Keen suggests that fiction writers emphasize “common
vulnerabilities and hopes through universalizing representations” in order to create
empathy for characters with whom the reader has nothing in common. 105 Kahlo’s
depiction of blood, indicating a physical wound, the tear, and her rendition of herself in a
vulnerable and precarious physical state are all universalizing elements in the work.
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It is important to remember that any attempt to interpret Frida Kahlo’s thoughts or
experience purely on the basis of her painting is entirely speculative. Any interpretation
made by the viewer will not necessarily be an accurate interpretation of what Kahlo
intended to express. The work is extraordinarily useful in the pedagogy of medical
humanities, however, because of its ability to stimulate an empathetic reaction in the
viewer and because it allows such a thorough exploration of the elements of narrative.
When interacting with living patients, the caregiver must continually verify his or her
interpretations with the patient. In discussing the narrative elements of Kahlo’s work, it
might be helpful to have students consider questions they would like to ask the artist if
she were available and willing to discuss her experience.
Frida Kahlo’s experience of miscarriage represents a traumatic life event in which
the science of medicine had very little to offer. There was no way to fully repair her
reproductive organs or the skeletal cradle that held them. There was no way to save her
unborn child. In recounting a personal experience of feeling medically powerless, Rita
Charon writes, “We had little clinically to offer this man. I did not know, then, that there
is no limit to what one can give as a doctor. I did not know that I was allowed, as a
doctor, to donate my presence, my attention, my regard.”106 This is the essence of
compassion, and there is much that can be perceived and practiced using Henry Ford
Hospital.
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Figure 1
Frida Kahlo

Henry Ford Hospital
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CHAPTER TWO
THE PEDAGOGY OF SELF-AWARENESS: USING LITERATURE TO EXPLORE
ALTERITY AND ADDRESS HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES

“[M]ost of the variability in health status we find in the United States and other
developed countries has little to do with health care and everything to do with one’s
position in the social hierarchy.”107

Donald A. Barr, MD, PhD

In Health Disparities in the United States, Donald Barr presents evidence of
inequalities in disease and death rates that exist along racial and socioeconomic lines in
the United States. He cites extensive evidence documenting poorer health in people of
lower socioeconomic categories,108 but also notes that even when income levels are the
same, black people in the US continue to have much shorter life expectancies than
whites.109 Barr references the work of Michael Marmot, who has described a “status
syndrome” showing a correlation between social status and health regardless of
income.110 Marmot writes, “Conventional explanations for noncommunicable disease –
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lack of access to medical care, unhealthy lifestyles – at best only partially explain the
status syndrome. Rather, the lower individuals are in the social hierarchy, the less likely
it is that the fundamental human needs for autonomy and to be integrated into society will
be met. Failure to meet these needs leads to metabolic and endocrine changes that in turn
lead to increased risk of disease.”111 In other words, the psychological effects of one’s
social status are an important determinant of physical health regardless of lifestyle or
access to healthcare. Although societal factors play a key, and often unrecognized, role
in health and longevity, Barr also reports, “blacks and other minority racial/ethnic groups
continue to receive less care and care that is of lower quality than whites.”112 Barr cites
the presence of unconscious individual racial biases as the primary reason for this
disparity.113
Miller and Garran have noted that racism remains pervasive in the United States
and often takes the form of unintentional aversion and racial microaggression.114 This
aversion and microaggression “occurs when white people hold implicit attitudes about
people of color – often at odds with a white person’s conscious beliefs or intentions – that
lead to negative interactions with people of color.”115 Barr points out that in more than
twenty years of medical practice he has “never seen a case of conscious racism on the
part of my physician colleagues.”116
This chapter addresses three key findings noted in the previously mentioned
research: (1) Persons living at the lower levels of societal hierarchies have a lower life

Ibid.
Barr, Health Disparities in the United States: Social Class, Race, Ethnicity, and Health, 200.
113 Ibid., 224.
114 Miller and Garran, Racism in the United States: Implications for the Helping Professions, Chapter 2.
115 Ibid., 96. Italics mine.
116 Barr, Health Disparities in the United States: Social Class, Race, Ethnicity, and Health, xi.
111
112

42

expectancy and increased risk of disease, (2) minority groups in the US receive lower
quality healthcare than whites, and (3) the quality of healthcare is often affected by
caregiver prejudice and biases that exist at an unconscious level even in persons with
altruistic desires. How do we educate future caregivers so they are cognitively aware of
hierarchical discrepancies in healthcare, and also affectively engaged in a manner that
facilitates positive action to counteract these discrepancies? How do we help students
acknowledge and mitigate their own unconscious prejudices and biases? This chapter
suggests the study of literature offers an effective means of responding to these questions
and presents a critical examination of two works of short fiction selected for their insight
into the perils of status syndrome and their exploration of conscious and unconscious
biases.
In their discussion of literature and the pedagogy of medical humanities, Shapiro
et al., note the twenty-first century discourse in medical education revolving around
virtue-based “professionalism” in medical caregivers.117 In this very recent article the
authors note both the practical benefits of studying literature and the difficulties of
quantitatively measuring the results of such study. They explain how close reading
generates discussion and questions that subsequently inform the practice of caregiving:
“Such an approach, translated into the clinical encounter, is likely to result in a critical
professionalism through respect, engaged attention, and critical thinking within a very
specific context.”118 These observations describe the ways in which close engagement
with literature allows students to explore the world from an unfamiliar perspective by
providing access to cultures and experiences that are not their own. In the words of
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Arthur Frank, “stories work on people, affecting what people are able to see as real, as
possible, and as worth doing or best avoided.”119
Eudora Welty’s “A Worn Path,” first published in 1941, presents an unlikely and
unassuming heroine who engenders deep respect and admiration from readers who come
to know her narrative, and Richard Selzer’s “Imelda,” first published in 1982, introduces
a young physician who discovers the humanity of his mentor, but fails to recognize his
own hubris. Scholars of medical humanities have written about both stories, but the
stories are useful in ways that have not yet been discussed. Welty’s work has been
praised for its power to elicit an empathetic response in the reader,120 but its importance
as a metanarrative exemplifying the concept and quandary of alterity has not been
explored. Selzer’s work, perhaps because its themes are more specifically related to the
practice of medicine, has not been subjected to the type of critical analysis that exposes
its depiction of subtle and unconscious prejudices. In addition, while “A Worn Path” has
been examined as an allegorical tale,121 “Imelda” has not been interpreted through this
hermeneutical lens even though Selzer’s comments and the story itself give clues to the
usefulness of such an approach. Each story has tremendous potential for enlightening
students in ways that will enable them to address racial and societal disparities in
healthcare and to become more aware of their own biases.
Phoenix Jackson, the protagonist of “A Worn Path,” is an elderly black woman
who must travel a great distance on foot to obtain “soothing medicine” for her grandson
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whose throat, Phoenix tells the nurse, “begin to close up again, and he not able to
swallow. He not get his breath. He not able to help himself.”122 Phoenix encounters
many obstacles along her way, which anchors the story firmly within the genre of “road
literature,” a figurative exploration of the journey of life.123
Phoenix’s journey begins in December, on “a bright frozen day in the early
morning.”124 We are told that Phoenix is very old and small, and that her eyes are “blue
with age.”125 Phoenix struggles to climb a hill, and then is caught in a thicket of briars on
the way down. At one point, she must cross a creek by means of a fallen log. Phoenix
walks the log and crosses the water with her eyes closed, relying on memory and intuition
while dispelling fear and apprehension. She crawls through a barbed wire fence, and is
knocked to the ground by a large black dog – “Over she went in the ditch, like a little puff
of milkweed.”126 A hunter who laughs at her and presumes to know the nature of her
journey helps her to her feet; “I know you old colored people! Wouldn’t miss going to
town to see Santa Claus!”127 He later points his gun at Phoenix and then grudgingly
admires her composure; “’Well Granny,’ he said, ‘you must be a hundred years old, and
scared of nothing . . . But you take my advice and stay home, and nothing will happen to
you.’”128 When she finally reaches Natchez, Phoenix must climb “a tower of steps,
where she walked up and around and around until her feet knew to stop.”129
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In addition to threats against her physical wellbeing, Phoenix must also contend
with psychological obstacles. She experiences hallucinations brought on by fatigue and
is fearful of large objects such as a scarecrow, which she initially believes to be a ghost,
because her failing vision does not enable her to correctly identify them. The reader, who
has made the journey along with Phoenix, comes to regard her as unfailingly courageous
and intelligent. We admire her determination and find ourselves feeling deep respect for
her dignity and fortitude in the face of difficult and often demeaning obstructions.
When Phoenix finally reaches the clinic, however, the attendant’s first words are,
“A charity case, I suppose,”130 a supposition based entirely upon Phoenix’s appearance –
her age, skin color, and clothing – because Phoenix has not yet spoken a word. A nurse
enters and informs the attendant, “Oh, that’s just old Aunt Phoenix. She doesn’t come for
herself – she has a little grandson. She makes these trips just as regular as clockwork.
She lives away back off the Old Natchez Trace.”131 When questioned about her
grandson, Phoenix, in a response that could be interpreted either as confusion or subtle
defiance, remains silent for a few moments. The nurse responds, “You mustn’t take up
our time this way, Aunt Phoenix. Tell us quickly about your grandson, and get it over.
He isn’t dead, is he?”132 The nurse and the attendant have no time to consider the details
of Phoenix’s journey; they are uninterested in her narrative and therefore have no
knowledge of her fortitude and no respect for her tremendous strength and wisdom.
“A Worn Path is a metanarrative in which Phoenix’s personal narrative is
available to the reader, but not to the other characters within the tale. The white people
Phoenix encounters throughout the story draw immediate conclusions based upon her
Ibid.
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appearance and refer to her as “granny,” “grandma,” and “old Aunt Phoenix,” assuming
a derogatory familiarity they believe is justified because Phoenix is aged, poor, and not
white. The other characters assume Phoenix is simpleminded and incapable and they
render her mute, both literally and figuratively. Readers, on the other hand, are aware of
Phoenix’s poetic intelligence, her strength, and her dignity. Phoenix requires assistance
from both the hunter and the healthcare workers, and in both cases the response is first to
infer, and then to insist upon, Phoenix’s absolute powerlessness; the hunter achieves this
with his gun and the caregivers with their words.
Literary scholars have variously interpreted “A Worn Path” as an allegorical
representation of the Christian faith,133 a mythological tale of rebirth,134 an appeal for
liberation theology,135 and an allegory of the African-American struggle for equality
following the Civil War.136 As a source of enlightenment regarding persistent healthcare
disparities in the United States, however, it becomes important to interpret the story less
figuratively and to carefully consider the characters of Phoenix and her grandson.
In a 2005 interview for Sooner Magazine, published by the University of
Oklahoma, Dr. Jerry Vannatta recalled a time when he had difficulty establishing an
emotional connection with one of his patients. Vannatta is a white male and his patient,
like Phoenix Jackson, was an elderly African American woman. As the patient described
a situation from her life, Vannatta recalled a passage from the novel Beloved, by Toni
Morrison; “the emotions I felt when I read that scene, came back to me in a flood and
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were available to me so I could connect with my patient. She was telling me a story
about her economic enslavement; the two stories joined. From that point on, we began to
make a more meaningful bond and rapidly solved her problem about her ability to buy
her medications.”137 So long as one remains cognizant of human singularity, recalling an
empathic connection to a literary character in order to address a real life problem can
become a useful means of bridging the chasm of alterity. Vannatta describes an
emotional response to Morrison’s work, and it is this affective engagement that makes
literature so valuable to healthcare workers.
In his discussion of literary hermeneutics Hans-Georg Gadamer writes, “The
important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself in all
its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings . . .
Methodologically conscious understanding will be concerned not merely to form
anticipatory ideas, but to make them conscious, so as to check them and thus acquire
right understanding from the things themselves.”138 If part of the reason we utilize
literature in the pedagogy of medical humanities is to increase awareness of our own
unconscious biases, we must first consider the biases we hold quite consciously. A
typical student response (and reader response in general, I suspect) to “A Worn Path” is
the formation of a strong sympathetic engagement with the character of Phoenix.
Students express their desire to help Phoenix, to provide her transportation to the clinic or
perhaps arrange home visits. These responses are altruistic and well-meaning, but they
also exemplify the paternalism inherent in the practice of healthcare and help clarify the
difference between sympathy and empathy. Engagement with the story and
Debra Levy Martinelli, “Medicine and Literature,” Sooner Magazine, Fall 2005.
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conscientious attention to its effects on the reader sheds light the social exchanges that
render Phoenix powerless.
One might argue that a story from 1941, a period in time when overt racism was
routinely practiced and tolerated, has little relevance to modern healthcare, but today’s
more subtle forms of racism and ageism are no less harmful. As recently as 1992, in fact,
one scholar wrote that the character of the hunter demonstrates genuine concern and
admiration for Phoenix, that the white woman in Natchez ties Phoenix’s shoes out of
respect, and that the nurse shows Phoenix compassion!139 That a late twentieth century
reader of this story could so completely misread the blatant condescension and disrespect
these characters demonstrate is clear evidence that we often fail to acknowledge those
parts of ourselves and our society that are most deeply troublesome. In healthcare there
will always exist a power imbalance between the sick person and the caregiver simply
because the ill person requires information and services that healthcare workers have the
power to provide or withhold. In spite of corporatization of healthcare, the manner,
timing, and efficiency with which these things are provided continues to lie primarily
with individual caregivers. It is therefore imperative that caregivers recognize attitudes
that disempower patients even when the caregiver means to be helpful.
In 1997 Anne Fadiman authored a groundbreaking non-fictional work titled The
Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down: A Hmong Child, Her American Doctors, and the
Collision of Two Cultures. A primary theme of the book is the existence of healthcare
that is state of the art, but “culturally inaccessible” due to language barriers, fear, or
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simple ignorance on the part of both caregivers and their patients.140 This text changed
the way healthcare is practiced at Mercy Medical Center in Merced, California and made
a significant contribution to the discourse on cultural sensitivity in healthcare throughout
the country.141 In the 2012 afterward to the second edition of the book, Fadiman notes
that terms like “cultural humility” and “cultural responsiveness” are replacing the
ubiquitous “cultural competence,” and are being used to promote some sense of parity
between caregivers and their patients as they seek mutual understanding.142
In “A Worn Path,” it is Phoenix Jackson’s place within the cultural and social
hierarchy that influences the response of her caregivers. Her age and appearance
determine her status and affect the treatment she receives. These facts must guide any
interpretation of the story if it is to be meaningful to students of medical humanities. In
discussing the effects of status syndrome, Marmot notes that ordinary life occurrences
become detrimental to health and wellbeing “when there is low control and little
predictability.”143 Caregivers hoping to benefit from reading “A Worn Path” must resist
the urge to rescue Phoenix. We must avoid sympathetic observation and instead attempt
to mitigate any alterity by allowing ourselves to imaginatively become the character of
Phoenix. One of the most important, and overlooked, aspects of this story is the fact that
caregivers never once ask Phoenix what she wants or needs.
This issue of alterity becomes important when asking students to attempt an
empathetic rather than sympathetic engagement with the character of Phoenix because, as
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multiple studies have shown, humans are more likely to empathize with others whom
they believe to be most like themselves.144 This effect can be mitigated, however,
through the practice of “role taking”: “A number of investigations have found that
observers will experience parallel affective responses when they step outside their usual
perspective on events and entertain the perspective of the target.”145 In other words,
participants who are acting as observers in various psychological experiments, are more
likely to experience emotions similar to those of the target participants when they
consciously and deliberately imagine themselves as the target participant rather than the
observer.
My observation in teaching “A Worn Path” is that students identify most readily
with the caregivers at the clinic, and sometimes with the hunter. They then begin to
describe ways in which their own behavior would be different from that of those
characters if they were faced with a similar situation. This is quite a useful exercise, of
course, but what becomes even more useful is to have the students imaginatively assume
the character of Phoenix, and then closely read the portion of the story in which Phoenix
becomes silent as the nurse is questioning her:
“Now, how is the boy?” asked the nurse.
Old Phoenix did not speak
“I said, how is the boy?”
But Phoenix only waited and stared straight ahead,
her face very solemn and withdrawn into rigidity.
“Is his throat any better?” asked the nurse. “Aunt
Phoenix, don’t you hear me? Is your grandson’s throat any
better since last time you came for the medicine?”
With her hands on her knees, the old woman waited,
silent, erect and motionless, just as if she were in armor.
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“You mustn’t take up our time this way, Aunt
Phoenix,” the nurse said. “Tell us quickly about your
grandson, and get it over. He isn’t dead, is he?”
At last there came a flicker and then a flame of
comprehension across her face, and she spoke.
“My grandson. It was my memory had left me.
There I sat and forgot why I made my long trip.”
Phoenix’s actions in this passage have been interpreted as the onset of senility,146
and even as an indication that Phoenix’s grandson is, in fact, already dead,147 but the
most plausible explanation comes from Elaine Orr, who notes, “Here [Phoenix] employs
silence rather than narrative invention to rebel against white and male ‘author-izations’ of
her journey as (m)other.”148 In understanding Phoenix’s silence as an act of quiet
defiance against the caregivers’ condescension, we can begin to understand the absence
of autonomy that is such a crucial element of this story, and the ways in which reflexive
responses often perpetuate rather than relieve that absence.
Near the end of “A Worn Path” it is revealed that Phoenix needs medicine for her
grandson’s throat because he had swallowed lye two or three years prior to Phoenix’s
most recent journey.149 In a revelatory article exploring the conditions of lye poisoning,
Melissa Stang demonstrates how expertly Welty has indeed rendered the implications of
status syndrome; “One 1939 study in the Southern Medical Journal, just a year before
Welty wrote her story reported that although esophageal burns from lye were very
common throughout the southern region, sixty percent of patients seen by doctors were
black, and almost all of the remaining white patients were children of tenant farmers . . .
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They surmised that these cases occurred as a result of poverty, a lack of both education
and information on the dangers of lye poisoning.”150 Including Stang’s article as
required reading for students studying “A Worn Path” provides important contextual
information about the ways in which social hierarchies and isolation contribute to status
syndrome.151 Phoenix tells the nurse, “My little grandson, he sit up there in the house all
wrapped up, waiting by himself. We is the only two left in the world. He suffer and it
don’t seem to put him back at all. He got a sweet look. He going to last.”152 The nurse
responds to Phoenix with impatience, “trying to hush her now.”153 Attention to
Phoenix’s dialog reveals that she is her grandson’s only caregiver and that she is aware
he will outlive her. The medical community’s disregard for Phoenix’s narrative is a
brilliant example of the willful ignorance Peggy McIntosh describes in her seminal
discussion of white privilege, “Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack.”154 The nurse hears
Phoenix’s words, but ignores their implications. The practice of narrative medicine
demands attention to the ethical responsibilities that come with hearing a patient’s
story,155 and there are also ethical implications that come with knowing Phoenix
Jackson’s story even though it is fictional.
In 1965 Louise M. Rosenblatt, professor of comparative literature and literary
theory at New York University, wrote Literature as Exploration, in which she developed
a “transactional” theory of literature that advocates close reading and emphasizes “the
essentiality of both reader and text, in contrast to other theories that make one or the other
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determinate.”156 The book has been reprinted five times and Rosenblatt’s ideas continue
to influence literary scholars and theorists.157 Her theories on pedagogy have recently
been criticized for placing more emphasis on exploring the emotional response of the
reader than on teaching about literature,158 but this approach is precisely what makes
Rosenblatt’s ideas particularly useful to scholars of medical humanities. In our work, the
primary objective of studying literature is not to perform a detailed analysis of the text
itself, but to connect the text and reader in such a way that the reader’s clinical practice is
improved through engagement with the literature.
Rosenblatt breaks the experience of reading into efferent and aesthetic modes,
where efferent reading involves the practical purpose of garnering information from the
text, and aesthetic reading concerns the affective experience of “sensations, feelings,
images, and ideas.”159 She writes that these ways of reading are always in flux, and that
the “shift of attention” from efferent to aesthetic is often ignored or taken for granted.160
In the case of Welty’s story, the efferent implication is the knowledge that we all carry
inherent biases that affect the ways in which we respond to our patients. Recognizing
our tendency to identify with literary characters that are most like us and instead
attempting to identify with the “other” allows the reader a small understanding of an
unfamiliar perspective. The reader thus becomes aware of a tendency to make
assumptions and perhaps to patronize. Critical assessment of our affective response to
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literature allows us to determine whether we are genuinely empathizing with a character
or instead feeling a disempowering form of sympathy.
Similar techniques of close reading and transactional awareness can also be used
to discern the deeper themes in Richard Selzer’s “Imelda.”161 Dr. Selzer was formerly a
practicing surgeon and member of the faculty at Yale School of Medicine, and is the
author of several works of fiction and non-fiction. In the preface to Letters to a Young
Doctor, the collection in which “Imelda” appears, Selzer writes, “These pieces are not,
strictly speaking, factual in the way that a medical textbook is factual. Nor are they
journalism or reportage. They are literary renditions of medicine meant to strike
resonating chords in the reader’s mind.”162
The unnamed narrator of “Imelda” is a young surgeon who writes about a medical
mission trip he had been part of during his third year of medical school. The organizer of
the mission and his former teacher is a brilliant plastic surgeon named Hugh Franciscus.
At a remote village in Honduras the medical team encounters a young woman, Imelda,
who has been brought in by her mother so the girl’s complete cleft lip and palate can be
repaired. Before the surgery begins, Imelda experiences malignant hyperthermia, a rare
type of allergic reaction to anesthesia that causes uncontrollable increases in blood
pressure and body temperature. With no ice available to lower her temperature, Imelda
dies on the operating table. When Dr. Franciscus explains this outcome to the girl’s
mother, the mother believes that Franciscus has managed to repair the cleft palate prior to
the girl’s death; “she was happy now that the harelip had been fixed so that her daughter
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might go to Heaven without it.”163 Franciscus does not correct the mother’s mistaken
assumption and instead steals into the morgue late at night to repair the cleft palate and
lip.
As Daniel Burr has noted, students studying “Imelda” seem initially most
interested in discussing the ethicality of performing surgery on a corpse,164 and this same
dilemma seems paramount to the story’s narrator, who at first sees the older surgeon’s
actions as those “of someone demented, or at least insanely arrogant.”165 The medical
student never speaks of the surgery and later even alters Franciscus’s slide presentation of
the trip in order to prevent anyone else from discovering what the surgeon has done.
Years later, when the younger surgeon learns that Dr. Franciscus has died, he remembers
Imelda and realizes the “unrealistic act was one of goodness.”166
To the best of my knowledge, “Imelda” has been published only twice outside the
realm of medical literature. The story appeared in the Touchstone Anthology of
Contemporary Creative Nonfiction: Work from 1970 to the Present (2007) and in Themes
(2005), a Prentice-Hall textbook designed to accompany freshman composition courses.
Critical commentary on the story has thus been restricted primarily to writers within the
disciplines of healthcare and medical humanities. Johanna Shapiro addresses the story in
her discussion of the clinical gaze,167 and Ed Stieve suggests the story provides useful
insights into ethics, the history of medicine, and cultural studies.168 In discussing the
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story as a means of engagement with literary studies, however, Stieve conflates the
narrator and the author and appears to assume the literal truth of the story.
In the preface to the collection in which “Imelda” appears Selzer writes, “Each of
these chapters is rooted in an event that I have experienced or witnessed. ‘Imelda’ took
place while on a surgical expedition to the Third World,” but he also notes, “I have
roamed the imagination for metaphor, myth, and memory.”169 Much is lost, therefore, if
“Imelda” is read as a literal first-person narrative, and much can be gained from
understanding the mythological nature of the story, considering the young narrator and
the elder Dr. Franciscus as archetypal characters.
In a paper discussing the usefulness of using myths as interpretive metaphors,
Antonio Fernández-Cano et al., write, “Myths are used to tell a story or talk about a
certain event or relevant person in the form of a metaphor. As such, they can be used to
embody, examine and explain certain phenomena and characters. The myth is one of the
enlightening phenomena with the greatest direct influence on the way in which humans
think about their conscience, their history, and the exegesis and hermeneutics of their
seminal texts.”170 There is textual evidence to suggest Selzer has turned to mythology
and metaphor in his rendition of the events in “Imelda.”
In the opening paragraph Selzer writes, “Dr. Franciscus was the archetype of the
professor of surgery,”171 and his use of the word archetype must be considered
deliberate. Carl Jung postulated that the recurring motifs in myths and folklore proved
the existence of biological archetypes present in the psyches of all humans throughout
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time.172 Although the Jungian concept of archetypes as biological has been upended by
genetic research, the notion of archetypes as “universal patterns producing meaning and
guiding development” persists.173 That Dr. Franciscus is indeed a mythological
archetype rather than a stereotypical professor of surgery or the epitome of such a man is
evidenced by the descriptors Selzer’s narrator employs. According to the nameless
young surgeon, Franciscus interprets the human body so skillfully he has “the appearance
of a prophet.”174 To the medical students Franciscus was “someone heroic, someone
made up of several gods . . . if he had grown accustomed to his miracles, we had not.”175
The narrator also tells us Franciscus is an avid deer hunter,176 a piece of information that
seems incongruous and unnecessary except that it aligns Franciscus even more closely
with ancient warrior gods and heroes.
Tragic heroes of Greek mythology often possess a fatal flaw, usually hubris,
which leads to their downfall. Franciscus tells the young narrator, “I’m taking a surgical
team to Honduras next week to operate on the natives down there. I do it every year for
three weeks, somewhere. This year, Honduras.”177 Though Franciscus never explains
why he makes these trips, the reader assumes some sort of humanitarian impulse. Yet
Franciscus’s words, “to operate on the natives,” make his hubris clear. These are not
people with whom Franciscus shares a common humanity; they are natives, a designation
clearly demonstrating Said’s theories of alterity as put forth in Orientalism; “they were
seen through, analyzed not as citizens, or even people, but as problems to be solved . . .
Erik Goodwyn, “Recurrent Motifs as Resonant Attractor States in the Narrative Field: A Testable
Model of Archetype,” Journal of Analytical Psychology 58, no. 3 (2013): 387.
173 Roesler C, “Are Archetypes Transmitted More by Culture than Biology? Questions Arising from
Conceptualizations of the Archetype.,” The Journal of Analytical Psychology 57, no. 2 (2012): 224.
174 Selzer, “Imelda,” 21.
175 Ibid., 22.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid., 23–4.
172

58

The point is that the very designation of something as Oriental [or “native”] involved an
already pronounced evaluative judgment.”178 That Franciscus intends to “operate on”
these “natives” confirms his objectification of the people. Their bodies are things he will
invade, acting upon them as he sees fit.
Franciscus dictates the following plan of care for one of the “natives” suffering
from a carcinoma of the eye and eye socket: “Operative plan: wide excision with
enucleation of the eye. Later, bone and skin grafting.”179 To the nonmedical reader it
might not be clear that enucleation means removal of the eyeball, causing a permanent
and intractable disfigurement and loss of vision. If the nonmedical reader lacks important
information about this plan, how much more oblivious would the patient have been?
While the procedure may have been medically necessary, there is no indication the
patient was informed, consulted, or asked for consent. The text simply notes, “The next
morning we would be in the operating room where the procedure would be carried
out.”180 Franciscus’s hubris lies in his assumption that whatever action he chooses to
take will be beneficial for the less fortunate “natives”.
When Imelda appears at the clinic, she initially refuses to show her face to the
doctors, but is quickly forced to submit to their examination. “Just then, Franciscus
reached up and, taking the hand that held the rag, pulled it away with a hard jerk . . . the
defect was utterly hideous . . . ‘Take her picture,’ he said . . . Through the eye of the
camera she seemed more pitiful than ever, her humiliation more complete . . . There was
the click of the camera. The girl winced. ‘Take three more, just in case.’”181 The
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narrator notices Franciscus seems “awed by the sight of this girl,” and reasons, “Had she
brought her mouth to him willingly, without shame, she would have been for him neither
more nor less than any other patient.”182 What are we to make of this passage? Close
reading suggests a cruelty that has been unremarked by critics who tend to paint
Franciscus as “a brilliant and dedicated physician so driven to achieve perfection he
defies death,”183 or “at once highly competent and arrogant, and as we discover later, a
compassionate practitioner.”184 Yet Franciscus, noticing the girl’s discomfort with being
photographed, demands three more photos. As the narrator makes clear, the sense of
“awe” Franciscus feels for the girl is not due to the unusual nature of her deformity, but
to the fact that she is humiliated before him. In actuality, Franciscus is less a dedicated
and compassionate surgeon than a capricious hero, before whom the less fortunate should
bow. His hubris lies in his absolute certainty that he can improve Imelda’s life by
creating beauty out of chaos. When Imelda dies, Franciscus’s veil of omnipotence is
lifted and we are told he never again undertakes a medical mission trip.185
Franciscus’s encounter with Imelda’s mother after Imelda’s death is genuinely
moving. He accepts the mother’s hand on his arm, and even appears to cry with her over
the loss of her child.186 We come to believe that perhaps the post-mortem surgery is, in
fact, an act of goodness, undertaken to provide Imelda’s mother with the comfort she
needs. And yet, it is also possible that Franciscus was merely preserving his own sense
of importance. In repairing Imelda’s face after her death he ensures that her mother will
continue to be in awe of his power. In fact, one of the most important phrases within the
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description of Franciscus’s encounter with Imelda’s mother reads, “All that hope of love .
. . gone.”187 This sentence makes it clear to the reader that at least part of what drives the
surgeon’s behavior is a desire to preserve his position as hero. There is a tendency to
read “Imelda” sentimentally, as a tale of two physicians who find their humanity through
failure and the realization that all humans suffer. Close reading prevents a superficial
interpretation, however, and allows for more nuanced questioning of the moral of this
story.
If we turn our attention to the young narrator, who tends to present himself as the
innocent pupil, unjaded and still kind, in awe of his master and eager to soak up his
knowledge, we can see that the student, although bilingual and altruistic, also
demonstrates prejudice and biases that affect his ability to be a compassionate caregiver.
Burr notes, “Selzer never reveals the gender of his narrator, but I have found that
male readers assume the narrator is a man, and female readers, a woman.”188 I would
argue that strong evidence of a male gaze makes a female narrator unlikely. Laura
Mulvey first introduced the concept of a male gaze in her 1975 essay “Visual Pleasure
and Narrative Cinema.” The essay uses psychoanalytic theory to offer a critique of “the
way the unconscious of patriarchal society has structured film form.”189 While
psychoanalytic theory and the idea of a patriarchal unconscious may not be tenable to
modern healthcare practitioners, the universal presence of unconscious biases must be
acknowledged if we are to overcome them. Mulvey writes, “In a world ordered by sexual
imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between active/male and passive/female.
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The determining male gaze projects its fantasy onto the female figure, which is styled
accordingly.”190 In “Imelda,” Selzer creates this exact scenario. Franciscus seems
drawn to Imelda because she is humiliated before him, and the narrator is drawn to her
objective beauty. Both characters view Imelda as a potentially perfect sexual object and
set about creating their fantasy, styling her accordingly.
Superficial assessment of the young narrator as an innocent apprentice who
attempts to mitigate Franciscus’s coldness overlooks the narrator’s own tendency to
objectify and sexualize the Honduran patients. In coming to see that even well-meaning
caregivers fall victim to the shadow side of human nature enables students to become
more conscious of their own potential frailties.
Early in the story we learn that the young narrator has been asked to join the
medical mission team because he is fluent in Spanish.191 In spite of the fact that he is
able to communicate with the Honduran people, the student accentuates the alterity
between himself and the Hondurans by relying solely upon his visual assessment of them,
and further complicates this approach by responding judgmentally to what he sees:
“They had flat, broad, dumb museum feet. At first they seemed to me indistinguishable
the one from the other, without animation. All the vitality, the hidden sexuality, was in
their black hair. Soon I was to know them by the fissures with which each face was
graven. But, even so, compared to us, they were masked, shut away.”192
The tendency of medical caregivers to rely upon visual information for diagnosis
was well discussed by Michel Foucault in The Birth of the Clinic, where Foucault traces
an epistemological history of medicine. Foucault discusses the power of the gaze in
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diagnosis, but also emphasizes the importance of non-judgment; “The gaze will be
fulfilled in its own truth and will have access to the truth of things if it rests on them in
silence, if everything keeps silent around what it sees.”193 In describing the Honduran’s
feet as “dumb museum feet,” the narrator appears to compare the living humans he
encounters with museum displays of inanimate figures incapable of thought or speech.
This could be seen as an initial reaction to being immersed in a wholly unfamiliar
environment, perhaps for the first time in his life, but the narrator persists in his
dehumanization of the Hondurans, remarking that when he did come to “know” them, it
was only through the fissures of their individual faces. When the narrator compares the
Hondurans to himself and declares them “masked, shut away,” he places the failure of
connection entirely with the Hondurans.
Repeated references to the sexuality and sensuality of the Honduran’s black hair
almost certainly indicates a heterosexual male narrator unaware of his objectification of
the Hondurans and, in particular, of Imelda. The narrator makes use of poetic metaphor
to describe Imelda, “A thin, dark Indian girl about fourteen years old. A figurine, orangebrown, terra-cotta, and still attached to the unshaped clay from which she had been
carved,” but reverts to decidedly un-poetic prose when describing Imelda’s mother; “The
mother was short and dumpy.”194 Later descriptions of Imelda follow the same pattern:
“The girl had long, loose black hair. . . Even with her in it, the dress was empty,
something hanging on the back of a door. Her breasts made only the smallest imprint in
the cloth, her hips none at all.”195 And, “She seemed to me then like an animal that looks
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outward at the infinite, at death, without fear, with recognition only.”196 Also, “Above the
thing [cleft lip and palate], clear almond eyes and long black hair reflected the light . . .
She was a beautiful bird with a crushed beak.”197 Each description of Imelda is
dehumanizing. She is either an object or an animal. Commentary on her breasts and hips
is invasive and demeaning. Repeated references to her long dark hair draw the reader
back to the narrator’s initial observation that all “the hidden sexuality, was in their black
hair,”198 and make it clear that Imelda is eroticized. Again, it is important to remember
the narrator is capable of communicating with Imelda, but never does. Selzer, the author,
seems aware of his construction of a dehumanizing male gaze when he writes these lines
for his narrator, “Under our gaze the girl’s eyes fell to her lap where her hands lay palms
upward, half open.”199
Both Eudora Welty and Richard Selzer present fictional accounts of healthcare
workers’ interactions with patients whose alterity presents an obstacle to compassionate
care. In both stories, people in positions of power behave in ways that disempower and
dehumanize the Other. In the case of Welty’s caregivers, their assumption of superiority
is obvious; Welty make plain her character’s condescension, but Selzer’s characters’
dehumanization of their patient is far subtler because it lies below the conscious desires
of seemingly altruistic characters.
In her seminal essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” first published in 1985, Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak poses, “the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the
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persistent constitution of the Other as the Self’s shadow.”200 Spivak critiques postcolonial attempts to construct a homogenous subaltern Other and also notes, “If, in the
contest of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the
subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow. . . we meditate upon an elusive
female figure called into the service of colonialism.”201 Spivak critiques not only the
colonial muting of the subaltern female, but also anti-colonial revisionist attempts to
provide the Other’s voice.202 Imelda utters only one word in Selzer’s story, her name, and
the narrator’s description of the sound adds an additional sensory element to the visual
imagery of her appearance; “the syllables leaked through the hole with a slosh and a
whistle,”203 Imelda’s voice is as grotesque as her wound. Imelda, as subaltern female, is
called into the service of God-like surgeons who would “operate on” her, fix her, and
thus provide her a voice. Spivak acknowledges the paradox that colonization often
provided great benefits to the subaltern even in the face of subjugation.204 It is unrealistic
to think that Imelda would not have welcomed the chance to have her defect repaired
considering the embarrassment it seems to cause her or the difficulties she must have had
with eating and speaking, but the fact remains; Imelda’s voice is absent. Selzer’s story
gives the reader no indication of Imelda’s response to Franciscus’s assertion that,
“Tomorrow, I will fix your lip. Mañana.”205 Spivak notes that, when the voice of the
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Other is absent or negated, one explanation and narrative of reality [is] established as the
normative one.206
From the perspective of the medical caregivers they encountered, both Phoenix
Jackson and Imelda Valdez exist as voiceless alterities. How can consideration of the
ways in which these characters were disempowered improve the practices of today’s
medical caregivers? Although they acknowledge, “psychological research on feeling and
emotion has been far from decisive,” David S. Miall and Don Kuiken nevertheless posit
“aesthetic and narrative feelings evoked during reading interact to modify the reader.”207
The researchers suggest:
In literary response, such feelings can roughly be sorted into
four domains: (1) evaluative feelings toward the text, such as the
overall enjoyment, pleasure, or satisfaction of reading a short
story; (2) narrative feelings toward specific aspects of the
fictional event sequence, such as empathy with a character or
resonance with the mood of a setting; (3) aesthetic feelings in
response to the formal (generic, narrative, or stylistic)
components of a text, such as being struck by an apt metaphor;
and (4) self-modifying feelings that restructure the reader’s
understanding of the textual narrative and, simultaneously, the
reader’s sense of self.208
The final two categories of feeling, aesthetic and self-modifying, become most
important when literature is used to provide alternative perspectives or to increase selfawareness. The authors state that aesthetic feelings are stimulated when certain passages
of text captivate the reader and cause him or her to read more slowly and to question the
meaning of a text.209 The young medical student’s descriptions of Imelda incorporate
poetic metaphors that create exactly this type of response in the reader. Miall and Kuiken
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go on to say that aesthetic feelings, those that demand closer attention to the text and a
reimagining of previously held ideas, encourage readers to evaluate and perhaps modify
their traditional ways of seeing.210 What does it mean to view another person as a
figurine made of clay? How would it feel to be thought of as a figurine? An animal? A
bird with a crushed beak? As Miall and Kuiken have noted, not all readers respond
aesthetically to any given work of literature,211 but even those who do not can be
encouraged to think critically about the deeper implications of the figurative language
used in this text.
If we set aside Selzer’s comments regarding his work and view Franciscus and the
narrator as actual people with human characteristics, we may see them in a more
forgiving light and agree with traditional interpretations of Franciscus as a justifiably
confident surgeon whose heart is opened when he grieves the death of a patient. His
response to Imelda’s shame can be seen as one of compassion; the wound itself did not
move him, for he had seen many such wounds, but he was compelled to remove the
embarrassment that caused Imelda’s suffering. Franciscus repairs Imelda’s face after her
death because he shares the grief of Imelda’s mother and wishes to provide her some
comfort. We may view the narrator as a young man searching for a way to describe the
haunting beauty of Imelda and her people, caught up in an experience he had no frame of
reference for communicating. For the typical reader, the story is poignant and thought
provoking.
Stanley Fish is generally considered a founder of reader-response theory, and his
ideas regarding “interpretive communities” are especially useful in considering the lens
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through which scholars of medical humanities must view “Imelda.” Even if we
understand Franciscus and the narrator’s sentiments as guileless, we must not accept
them as moral or just, for to do so mutes the didactic power of the story. Fish contends
that interpretive communities share interpretive strategies “that exist prior to the act of
reading and therefore determine the shape of what is read.”212 The classroom of students
considering careers in healthcare forms an interpretive community. If one goal of this
community is to understand the form of unconscious biases and the prejudices they
engender, we must recognize their presence even in otherwise admirable literary
characters and thus become better able to recognize them in ourselves.
As previously mentioned, Shapiro et al., recently discussed the value of literature
in the development of “professionalism” in medical caregivers. They describe this
professionalism as “virtue-based attributes such as altruism, trust, honesty, patient
empowerment, and commitment to social justice,”213 and assert, “Close reading requires
a wariness of superficial and facile interpretations, a clinical position that helps the
clinician avoid bias, assumptions and judgmentalness.”214 In an astute observation that
beautifully illuminates the value of a more critical reading of “Imelda” the authors note,
“Studying literature and reading stories reveal that even such enshrined professionalism
values as compassion do not necessarily always serve moral ends; and point out ways in
which such values need to be interrogated more critically to understand how they might
go astray.”215

Stanley Fish, “Interpreting the Variorum,” in The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed.
(New York: Norton, 2010), 1990.
213 Shapiro et al., “Medical Professionalism,” 2.
214 Ibid., 3.
215 Ibid., 4–5.
212

68

If we return to the original problems set forth in this chapter – healthcare
disparities that result from social hierarchies that impair individual autonomy, and
unconscious biases that lead to unintended acts of prejudice – we can see how close
reading and discerning interpretations of “Imelda” and “A Worn Path” illuminate the
mindsets and inclinations that perpetuate both the hierarchies and the biases. Students
must, of course, be made aware of existing healthcare discrepancies, and the work of both
Barr and Marmot are important sources of factual information. Literature is far more
useful, however, in fostering the kind of self-exploration that allows individual caregivers
to become aware of, and work to mitigate, their own constructions of alterity,
subconscious and otherwise. Deep engagement with literature helps reveal our
tendencies to judge, objectify, and patronize. We can only work to counteract these
tendencies if we are aware of their existence.

69

CHAPTER THREE
THE PEDAGOGY OF BIOETHICS: USING DRAMATIC LITERATURE TO
INTRODUCE VIRTUES AND PRINCIPLES

“Great dramatic art addresses itself to our love of learning; it can overcome
prejudices and preconceptions, and teach us to see the world and ourselves in a new
way.”216
Martha Nussbaum

The field of bioethics seeks to apply the principles and processes of philosophical
inquiry to dilemmas brought about by extraordinary developments in modern medical
treatment and research. This chapter briefly introduces the major theories of bioethics
and asserts that, because most general undergraduate students have not yet been exposed
to clinical dilemmas, bioethics, or perhaps even general philosophy, literature and the
visual arts once again offer an important means of instilling key concepts. In addition,
this chapter considers the question of what it means to be a virtuous person. Medical
caregivers, because of their training and expertise, hold an inherent position of power in
relation to their patients who are, because of illness or injury, often at their most
Martha Nussbaum, “Consequences and Character in Sophocles’ Philoctetes,” Philosophy and
Literature 1, no. 1 (1976): 26, doi:10.1353/phl.1976.0004.
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vulnerable. In this position of power, character matters. I believe the majority of students
who choose careers in healthcare do so because they are genuinely altruistic and wish to
be of service, however evidence demonstrates that the ability to feel and express
compassion may be subverted by a for-profit healthcare industry and a medical culture
that seems to value scientific knowledge over human kindness.217 It is therefore
important for students to understand the concept of virtue and, through a process of selfexploration that can be guided by the study of literature and art, develop a frame of
reference for maintaining their own virtue as they pursue a very demanding profession.
Two works of dramatic literature, one ancient and the other modern, will be used
to immerse students in the questions and concerns of contemporary bioethics, thereby
encouraging reflection, discussion, and the formation of individual interpretations of
complex philosophical theories. As with other chapters in this dissertation, the literature
is but one piece of a pedagogy that begins with the introduction of key vocabulary and
concepts and continues with the exploration of these ideas through the study of literature
and art.
Students who continue a course of study related to some aspect of healthcare will
likely encounter an introductory bioethics course in which theories are presented and
subsequently applied to case studies taken from actual clinical experience. For general
undergraduates, most of whom are as yet unfamiliar with the world of clinical practice,
exploring the important tenets of bioethics through literature rather than case studies has
many advantages. Dramatic works of art from ancient and modern eras confirm the
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universality and timelessness of ethical quandaries. In addition, fictional characters and
situations demonstrate the importance of narrative in determining what each individual
values most highly in times when difficult choices must be made. Readers are privy to
the innermost desires and fears of literary characters in a way that does not often happen
in real life but that can nevertheless provide insight into human nature and motivation.
Finally, I would argue that discussion of the ethical dilemmas of fictional characters
allows students greater freedom to explore their own reactions and responses than do case
studies involving actual people. While it is important for readers to form an empathetic
connection to fictional characters (most would say this what makes a work moving and
meaningful) the absence of real life consequences and time constraints allows the
exploration of multiple possibilities and the formation of alternate scenarios and
outcomes.
Multiple theoretical constructs come into play within the larger discipline of
bioethics, and although the developers and proponents of each seem to believe their own
theory is completely sufficient for resolving ethical dilemmas, the fact is that each
approach has attributes and shortcomings. Virtue ethics places premium importance on
the moral character of medical practitioners, arguing that caregivers should possess
specific virtues such as compassion, discernment, trustworthiness, integrity, and
conscientiousness, in order to provide competent, ethical care.218 Principlism, arguably
the theory most often taught and applied,219 proposes four principles – autonomy,
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice – that should guide ethical decision making in

218
219

Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 40.
Gert, Culver, and Clouser, Bioethics: A Systematic Approach, 17.

72

healthcare.220 Principlism is a deontological approach to ethics, arguing for the
importance of rules of conduct and proper action over aspects of character. Casuistry
rejects the idea that a single unified theory can be applied to all ethical dilemmas, and
suggests a case-by-case approach that relies on precedents and previously established
paradigms.221 Narrative Ethics argues that proficient use of any ethical theory requires
narrative competence,222 i.e., the ability to “recognize, absorb, interpret, and be moved by
the stories of illness,”223 and posits that such attention to narrative is not only beneficial,
but ethically mandated.
Difficult and binding decisions must often be made in the practice of healthcare,
and it is human nature to hope there will be one right answer to complex ethical
dilemmas and that this answer can be found if one asks the right questions or knows the
right theories. The fact is, however, some disagreements are not perfectly resolvable, and
there are often cases where more than one solution is morally acceptable.224 It is better,
then, to provide students with suitable guides for inquiry and examination than to portray
bioethics as a means of finding certainty in the face of moral quandaries. Philoctetes, an
ancient Greek drama and W;t, a Pulitzer Prize winning medical drama, each present
ethical dilemmas with solutions that perhaps seem obvious, but upon closer evaluation,
prove complex and confounding. Encouraging students to work through any initial
certainty as they apply the precepts of bioethical theories to the quandaries presented in
the dramas, allows expanded awareness, the practice of critical thinking, and the
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development of intellectual conscientiousness. But how does consideration of this
literature aid in the development of virtuous character?
Examining the goals of ethics education, William Frey discusses the ways in
which such education may be used not only to teach the characteristics of virtue, but also
the “skills and competencies of moral expertise.”225 In other words, he suggests a
pedagogy that goes beyond teaching what it means to be virtuous, and includes the
expectation that such knowledge will be internalized, thereby fostering virtuous behavior.
But perhaps a more salient question in the debate about whether or not virtue can be
taught is; can we make students want to be virtuous? Practically speaking, students who
care about developing and maintaining a virtuous character will make use of what this
type of pedagogy has to offer while those whose interests lie elsewhere may not. As Ann
Marie Begley notes, however, that should not keep us from making an effort to mold
virtuous character in those who care for the sick.226
In discussing the “pedagogical implications of moral psychology,” Frey lists four
goals and objectives for teaching virtue:
1. Stimulate the moral imagination of students.
2. Help students recognize moral issues.
3. Help students analyze key moral concepts and
principles.
4. Help students to accept the likelihood of ambiguity and
disagreement on moral matters, while at the same time
attempting to strive for clarity and agreement insofar as
it is reasonably attainable.227
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This pedagogical model recognizes the importance of practicing virtue. It affirms
that desiring a virtuous character, while important, is not enough to ensure its presence,
especially in the face of conflicting interests and objectives. Developing and maintaining
essential virtues requires deliberate attention and intention, skills that can be modeled in
the classroom. According to Frey, “Moral skill sets can be taught successfully but
require extensive practice accompanied by expert feedback.”228 Frey describes moral
imagination as, “the ability to project into the standpoint of others.”229 This skill is not
unlike empathy, and it, along with the other three objectives, can be practiced in the
classroom using close reading of literature along with written and verbal reflection, as
will be demonstrated in the remainder of this chapter.
Sophocles’ Philoctetes was first performed in Athens in 409 BCE and won first
prize at the festival of Dionysus.230 It tells the story of Philoctetes, a hero of the Trojan
War made famous in Homer’s Iliad. Philoctetes commanded seven ships for the Greeks,
but before he ever reached Troy he was bitten by a snake at the temple of the goddess
Chryse. His wound was so foul-smelling and his cries of pain so distracting, that
Odysseus, commander of the Greek forces, abandoned Philoctetes on the deserted island
of Lemnos.231
During the tenth year of the Trojan War Odysseus received a prophecy that the
Greeks could not win without the invincible bow of Heracles, whose arrows never miss
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their target.232 Upon his death and apotheosis, Heracles had bequeathed his bow to
Philoctetes, the only person brave and compassionate enough to light Heracles’ funeral
pyre thus ending the suffering Heracles’ endured after unknowingly donning a poisoned
cloak.233 The bow remained with Philoctetes on the island of Lemnos for the ten years of
his isolation. As the play opens, Odysseus has returned to Lemnos for the bow, but he
knows Philoctetes now despises him, and has thus implored Neoptolemus, son of
Achilles, to trick Philoctetes and seize the bow.234
Although Philoctetes is perhaps lesser known to general audiences than other
Greek tragedies, it might be familiar to journal-reading physicians because of occasional
attempts to diagnose the hero’s wound. In 1989, Stefano suggested Philoctetes suffered
from a venous ulcer.235 Grassi, Farina, and Cervini later argued for acute gouty arthritis,
and suggested Sophocles was describing his own pain.236 In 2000, Bryceson, noted that
Grassi et al., “ignore at least five essential points in the case history,” and suggested a
diagnosis of mycetoma, a fungal infection.237 Bryceson goes on to say, “Philoctetes’ case
illustrates nicely the need to take a careful travel history, and to pay attention to all the
patient’s complaints.”238 More recently, Horton Johnson diagnosed an infection with
staph aureus,239 and Mark Powlson countered (perhaps tongue-in-cheek), “Dr. Horton
Johnson, in his appraisal of Philoctetes’ foot perhaps does not take sufficient account of
Sophocles, Philoctetes, trans. Judith Affleck, Cambridge Translations from Greek Drama
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), line 113.
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the malevolence of centaurs . . . the underlying cause of the condition was quite probably
Burkholderia mallei,” 240 a bacterium that can cause infection in both horses and humans.
Urso and Farella note, “Every myth contains an unalterable core, representing its point of
contact with reality . . . The core of Philoctetes’s myth is a disease, which, in the
Sophoclean tragedy, is presented in the foreground . . . allowing the opportunity to
analyze all available elements and to attempt a clinicopathologic investigation, in the
hopes of identifying his affliction.”241 In an effort to account for all Philoctetes’
symptoms, Urso and Farella conclude that he suffered both fungal and bacterial
infections as sequelae of the snakebite.242
These interpretations of Philoctetes as a case history exemplify a medical
tendency to focus on corporeal phenomena at the expense of the many other insights
offered by the drama. Approaching physical maladies as puzzles to be solved should not
necessarily be discouraged since any sick person hopes for a physician skilled in
diagnosis, but much is lost when physical diagnosis is stripped from its narrative context.
It is important to remember, however, that these diagnostic approaches to Philoctetes also
demonstrate the medical community’s desire for practical benefits to the academic study
of literature.
A review of the philosophical scholarship related to Philoctetes yields more
theoretical observations and has important implications for learning to see beyond the
mechanics of illness. Philosophers tend to focus on the moral characteristics of Odysseus
and Neoptolemus, or on the wider implications for society as a whole. Two primary
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ethical dilemmas are presented in Philoctetes. A conflict exists because the Greek army
will suffer defeat at the hands of the Trojans unless Philoctetes, with his invincible bow,
can be persuaded to join the fight,243 but Philoctetes has refused to do so on the grounds
that, because Odysseus abandoned him, he owes no debt of loyalty to the Greeks.244 The
second conflict lies within the character of Neoptolemus, who must choose whether to
honor his personal sense of integrity245 or his commitment to the Greek army.246
Martha Nussbaum has written extensively on the moral implications of Greek
tragedy, and views Philoctetes as a man “undeserving of his misfortune, and who tells us
explicitly that similar misfortunes might befall any human being.”247 Nussbaum asserts
that Odysseus seeks to use Philoctetes as a means to an end and considers this a
consequence of living “in a world of moral blindness.”248 She finds in Philoctetes a
victim worthy of sympathy because he has retained his agency in the face of horrendous
circumstances noting, “Philoctetes retains the capacity for friendship that eventually wins
him his cure.”249
In a closer examination of the character of Odysseus, Nussbaum writes,
I would like to argue that Sophocles portrays Odysseus as a man
who accords ultimate value to states of affairs, and, specifically, to
the state of affairs which seems to represent the greatest possible
good of all citizens. He gives his approval to any action which he
believes will best promote the general welfare, and resists the
argument that there are certain actions which should not be done
by an agent because of his character and principles, decrying this
view as a form of squeamishness.250
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Although Nussbaum recognizes Odysseus’ concern for the general welfare of others, she
also notes, “The social system administered by an Odyssean is characterized by great
emphasis on secrecy and plotting, together with a demand for blind obedience from the
non-rulers.”251 One could also make the case, however, that this is what we expect from a
good leader – a strong grasp of the intricacies of human nature, and a willingness to stay
focused on the larger picture, in this case, the welfare of the Greek army and
consequently, of all the Greeks. G. J. Warnock explains the utilitarian philosophy of
morality as follows; “An action is morally right if, and only if, it produces at least as
great a balance of value over disvalue as any available alternative action.”252 Seen in this
light, Odysseus’s concern for the welfare of the Greeks over that of Philoctetes is a
morally right action.
In combing the play for insights into political justice, Aristide Tessitore notes the
conflict between justice that seeks the common good and justice that provides
retribution.253 Philoctetes’ own sense of justice underlies his motivation for refusing to
accompany Neoptolemus and seek treatment for his wound.254 According to Tessitore,
because Philoctetes sees the system of reward and punishment as the duty of the gods, his
refusal to accompany Odysseus becomes a religious objection.255 Odysseus, on the other
hand, expresses a more utilitarian and consequentialist view of justice in which victory

Ibid., 38.
G. J. Warnock, “The Object of Morality,” in Philosophical Ethics: An Introduction to Moral
Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 35.
253 Aristide Tessitore, “Justice, Politics, and Piety in Sophocles’ ‘Philoctetes,’” The Review of Politics 65,
no. 1 (2003): 61.
254 Sophocles, Philoctetes, l. 1070–76.
255 Tessitore, “Justice, Politics, and Piety in Sophocles’ ‘Philoctetes,’” 76.
251
252

79

must be sought by any means possible.256 The character of Neoptolemus has yet another
view of justice.
In his state of disability and disease we can, as the previously mentioned medical
writers have done, consider Philoctetes a patient. Neoptolemus, the only character to
acknowledge Philoctetes’ needs in addition to those of the Greeks, becomes his potential
caregiver. In addition, Neoptolemus pledges his assistance to Philoctetes when
Philoctetes is at his most vulnerable, promising to stay with Philoctetes and guard his
bow while Philoctetes is incapacitated by a spasm of pain:
PHILOCTETES: Oh, child! Take courage. Its attacks are
sharp, but they are quickly over.
Please, I beg you, don’t leave me on my own.
NEOPTOLEMUS: Don’t worry, we’ll wait.
PHILOCTETES: You will?
NEOPTOLEMUS: Be sure of it.
PHILOCTETES: I feel it’s not right to place you under oath,
child.
NEOPTOLEMUS: Just as it would be wrong for me to go
without you.
PHILOCTETES: Give me your hand on it.
NEOPTOLEMUS: My hand says I will wait.257
This verbal contract signifies Neoptolemus’ intention to care for Philoctetes and
affirms that he considers his obligation binding. While the term ‘justice’ defies a singular
definition, the principle of justice as outlined by proponents of principlism refers more
specifically to distributive justice, defined by Beauchamp and Childress as, “fair,
equitable, and appropriate distribution determined by justified norms that structure the
terms of social cooperation.”258 Yet, even if we confine our consideration of justice to
the distributive realm, there are still multiple theories that “attempt to connect properties
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of persons with morally justifiable distributions of benefits and burdens.259 Marooning
Philoctetes on an uninhabited island reduces the burden of his illness to a single person,
which may be considered a just action, but it also subverts the principle of autonomy, or
Philoctetes’ ability to act “freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan,”260
In addition, we must concede that what Philoctetes deems beneficent, to be
returned to his homeland without ever again visiting Troy,261 Neoptolemus knows to be a
most unhelpful course of action.262 Beauchamp and Childress define the principle of
beneficence as “the moral obligation to act for the benefit of others,”263 and further state,
“Promoting the welfare of patients – not merely avoiding harm – embodies medicine’s
goal, rationale, and justification.”264 Recognizing his own frustration with Philoctetes’
adamant refusal to accept the help being offered, Neoptolemus initially considers whether
his agreement with Philoctetes remains binding, and tells Philoctetes, “People who cling
to self-inflicted injuries, like you, have no right to anyone’s sympathy or pity.”265
Neoptolemus is not referring to the wound as self-inflicted, but to the unnecessary
continuation of Philoctetes’ suffering. Neoptolemus reminds Philoctetes that it is
possible to maintain his autonomy and still provide help to the Greeks,
You will never find rest from this sickening affliction as
long as the sun continues to rise and set where it does,
unless you go of your own free will to the plain of Troy,
meet with the sons of Asclepius who are with us there, and
find relief from this disease; you, together with these
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weapons and my help, will be known as the one who sacked
the citadel.266
Philoctetes acknowledges Neoptolemus’ good intentions, but continues to believe
it would be wrong to fight on behalf of those who have shown him such tremendous
dishonor. He entreats Neoptolemus, “When you took my right hand, you vowed you
would take me home. Do that for me, child.”267 After being reminded of his duty,
Neoptolemus agrees and in return Philoctetes promises to use his invincible bow to
protect Neoptolemus and his homeland from the wrath of the Greeks.268 Although
Neoptolemus has honored both his commitment to Philoctetes and Philoctetes’
autonomy, his actions have placed the entire Greek army, as well as himself and the
people of his homeland, in grave danger. Many would argue against the wisdom of this
decision, and they would not be wrong. Neoptolemus’ actions toward Philoctetes display
beneficence and respect Philoctetes’ autonomy, but they nevertheless place a great many
others at risk, thereby subverting the principle of justice.
At first glance, a reader might agree completely with Neoptolemus’ assertion that
Philoctetes’ behavior is utterly selfish and does not warrant the devotion of his potential
caregiver. In fact, Philoctetes has been discussed as a non-compliant patient with an
attachment to misery whose attitudes sabotage his own healing.269 But his unwavering
refusal to accompany Neoptolemus to Troy does contain a small grain of altruism. As
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Philoctetes makes clear, his animosity toward Odysseus goes beyond the personal, and
includes a wish never to see such a man in charge of the wellbeing of others.270
Considering Philoctetes through the lens of principlism might lead us to side with
Odysseus and deem as most worthy the actions that benefit the greatest number of
people. We might conclude that the principle of justice overrides the principle of
autonomy in this case, especially since it appears that Philoctetes’ desires come, at least
in part, from a place of prideful arrogance. The principle of autonomy is the driving
force behind the rules of informed consent and is often considered a safeguard against
medical paternalism, but it “is not excessively individualistic (thereby neglecting the
social nature of individuals and the impact of individual choices and actions on
others)”271
Encouraging students to consider Odysseus’s actions through the lens of
principlism allows them to reflect upon the concept of duty as it relates to ethical
decision-making. Odysseus was bound by his duty to the Greek army and this influenced
both his decision to abandon Philoctetes and his decision to retrieve the bow through
subterfuge. Neoptolemus is unable to accept this course of action, however, because it
conflicts with his perception of personal virtue.272
Describing the characteristics of virtue ethics, Pellegrino writes,
Virtue theories focus on the agent; on his or her intentions,
dispositions, and motives; and on the kind of person the moral agent
becomes, wishes to become, or ought to become as a result of his or
her habitual disposition to act in certain ways. . . In a purely virtuebased ethic, the normative standard is the good person, the person
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upon whom one can rely habitually to be good and to do the good
under all circumstances.273
Acknowledging the problem of what one defines as good in a general sense,
Pellegrino nevertheless argues that it is possible to determine what is good within the
discipline of healthcare,274 and also observes that the application of any kind of bioethical
theory will continue to “depend on the kind of persons carrying out the moral acts and
their analyses.”275 Pellegrino believes it is reasonable to expect healthcare providers to be
virtuous because of the unique nature of the caregiver-patient relationship; “The promise
made to the dependent patient directs the knowledge, techniques, and personal
commitment of the physician or nurse to the telos of the relationship – helping and
healing.”276 He lists seven essential virtues for healthcare providers: fidelity to trust and
promise, benevolence, effacement of self-interest, compassion and caring, intellectual
honesty, justice, (which he describes as a covenant between caregiver and patient rather
than a commitment to distributive justice) and prudence.277 Pellegrino does not suggest
virtuous character as the single determinant of ethical behavior, and points out that every
“moral event” will involve “the agent, the act, the circumstance, and the consequence,”
but nevertheless argues for attention to and cultivation of virtue in healthcare
providers.278
Returning to Philoctetes, we may consider the actions of Odysseus and
Neoptolemus through the lens of virtue ethics as described by Pellegrino, and we may use
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this relationship as a means of realizing Frey’s pedagogical objectives. As commander of
the army, Odysseus is not obligated to care for Philoctetes; his duty lies with his army.
While his treatment of Philoctetes is not ideal, Odysseus sees it as necessary because
Philoctetes’ wound and cries of pain demoralized his soldiers and made it impossible for
them to carry out the religious rituals that were required for victory.279 Neoptolemus, on
the other hand, accepts a different form of duty when he agrees to care for Philoctetes
during his incapacitating spasm.
Philoctetes entrusts his bow to Neoptolemus during this crisis in his illness, and
Odysseus insists that Neoptolemus keep the bow and return to the Greek ships. This will
be a death sentence for Philoctetes, who will now be unable to hunt for food.280 After
numerous failed attempts to convince Philoctetes to rejoin the army, Neoptolemus
reluctantly takes the bow and leaves with Odysseus. He turns back almost immediately,
however:
ODYSSEUS: Tell me why you’ve turned back? Where are you going
in such a rush?
NEOPTOLEMUS: I am going to undo a mistake I made earlier.
ODYSSEUS: Your words alarm me. What mistake is this?
NEOPTOLEMUS: One I made in obedience to you and the whole
army.
ODYSSEUS: What have you done that you shouldn’t have?
NEOPTOLEMUS: I used shameful deception and trickery in catching
him.281
Odysseus threatens to come after Neoptolemus with “every man in Greece,” and
proclaims Neoptolemus’ words and actions most unwise,282 to which Neoptolemus
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replies, “Perhaps not wise, but they are just – and that matters more than wisdom.”283
This exchange perfectly exemplifies the concept of virtue according to Pellegrino.
Neoptolemus considered his relationship with Philoctetes and the preservation of his own
virtuous character of greater importance than his duty to Odysseus and the Greeks. In his
actions, Neoptolemus displays each of the seven essential virtues outlined by Pellegrino,
and thus can be said to have behaved virtuously within the context of his relationship, but
this does not negate the negative consequences of his actions for everyone except
Philoctetes. Our evaluation of Neoptolemus’ decision will change depending upon
whether we consider him a soldier of the Greek army or a friend to Philoctetes – in this
case it seems he cannot behave virtuously in both roles simultaneously. Neoptolemus
declares his intention in line 1472 and following when he agrees to return Philoctetes to
his homeland even as he becomes fearful of the danger this will create for him and his
countrymen.
Encouraging students to consider the contrast between Odysseus’ duty-based
approach to decision making and Neoptolemus’ adherence to a more personal code of
morality meets Frey’s pedagogical objectives of helping students recognize moral issues
and analyze moral concepts and principles. The presence of ambiguity and disagreement
also becomes clear, but the exercise of moral imagination allows students to contemplate
their own construct of virtue. What aspects of character would they be unwilling to
compromise even if duty required it?
Proponents of virtue ethics have considered the conduct of “moral exemplars,”
“individuals who reach and sustain outstanding moral conduct throughout their
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professional or occupational careers,”284 as a possible source of insight for the
development of virtue. As Edmund L. Erde has noted, “Persons concerned with medical
education sometimes argued that medical students need no formal education in ethics.
They contended that if admissions were restricted to persons of good character and those
students were exposed to good role models, the ethics of medicine would take care of
itself.”285 As with any profession, however, it is difficult to judge the character of every
person seeking to enter and not all practitioners can be considered good role models.
Students who consider virtuous character an important aspect of their practice may
nevertheless hope to find a moral exemplar to consult and emulate. It is necessary,
therefore, to consider the attributes of such a person. Discussion of the ways
Neoptolemus displays (or does not display) Pellegrino’s seven essential virtues allows
students to reflect upon the qualities they consider essential in a role model. Students
should be cautioned against hoping to find a moral exemplar that never makes mistakes,
and should be encouraged instead to consider how an exemplar handles the inevitable
human failings.
The moral dilemmas of Philoctetes are resolved with a deus-ex-machina; Heracles
himself appears just as Neoptolemus and Philoctetes are preparing to leave the island and
return to Philoctetes’ homeland. Heracles promises to send Asclepius, Greek god of
medicine and healing, to treat Philoctetes’ wound and vows that only Philoctetes and
Neoptolemus, working together, will bring about the downfall of Troy. He promises
victory and glory to both of them so long as they look out for each other and show proper
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reverence to the gods. Neoptolemus and Philoctetes agree to this course of action and
depart the island together.286
Gill interprets the appearance of Heracles as a reward for Neoptolemus’ virtuous
behavior,287 but Parham sees in Heracles a moral exemplar whose edicts both Philoctetes
and Neoptolemus are willing to follow; “While Heracles has divine authority, he does not
persuade by argument but by example. His fame, his divinity, come from his suffering.
As the inheritor of his bow Philoctetes too must suffer and triumph.”288 As a moral
exemplar, Heracles requires three things of Philoctetes: that he humble himself enough
to accept the healing of Asclepius,289 that he protect Neoptolemus as Neoptolemus has
protected him,290 and that he show due reverence to the gods for his victory.291 This
attention to self-effacement, to relationship, and to respect may be seen as traits to seek
out and emulate in a moral exemplar.
However we interpret the deus ex machina, it remains true that no completely
satisfactory solution was achievable without it and we must accept the fact that this is the
case with virtually all bioethical dilemmas, otherwise they would not be dilemmas.
Students should be encouraged to find some means of empathetic engagement with all
three characters of Philoctetes and to carefully consider what each deems most important.
My observation in teaching Philoctetes is that some students admire Neoptolemus’
decision while others find it quite troubling. Many students admire Odysseus’ devotion
to those under his command, and some find Philoctetes’ self absorption difficult to
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tolerate. The objective in studying this drama is self-reflection, inquiry, and some level
of comfort with uncertainty and imperfect outcomes as well as a basic understanding of
virtue and principles.
Turning our attention to W;t, a more contemporary medical drama, we perhaps
find the opposite of a moral exemplar, as the play includes several characters who clearly
demonstrate how not to behave. W;t, reflects every single negative stereotype of
healthcare in the United States: institutions in which no thought is given to human
comfort, doctors who are callous and arrogant, and nurses who are kind but not terribly
intelligent. Yet it won the Pulitzer Prize for drama in 1999, suggesting a resonance with
the non-medical jury of theater critics who must have seen its “dealing with American
life” as accurate.292 In 2002, HBO produced a film version directed by Mike Nichols that
utilized a near word-for-word adaptation of the script and starred prestigious actors
Emma Thompson, Christopher Lloyd, and Audra McDonald.293 Roger Ebert referred to it
as one of the best films of 2002 and noted, “The movie is merciless in showing how
hospital routine robs [Bearing] of her dignity.”294 The play continues to be staged
frequently and was part of the 2015 season at the Boston Center for American
Performance.295
In spite of its obvious popularity with critics and the general public, the play’s
depiction of healthcare and healthcare providers is problematic for reasons that go
beyond negative stereotypes. As noted by bioethicist Dr. Osborne Wiggins, any
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Institutional Review Board would have prohibited the research being conducted by the
play’s physicians, which renders the medical premise of the play erroneous.296 In
addition, medical ethics (and common courtesy) would prohibit a physician from
performing a pelvic exam on a woman with whom he was socially acquainted. Finally,
the nurse, Susie, appears to work all shifts in all areas of the hospital, which is completely
illogical.
Edson drew the inspiration for W;t from her work as a unit clerk on an oncology
floor of a large research and teaching hospital,297 and her depiction of physicians has
come under scrutiny. Writing for The Annals of Internal Medicine, Faith McLellan, PhD
(but not MD) notes, “Doctors come in for a deserved hit, as they treat their patient as an
object, a research subject held at arm’s length,”298 but, many physicians feel
undeservedly singled out for ridicule. Writing for the New York Times, Abigail Zuger,
MD, recalls feeling depressed after “watching yet another scathing indictment of modern
medicine and the dubious habits by which some of us are either fortunate or unfortunate
enough – take your pick – to earn our keep.”299 In the article, Zuger offers quotations
from other physicians. Sherwin B. Nuland, professor of surgery at Yale University
states, “The doctor roles are stick figures, straw men, caricatures of the worst, completely
unrealistic,”300 and Larry Norton, head of medical oncology at Sloan-Kettering insists,
“People think clinical research is removed from the patient, but it’s the absolute opposite.
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Our goal is to make sure that every patient in the study gets the best possible care. . . I’m
saddened by the fact that the doctor is never well-represented. What we do and what we
are and what we have to deal with has never been captured by art. It’s a shame.”301 As a
member of the healthcare community myself, I am inclined to agree that the physician
characters in W;t are not accurate representations. I feel it is important to tell students
that, in all my years as a nurse, I never saw a physician behave with such complete
disregard for patient well-being as those depicted in in this play. I believe Edson has
created composite characters in Kelekian and Posner, and that they represent the worst
possible combination of moral failures. I contend, however, that despite its
inconsistencies and medical inaccuracies, this play has something to offer scholars and
students of medical humanities.
Rita Charon acknowledges, “I hated the play the several times I saw it. I felt
attacked by what I considered to be a crude and one-dimensional caricature of doctors
and nurses. I felt defensive in the face of the wholesale blaming of medicine as a cruel
enterprise.”302 But Charon could not ignore the overwhelmingly positive public response
to the play and conceded, “Patients and their families seeing performances of Wit felt
recognized or even vindicated by the play’s savage portrayal of contemporary health care
because, I suspect, such inhumane and therefore ineffective care is enacted every day in
hospitals everywhere.”303 I disagree with Charon’s generalization – acknowledging the
appeal of the play does not mean we have to accept its portrayal of healthcare as accurate
– but we must accept that Edson has captured the experience of being a patient in a way
that resonates as authentic and we must consider what this should mean to healthcare
Ibid.
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providers. If we become defensive and disregard the play because of its inaccuracies, we
miss an opportunity for growth and enlightenment.
W;t is, at its core, about power and powerlessness. Vivian Bearing, the cancer
stricken protagonist, is a brilliant woman, the foremost scholar in her field of study, yet
her knowledge and expertise are useless in a world where her very life is at stake. This
explains the appeal of the play to general audiences who have already felt, or fear a time
when they will feel, at the mercy of a medical world in which their own knowledge and
wisdom are useless, or worse, discounted. Roger Ebert writes of reviewing the movie
positively prior to his own cancer diagnosis, but of being unable to watch it after, “I
remembered it too clearly, perhaps, and dreaded re-living it . . . I have had cancer, and
had all too many hours, days and weeks of hospital routine robbing me of my dignity.”304
Ebert was not confirming the veracity of the conduct and situations depicted in the play,
but rather the truth of the experience of powerlessness and loss of dignity experienced by
patients. This is what caregivers must seek to understand and to prevent.
The protagonist of the script is Vivian Bearing, a university professor and
preeminent scholar of the metaphysical poet John Donne.305 Vivian is diagnosed with
stage four metastatic ovarian cancer and the primary setting of the play is “the University
Hospital Comprehensive Cancer Center” where she receives treatment.306 The title, with
semicolon, comes from an observation by Vivian’s mentor, renowned Donne scholar E.
M. Ashford, and references an “inauthentically punctuated translation” of Holy Sonnet
Six in which the deeper meaning of the sonnet is lost when a semicolon replaces a
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comma in the final stanza of the poem.307 According to Ashford, the semicolon
represents an “insuperable barrier” between life and death, when in fact, “Nothing but a
breath – a comma – separates life from life everlasting.”308 In W;t, this semicolon may be
seen as representing the insuperable barriers between the sick and the healthy, caregivers
and their patients.
Vivian has devoted her entire life to the study of Donne’s poetry and recalls
herself as a cold and uncompromising professor who only now, at the end of her life,
recognizes the importance of compassion and human connection. As the play begins
Vivian discloses, “Now, I suppose we shall see, through a series of flashbacks, how the
senior scholar ruthlessly denied her simpering students the touch of human kindness she
now seeks.”309 Vivian draws parallels between her own interactions with students and
the similarly impersonal relationships she has with her doctors, Harvey Kelekian,
attending physician and chief of medical oncology, and Jason Posner, Vivian’s former
student, and the young medical resident working with Kelekian.310 Vivian’s primary
nurse is Susie Monahan, RN, BSN.311 Susie is the only caregiver that attempts to
understand something of Vivian beyond her disease.
Late in Vivian’s treatment cycle, when her digestive system has been virtually
destroyed by chemotherapy, Susie brings Vivian a Popsicle and broaches the topic of
Vivian’s code status. After their conversation Vivian muses, “That certainly was a
maudlin display. Popsicles? “Sweetheart”? I can’t believe my life has become so . . .
corny. . . we are discussing my life and my death, and my brain is dulling, and poor
Ibid., 13.
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Susie’s was never very sharp to begin with . . .”312 As Vivian nears the end of her life
she realizes that an uncompromising attention to scholarly detail has left her without the
emotional resources to contemplate her own mortality. She muses,
(Quickly) Now is not the time for verbal swordplay,
for unlikely flights of imagination and wildly shifting
perspectives, for metaphysical conceit, for wit.
And nothing would be worse than a detailed
scholarly analysis. Erudition. Interpretation.
Complication.
(Slowly) Now is a time for simplicity. Now is a
time for, dare I say it, kindness.313
There are numerous moral lapses in the story, the most glaring of which is the fact
that Vivian’s physicians never tell her that her cancer is terminal. Instead, she is
encouraged to consent to a horrific course of chemotherapy, ostensibly in the hope of a
cure:
KELEKIAN: The important thing is for you to take the
full dose of chemotherapy. There may be times when
you’ll wish for a lesser dose, due to the side effects. But
we’ve got to go full-force. The experimental phase has
got to have the maximum dose to be of any use. Dr.
Bearing –
VIVIAN: Yes?
KELEKIAN: You must be very tough. Do you think you can
be very tough?
VIVIAN: You needn’t worry.
Only near the end of the play does Vivian realize she will not recover.314 Shortly
before Vivian’s death, Posner acknowledges the true purpose of her treatment was not to
attempt a cure, but to document the physical effects of full dose chemotherapy; “Eight
Ibid., 69. Italics original. The phrase “my brain is dulling, and poor Susie’s was never very sharp
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cycles of Hex and Vin at the full dose. Kelekian didn’t think it was possible. I wish they
could all get through it a full throttle. Then we could really have some data.”315
That Vivian was not fully informed of the nature of her illness or the purpose of
her treatment denied her necessary information for consent and was a clear breach of the
principle of autonomy. When considering the suffering induced by the course of
treatment Vivian endures, Kelekian and Posner’s actions may be seen not only as nonbeneficent, but also as maleficent in the extreme.
The physicians consistently fail to demonstrate any of Pellegrino’s essential
virtues for healthcare providers, and Susie, who has shown deep compassion and
benevolence, fails to demonstrate intellectual honesty or fidelity to the trust Vivian has
placed in her. Susie is aware of the deception perpetrated by the physicians, but does not
share this information with Vivian until shortly before Vivian’s death when she
confesses, “There just isn’t a good treatment for what you have yet, for advanced ovarian.
I’m sorry. They should have explained this – ”316 This scene presents an excellent
opportunity to discuss situations in which a caregiver might be expected to behave in a
way that violates her moral consciousness. Inviting the use of moral imagination,
students can be asked to consider why an otherwise compassionate nurse might withhold
information from her patient? Did she hope to protect Vivian somehow, or did she fear
losing her job, as was the case when Jason performed the pelvic exam on Vivian in spite
of his extreme discomfort? Where does Susie’s duty lie, with her patient or with her
employer? This is an ideal opportunity to request written reflections from students. They
may be asked to reflect upon the obligations incurred when one accepts certain types of
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employment – for example, should pharmacists opposed to abortion be required to
dispense Plan B? Or they might be asked to consider a time when they felt powerless in
the face of authority.
According to the script, Vivian has no family and only one visitor throughout the
eight-month course of her treatment. Like her physicians, Vivian is a researcher, devoted
to the pursuit of knowledge and excellence in her field.317 Had anyone discussed the true
nature of her illness and the need for medical research, there is a distinct possibility
Vivian would still have agreed to participate. The physicians could not have known this,
however, without knowing something of Vivian’s narrative, specifically, her own lifelong quest for knowledge and information.
One of the most difficult tasks any caregiver faces is that of attempting to
ascertain, often in only a matter of minutes, exactly what type and amount of information
will be beneficial to the patient. Navajo Indians, for example, refuse to speak of death
and believe that only someone who intends to bring it about would presume to discuss it,
which means the subject of advance directives must be approached very carefully.318
Some patients prefer a “straight shooter” who provides factual results exactly as they are
discovered, while others cope principally through some form of positive thinking and do
not wish to hear of potentially negative outcomes. Many patients have strong familial or
social support systems, while others must cope with healthcare issues alone. Often,
patients will have some degree of medical knowledge gleaned from the internet or other
sources, and may believe this information more accurate than what they hear from an
unfamiliar caregiver. Maintaining patient autonomy dictates that all relevant information
Ibid., 18–20.
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be provided to the patient, but decisions regarding the timing and manner in which this is
done become the responsibility of the caregiver and are best undertaken with some
knowledge of the patient’s desires, support system, and knowledge base.
When speaking to Vivian about her options for end of life care, Susie offers the
choices of “full code” and “Do Not Resuscitate,” telling Vivian, “I wanted to present both
choices before Kelekian and Jason talk to you.”319 When Vivian asks whether Susie and
the doctors disagree on the appropriate choice, Susie replies, “Well, they like to save
lives. So anything’s okay, as long as life continues . . . they always want to know more
things.”320 Vivian’s response to this statement provides significant insight to her hopes
and motivation: “I always want to know more things. I’m a scholar. Or I was when I
had shoes, when I had eyebrows.”321 This leads the reader to wonder whether Vivian
would have agreed to the chemo, perhaps even found meaningful purpose in the research,
even if she had known there was no hope for a cure. The actions of both physicians
throughout the play are utterly callous and inexcusable, but Vivian’s words provide a
subtle and poignant reminder of the ethical imperative of narrative practice. Beneficent
care requires eliciting a patient’s narrative and confirming some understanding of the
patient’s wishes. Narrative ethics mandates attention to the stories of patients’ lives as
the primary means of providing competent healthcare.322 In point of fact, no ethical
decision can be made in the absence of narrative. Respect for the bioethical principles of
autonomy and beneficence require knowledge of what the patient considers most
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important in his or her care and such knowledge cannot be obtained without establishing
a trusting relationship with the patient.
W;t opens with a presentational monologue in which Vivian addresses the
audience and describes her interactions with her physicians:
VIVIAN: (In false familiarity, waving and nodding to the audience)
Hi. How are you feeling today? Great. That’s just great . . . I have
been asked “How are you feeling today?” while I was throwing up
into a plastic washbasin. I have been asked as I was emerging from a
four-hour operation with a tube in every orifice, “How are you feeling
today?”
I am waiting for the moment when someone asks me this
question and I am dead.
I’m a little sorry I’ll miss that.323
This monologue exemplifies the impersonal treatment Vivian receives from her
physicians throughout the play beginning with her diagnosis:
VIVIAN: I’ll never forget the time I found out I had cancer.
(DR. HARVEY KELEKIAN enters at a big desk piled high with papers)
KELEKIAN: You have cancer.
VIVIAN: (To audience) See? Unforgettable. It was something
of a shock. I had to sit down. (She plops down.)
KELEKIAN: Please sit down.324
At no time does either physician attempt more than a cursory interaction with
Vivian, and Posner makes it clear that even this is simply a burdensome obligation:
JASON: Compromised kidney function is a highly complex
reaction. I’m simplifying it for you.
VIVIAN: Thank you.
JASON: We’re supposed to.
VIVIAN: Bedside manner.
JASON: Yeah, there’s a whole course on it in med school. It’s
required. Colossal waste of time for researchers. (He turns
to go.)325
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When Jason conducts a pelvic exam on Vivian, his former professor, Vivian
describes the experience as “degrading,” and part of what she terms “learning to
suffer.”326 Healthcare workers familiar with common practice will no doubt find this
scene implausible, but Edson is taking a bit of poetic license to highlight a point about the
degradation patients may experience at the hands of unfeeling caregivers. Edson presents
Kelekian and Posner as socially inept, caring only for the results of their research, and
even this is not because of the good they might do, but simply because they are fascinated
by the attributes of cancer on a cellular level.327 It is the absence of empathy that is so
striking in both physicians. We are given the impression they’ve been taught “bedside
manner” as an obligatory course without being taught any sense of why it actually
matters to a patient. This illustrates the importance of encouraging students to practice
empathetic engagement by imaginatively placing themselves in situations faced by
fictional characters and attempting to understand their needs. Might Kelekian and Posner
have behaved differently if their course on bedside manner had required them to reflect
upon the experience of Ivan Illych, for example, or a similar figure from the literature and
medicine canon? Many physicians report changes in their bedside manner after a
personal experience of illness or injury,328 and the character of Vivian in W;t certainly
demonstrates the power of personal suffering to incite a previously undeveloped
compassion for others, but making use of moral imagination in the empathetic
engagement with literary characters allows a similar, if less profound, enlightenment.329
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In her discussion of the possibilities for moral growth, Judith Andre notes, “The
more sensitive one is to the effects of one’s behavior on others, the more one is likely to
help.”330 She goes on to say that “becoming a sensitive observer is a “complex task” that
requires “self-awareness and understanding.”331 Finally, and most salient for a medical
humanities pedagogy, she suggests that the practice of moral reasoning be broadened to
include the practice of moral reflection;
[Moral reflection] includes the consideration of myth and metaphor,
attention to one’s nagging doubts and suspect enthusiasms, and the
use of moral imagination. Besides making real another person’s
point of view, moral imagination helps us think of creative
alternatives that would allow us to avoid the horns of a dilemma. It
makes us think about the conditions that led to the quandary, to do
what is called “preventive ethics.”332
It is possible that Kelekian and Posner lack the milk of human kindness in part
because they have never engaged in the self-reflection required to understand the needs of
others. Vivian was similarly cold and insensitive until the loneliness and isolation of
illness forced her to acknowledge her own desire for emotional connection and
compassion. The reader discerns that if Vivian had lived, her interactions with students
and others would have been vastly different than they were before her illness.
In the absence of such life altering personal experience, dramatic literature
provides an excellent format for moral reflection. Because the entire literary work
consists of dialog, students can be encouraged to engage the moral imagination by
considering how specific conversations might be rewritten in a manner that provides the
kindness Vivian seeks and prevents the indignities she is forced to suffer. This is an ideal
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exercise for small group work and when complete, the rewritten scenes can be read for
the class, engendering further discussion and the proposal of still more options. The four
components of compassion (cognitive, affective, intentional, and motivational) may be
considered individually as students are asked to show evidence of each in the rewritten
scenes.
There is no doubt that the physicians in W;t behave in a manner that is morally
wrong. This fact holds true no matter which bioethical theory we are using to judge their
behavior and serves to illuminate the presence of a common morality, “norms about right
and wrong human conduct that are so widely shared that they form a stable (although
incomplete) social agreement.”333 The casuist theory of bioethics rejects the idea that,
apart from this common morality, there are specific principles or guidelines that can be
applied to every situation and instead looks to “paradigm cases” and precedents from
which to draw judgments and make decisions.334 This underlying methodology,
“thinking about new and perplexing cases by thinking about the perplexing case’s
similarities with clear, paradigmatic cases,”335 is something we do, consciously or
subconsciously, any time we have a decision to make. When considering the case of
Vivian Bearing, we cannot help but compare her situation with what it ought to have
been, and this, ideally, influences our behavior in the future.
The only comfort Vivian receives during the entire course of her treatment comes
during a visit from her former professor and mentor, E. M. Ashford, now eighty years old
and in town for her great-grandson’s fifth birthday. Ashford comforts Vivian by
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climbing into bed beside her and allowing Vivian to “nestle in” while Ashford reads to
her.336 When Vivian declines a recitation of Donne, Ashford reads from a children’s
book, The Runaway Bunny, interpreting it as “A little allegory of the soul.”337 Vivian
drifts peacefully off to sleep and does not wake. Ashford is able to provide Vivian with a
few moments of serenity because she knows Vivian and does not turn away from her
suffering. Ashford understands that Vivian finds solace in words and language and she
offers these in addition to her own presence in a touching gesture of compassion.
Vivian’s peace is short-lived, however, and her final indignity comes at the end of
her life when, after requesting a do not resuscitate (DNR) order and having it entered into
the chart by Dr. Kelekian in the presence of Jason, Jason nevertheless impulsively calls a
full code for Vivian when he finds her unresponsive and without a pulse.
(SUSIE, hearing the announcement, runs into the room.)
SUSIE: WHAT ARE YOU DOING?
JASON: A GODDAMN CODE. GET OVER HERE!
SUSIE: She’s DNR! (She grabs him.)
JASON: (He pushes her away.) She’s Research!338
The final moments of the play are a nightmarish scene in which Vivian’s body is
manhandled by the code team and subjected to electric shocks as Susie runs frantically
between the code team members yelling STOP, while Jason reacts “(In agony) Oh, God.”
and finally “(Howling) I MADE A MISTAKE,” before collapsing to the floor.339 After
verifying the DNR, the code team members mutter, “ – It’s a doctor fuck-up. –What is
he, a resident?”340 This scene may lead the reader to wonder whether Jason’s howling
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collapse is because he finally understands the inhumanity of his actions or merely
because he wonders if they have affected his future as Kelekian’s fellow.
Either way, we have yet another moral lapse and ethical breach by one of
Vivian’s physicians. The doctor’s actions and Vivian’s suffering are not only the result of
moral failures, but also of complete emotional detachment. W;t thus illuminates the
importance of genuine human connection in the delivery of competent care. We can
hope Jason’s collapse marks some sort of epiphany in which he realizes the cost of his
inhumanity.
In discussing the possibility for “epiphanic” knowledge that changes the way we
live and practice, Anne Hunsaker Hawkins reminds us, “Narrative ethics often
emphasizes the importance of attending to the patient’s ‘life-story.’ But we should
remember that every ethical decision marks the intersection of two stories, the patient’s
and the physician’s, and epiphanic moments of imaginative insight or intuitive
understanding occur in both.”341 Studying the ethical breaches presented in W;t provides
students with multiple opportunities for epiphanic insights as they come to understand the
suffering caused by decidedly unethical behavior rendered by caregivers with no regard
for their patient apart from the statistics her case provides.
The insights gained from studying great literature and art come about as the result
of a process of self-exploration induced by the works themselves and encouraged through
discussion and written reflection. Grappling with ethical dilemmas and demonstrating
virtue in the presence of suffering often involves a process ethicists refer to as reflective
equilibrium. Beauchamp and Childress write, “The goal of reflective equilibrium is to
Anne Hunsaker Hawkins, “Medical Ethics and the Epiphanic Dimension of Narrative,” in Stories
and Their Limits: Narrative Approaches to Bioethics, ed. Hilde Lindemann Nelson (New York:
Routledge, 1997), 168.
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match, prune, and adjust considered judgments and their specifications to render them
coherent with the premises of our most general moral commitments.”342 In their view,
making ethical decisions that we can live with first requires an awareness of our own
moral convictions. Vivian Bearing’s narrative is presented in the form of a dramatic
script that lays bare the consequences of unethical conduct, and encourages students to
form their own ideas of morally acceptable and unacceptable behavior.
In discussing the possibility of teaching virtue to nursing students, Ann Marie
Begley observes, “We can teach ‘the four principles’ approach and students can learn
these and apply them just as well as they can the ‘signs and symptoms’ of diseases.”343
Begley does not believe this is enough, however, and affirms that educators also bear
some responsibility for shaping virtuous character. She notes, “We many not achieve a
satisfactory result with all students, but we must try, and the pessimism involved in
considering all students to be beyond our influence is unwarranted.”344 The methods
Begley advocates for teaching virtue involve enhancing a student’s capacity for
emotional response and sensitivity,345 and this is precisely where dramatic literature
offers such a wealth of possibilities. According to Begley, “While the situations to which
we respond are imaginary, the felt emotions are real.”346 The fictional character of
Vivian Bearing, a scholar of words and wit, offers a narrative of illness that is
challenging but ultimately enlightening.
In Stories of Sickness, Howard Brody writes, “There is, unfortunately, little
evidence to support the notion that the teaching of ethics, as is currently done in most
Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 382.
Begley, “Original Article,” 260.
344 Ibid.
345 Ibid.
346 Ibid., 262. Italics original.
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medical schools, produces a more humane or compassionate professional. The narratives
reviewed in this book might persuade us that the better way to produce more
compassionate physicians is to abolish all courses in medical ethics and replace them
with courses in medicine and literature.”347
If we return to Frey’s suggestions for teaching virtue it becomes clear why
literature is so effective – it stimulates the moral imagination as students become
empathetically engaged with complex characters, it allows the consideration of multiple
courses of action and removes real-life time constraints so all moral issues can be
considered and key concepts and principles can be analyzed, and it encourages students
to become more comfortable with ambiguity even as they work to construct their own
ideas of what it means to be a virtuous human being.

347
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ART OF MINDFULNESS: HELPING CAREGIVERS CARE FOR
THEMSELVES

“Creativity is the work of healthcare.”348
~ Rita Charon

While most practitioners agree that compassionate caregiving based upon
narrative practice and an empathetic emotional relationship with patients is ideal, they
also fear that time constraints and threats to their own emotional well-being make this
style of practice untenable.349 This chapter addresses these obstacles and suggests that
cultivation of intentional, nonjudgmental, present moment awareness, or
“mindfulness,”350 helps make even the briefest clinical encounters more therapeutic and
also helps prevent the burnout and compassion fatigue associated with caregiving. In
addition, understanding the therapeutic mental state of “flow,”351 and cultivating
activities that encourage this state helps future caregivers realize the importance of habits
Rita Charon, “Narrative Medicine” (Classroom visit, Bellarmine University, Louisville, KY,
September 22, 2015).
349 Halpern, From Detached Concern to Empathy: Humanizing Medical Practice, 15–7.
350 Jon Kabat-Zinn, Mindfulness for Beginners: Reclaiming the Present Moment and Your Life (Boulder,
CO: Sounds True, 2012), 1.
351 Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience.
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that are mentally and emotionally restorative. Because compassionate caregiving often
involves deep emotional investment, self-care requires more than warm baths or other
activities designed to reduce stress; it requires special attention to cognitive processes that
influence thought and emotion.
Drawing upon Jon Kabat-Zinn’s concept of mindfulness, Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi’s theory of flow, and Wassily Kandinsky’s interpretations of form and
color, this chapter asserts that viewing and creating nonrepresentational art as a means of
contemplative practice allows students to become aware of the ever-present stream of
thought and to develop some mastery over its content. The cultivation of sustained
attention and present moment awareness fosters therapeutic clinical encounters in which
patients feel heard and cared for even when the encounters are brief. These skills also
enable caregivers to be empathetically present with their patients without carrying those
emotions into other areas of their lives.
In developing the classroom exercises proposed in this chapter I have made
extensive use of Dr. Ronald Epstein’s techniques for cultivating healthy habits of
mind.352 While non-objective art provides an excellent medium for bringing Epstein’s
ideas into the classroom, it is important to note this is not an effort to teach art
appreciation or art history, but rather a means of promoting a particular form of metacognition. Before beginning a discussion of pedagogy, we must understand the
importance of teaching caregivers to care for themselves.
Researchers studying dissatisfaction in healthcare workers often use the terms
burnout and compassion fatigue interchangeably, but there are subtle differences between
the two. Carla Joinson first used the phrase “compassion fatigue” in 1992 to denote a
352
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specific type of burnout that occurs in healthcare workers, especially nurses.353 Smart et
al., note, “Burnout can result from any situation of being overworked and is not unique to
caring professions . . . combatting burnout will require attention to organizational
variables such as workload and patient volume . . . Compassion fatigue, however, may
require personalized interventions.”354 In 2010 nurse researchers in South Africa
constructed a comprehensive definition of compassion fatigue and noted that it develops
in phases and ultimately results in “a state where the compassionate energy that is
expended by nurses has surpassed their restorative processes, with recovery power being
lost.”355 In describing the all-inclusive effects of compassion fatigue they write:
[T]he indicative signs of compassion fatigue are the
physical effects of burnout, absence of energy, and accident
proneness, the emotional effects of breakdown, apathy and a
desire to quit, the social effects of unresponsiveness,
callousness, and indifference towards patients, the spiritual
effects of poor judgment and disinterest in introspection, and
the intellectual effect of disorderliness.356
Under “risk factors” the authors list “contact with patients,” highlighting the fact that all
types of caregivers are at risk for compassion fatigue as well as burnout.357
Research consistently shows that as many as sixty percent of physicians report
symptoms of compassion fatigue including “emotional exhaustion, depersonalization
(treating patients as objects), and low sense of accomplishment.”358 The prevalence of

Carla Joinson, “Coping with Compassion Fatigue,” Nursing 22, no. 4 (April 1992): 116.
Denise Smart et al., “Compassion Fatigue and Satisfaction: A Cross-Sectional Survey Among US
Healthcare Workers,” Nursing and Health Sciences 16, no. 1 (March 2014): 4, doi:10.1111/nhs.12068.
355 Siedine Knobloch Coetzee and Hester C. Klopper, “Compassion Fatigue Within Nursing Practice: A
Concept Analysis.,” Compassion Fatigue within Nursing Practice: A Concept Analysis. 12, no. 2 (June
2010): 237, doi:10.1111/j.1442-2018.2010.00526.x.
356 Ibid., 239. Italics mine.
357 Ibid., 240.
358 Michael S. Krasner et al., “Association of an Educational Program in Mindful Communication with
Burnout, Empathy, and Attitudes Among Primary Care Physicians,” Journal of the American Medical
Association 302, no. 12 (September 2009): 1284.
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burnout and/or compassion fatigue is higher among physicians than for other occupations
in the general population.359 For nurses, the rate of burnout and compassion fatigue may
be even higher than for physicians, with research showing that more than eighty percent
of emergency room nurses demonstrate “moderate to high” levels of burnout and
compassion fatigue.360
Wariness of compassion fatigue is part of the reason physicians have traditionally
been encouraged to maintain a sense of emotional detachment from their patients, yet, as
Halpern points out, such emotional detachment does not help physicians avoid the
symptoms of compassion fatigue.361 On the contrary, physicians who report the highest
levels of job satisfaction are those who develop caring, empathetic relationships with
their patients.362 Caregivers must have confidence in their ability to maintain their own
emotional well-being before they will be able or willing to engage empathetically with
their patients, however. If they do not have such confidence, both the affective and
motivational components of compassion become impossible. Teaching students the
principles of mindfulness as a practice of self-care may alleviate this fear since it is well
documented that the practice of mindfulness is beneficial in reducing the symptoms of
compassion fatigue and that it improves relationships between caregivers and their
patients.363 Medical schools are increasingly offering courses in mindfulness, but there is

Tait D. Shanafelt et al., “Burnout and Satisfaction With Work-Life Balance Among US Physicians
Relative to the General US Population,” Archives of Internal Medicine 172, no. 18 (October 8, 2012):
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no consistency of format, and courses are generally only offered as electives.364 Given
the empirically proven benefits of mindfulness education, I believe its precepts should be
introduced to general undergraduate students considering careers in healthcare, thus
allowing the students to assess the value of such habits in creating compassionate
relationships and developing healthy practices of self-care before they embark on
supremely challenging careers. This suggestion is not without caveats, however, and
these will be discussed in detail.
A consistent state of mindfulness, or nonjudgmental, present moment awareness,
is developed through meditation and other contemplative practices designed to encourage
mental stillness and somatic awareness.365 While the concept of mindfulness and the
meditation practices associated with it have their roots in Theravada Buddhism, the
practices of Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) and Mindfulness Based
Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) are two examples of the secular application of mindfulness
principles.366 The contemplative practices developed for MBSR have been shown to
reduce anxiety and depression, improve memory, strengthen the immune system, reduce

Analysis,” Journal of Advanced Nursing 70, no. 2 (February 2014): 282–94, doi:10.1111/jan.12182;
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hypertension, and improve an overall sense of well-being, among other positive physical
and emotional effects.367
Although the benefits of mindfulness have been subjectively reported and
documented, the exact neurophysiological mechanisms at play in achieving those benefits
are still poorly understood.368 One theory proposes that meditation interrupts a pattern of
rumination; a maladaptive thought process that involves constant repetitive thinking.369
Rumination has become an important topic for researchers studying emotion because of
its association with anxiety and depression.370 López-Pérez and Ambrona have studied
emotional responses to perceiving a person in need and have attempted to identify the
causative factors that differentiate empathetic concern from personal distress. 371 They
write that personal distress occurs in observers who experience a strong vicarious
emotional response to the suffering of others, but lack the ability to regulate those
emotions. This may cause the observer to turn away from the person in need or to
attempt the suppression of his or her own emotional response.372 (Recall the emotional
symptoms of compassion fatigue are apathy and a desire to quit.) The researchers studied
two types of emotional regulation, rumination and reappraisal. Reappraisal is a positive
emotional response that “involves thinking about what happens in a different way, by
changing the mindset and by making a different interpretation of the event.”373 Their

For a comprehensive list of the benefits of meditation as well as the studies in which they were
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studies demonstrated “reappraisal led to a higher empathic concern, [and] rumination led
to higher personal distress.”374 In the parlance of mindfulness, this is called responding to
a situation rather than reacting to it, and the capacity for healthy response is developed
through an awareness that thoughts are only thoughts and do not always reflect reality.375
David Vago suggests mindfulness is a type of “meta-awareness” that enables one
to “shift from identifying personally with thoughts and feelings to relating one’s
experience in a wider field of awareness, and in which one can engage with an object of
attention without avoiding it or becoming entangled (as in rumination).”376 For
caregivers, rumination might include constant thoughts and emotions related to the
suffering of others, or self-recrimination for being unable to eliminate that suffering. A
reappraisal of the same situation might allow a caregiver to reflect upon the ways in
which he or she provided a comforting presence even if nothing more could be offered.
The wealth of positive results coming from research on mindfulness-based
interventions (MBI’s) in healthcare and psychology has lead to a proliferation of
programs and teachers. This suggests a need for careful critical examination and
awareness that mindfulness practices are not for everyone. At this point in time,
however, I am aware of only one critical voice in the scholarly journals. In 2014 Daniel
David observed,
In psychotherapy, mindfulness was initially conceptualized as a tool
that should be used when standard evidence-based treatments – like
cognitive-behavioral therapy – fail or do not achieve optimal, longterm outcomes. . . mindfulness has more recently come to be
viewed as a first line intervention, be it independent and/or part of
Ibid., 305.
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multimodal treatments, for many psychological disorders and
conditions, rather then [sic] circumscribed to some clinical context .
. . My contention, which will no doubt stir academic controversy, is
that the indiscriminate practice of mindfulness in psychotherapy,
particularly if such practices are viewed as a panacea, may well
unintentionally create an unhealthy detachment from the very
feelings that make us human.377
In responding to David’s concern, Gardner, Moore, and Marks insist that David is
misunderstanding the intent of mindfulness-based interventions (MBI) in psychotherapy;
The purpose of mindfulness use in MBCT [Mindfulness Based
Cognitive Therapy] is to allow for increased perspective-taking
(greater awareness of possibilities), so that one can make effective
choices in response to emotional experience. It is not meant to
neutralize the emotional experience, but to recognize patterns of the
mind that contribute to withdrawal, inaction, ineffective decisionmaking, etc., in the service of avoiding emotional experience.378
Several things are worth noting about David’s criticism and the subsequent
rebuttal. First, the reason MBI’s have become first line treatments is because they have
proven effective for so many people, but David is right to urge caution in seeing such
successes as a universal panacea. I do concur, however, with Gardener, et al., who view
his concerns about detachment as misguided. David is referring to a particular tenet of
mindfulness called non-attachment that addresses the fact that many of our thoughts and
emotions are the result of our own perceptions, which may or may not be valid. David
suggests that a student who has no anxiety about whether he will pass or fail an exam is
less likely to put forth the effort to excel, and that a healthy level of “motivational
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relevance” is important to success.379 He is correct, of course, but he has misinterpreted
non-attachment, which never discourages putting forth one’s best effort, but simply
suggests that clinging to expected outcomes is not a healthy state of mind. Preparing for
a test with an attitude that all is lost if I do not do well, will not allow optimal
preparation. Likewise, if I have done my best to prepare, but still fail the exam, nonattachment would suggest it is not the end of the world, but rather an opportunity for
reassessment. Detachment does not seek to eliminate thoughts or emotions, but suggests
an awareness that we often cling to expectations and fears in a way that prevents peace of
mind.380
David’s criticisms are related to MBI’s used in psychotherapy, but mindfulness
training is becoming increasingly prevalent in mainstream culture and Gardner et al.,
rightfully acknowledge the possibility of misinformation being espoused by therapists or
teachers who are not properly trained.381 This is likely to be a growing concern as
interest in mindfulness increases and instructor training programs proliferate.
While I could find no reports of adverse reactions to meditation in scholarly
journals, a recent opinion piece in The New York Times382 references an article in The
Atlantic that highlights the fact that meditation is not suitable for everyone. Thomas
Rocha quotes psychiatrist and Brown University Medical School professor Willoughby
Britton, who is leading “an effort to document, analyze, and publicize accounts of the
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adverse effects of contemplative practices.”383 The article notes that Britton and her team
have collected data from “nearly 40” subjects who were “fairly out of commission, fairly
impaired for between six months [and] more than 20 years.”384 While forty is a miniscule
number considering the millions of people now engaged in some form of contemplative
practice, it does indicate the possibility of severe adverse responses in people who might
be emotionally or psychologically fragile.
While the benefits of mindfulness make it an important tool for many healthcare
providers, introducing it in the classroom must be done with caution. The classroom is
an ideal place for practicing sustained attention and present moment awareness, for
encouraging non-judgment, and for helping students become aware of their own patterns
of thought, but it is not the place for lengthy meditations. In addition, it is important to
stress that even brief periods of meditation are optional. When introducing meditation
practices in the classroom, I keep the exercises very short (2-3 minutes) and I make a
promise to my students that I will not be watching them. Those who choose to follow the
meditation are free to do so, while others may opt to read or put their heads down for a
couple of minutes. I do require that all electronic devices be put away.
A typical introduction to mindfulness meditation involves cultivating present
moment awareness and slowing the constant stream of thoughts by paying attention to the
physical sensations of breathing.385 As Kabat-Zinn and others have noted, human beings
are constantly thinking, most often either remembering the past or considering the future,
and these thoughts have a profound effect on our emotions and our lives; “Out of the
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vortex of our thoughts, first emotions arise, and then moods and behaviors, and finally
habits and traits of character.”386 The object of mindfulness meditation is to “calm the
turbulent mind” and return it to the present moment.387 As thoughts arise in the mind, the
meditator acknowledges them and then gently returns attention to the physical sensations
of the breath entering and leaving the body. Williams and Penman explain,
Focusing on each breath in this way allows you to observe
your thoughts as they arise in your mind and, little by little,
to let go of struggling with them . . . You come to the
profound understanding that thoughts and feelings
(including negative ones) are transient . . . mindfulness
allows you to catch negative thought patterns before they tip
you into a downward spiral. It begins the process of putting
you back in control of your life.388
When introducing students to the practice of mindfulness meditation using the
breath, it is important to emphasize nonjudgmental awareness. Students who find it
difficult to maintain attention on the breath may become frustrated or feel that they are
doing it wrong or are unable to meditate, but the initial objective is simply to become
aware of the constant stream of thoughts that dominate our everyday lives.389 There is no
attempt to eliminate these thoughts or to judge their validity, the goal is to acknowledge
their presence and gently return attention to the breath. Students who find these short
meditations useful can be directed to texts that offer expanded instruction or to campus or
community based meditation programs like MBSR, or Koru Mindfulness, a shorter
program of instruction designed especially for college students and faculty.390
Matthieu Ricard, Why Meditate: Working With Thoughts and Emotions, trans. Sherab Chödzin Kohn
(Carlsbad, CA: Hay House, 2010), 23.
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Because not all students will be interested in exploring the practice of meditation,
other forms of quieting the mind and developing present moment awareness should be
introduced. Viewing and engaging with fully abstract or nonrepresentational art offers
outstanding opportunities for practicing sustained attention and nonjudgmental
awareness. Because nonrepresentational art lacks the familiar objects and images that
guide the mind and evoke emotional responses, it presents an opportunity to observe the
process of thinking itself. In addition, many students come to class already convinced
they do not like nonrepresentational art because they believe they do not understand it or
because they fail to see artistic skill evidenced in its creation. This provides an excellent
opportunity for examining the judgmental quality of our thoughts and practicing the task
of suspending that judgment.
Doctor Ronald Epstein, from the Department of Family Medicine and Psychiatry
at the University of Rochester, has written extensively about the mindful practice of
medicine. Epstein suggests “an 8-fold teaching method to improve the capabilities of
health professionals by fostering four key habits of mind: attentive observation, critical
curiosity, informed flexibility, and presence.”391 Although Epstein teaches medical
students, interns, and residents,392 his methodology and objectives are equally useful in
other situations where one hopes to introduce the key habits of mindfulness. Epstein’s
“8-fold method” incorporates the following techniques: priming, availability, asking
reflective questions, active engagement, modeling while ‘thinking out loud’, practice,
praxis, and assessment and confirmation.393 Here I discuss the ways in which Epstein’s
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techniques may be used in conjunction with Wassily Kandinsky’s 1924 Blue Painting
[Figure 2]394 in guiding students toward healthy habits of mind.
Kandinsky was one of the first artists to paint fully abstract works,395 and his
theories regarding the power of color remain intriguing, if not empirically provable.396
While Kandinsky’s association of colors with spiritual properties397 was likely the result
of synesthesia and his interest in Theosophy,398 people often do have emotional and/or
cognitive reactions to color, and these are worth exploring.
As of October 5, four of Amazon.com’s top twenty bestselling books for 2015
were coloring books for adults.399 These books feature intricate, complex designs, often
in the form of nature scenes or mandalas that are meant to be colored with pencils,
markers, or paints. In a recent article for The New Yorker, Adrienne Raphel situates the
coloring book trend as part of a “Peter Pan Market” in which adults are reading young
adult literature, going to summer camps, and attending “preschool” in an effort to reduce
stress and bring play back into their lives.400 However, I am not convinced the coloring
books necessarily belong in the same odd category as summer camps and preschools for
adults. Working with color in a way that does not demand artistic training or talent
speaks to a universal human fascination with color that has been explored by
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philosophers, scientists, and artists for millennia. Color theorists disagree about whether
color is a physical property of objects (physicalism) or simply a mental property in which
the viewer projects his or her sensory experience of color onto a colorless object
(eliminativism),401 but all agree color has aesthetic characteristics to which humans
respond.402
Research has shown that emotional responses to color are both innate and
culturally mediated.403 In 2006 Clarke and Costall noted that while previous research
demonstrated a general finding that, “‘cool’ colors are soothing, and ‘warm’ colors
stimulate,” a more qualitative study was needed to understand “the more subtle
connotations of colors, the multiple meanings of a single color, and also the participants
reasons for these connotations.”404 Their results were consistent with previous research,
but they also found individual responses to color were “emotionally multifaceted,” and
were influenced by experience and cultural associations.405
Art historian John Gage has written extensively about the history and meaning of
color and suggests, “A unifying framework for the study of colour in all its aspects might
indeed be provided by the history of art, precisely that subject where it has hitherto been
so meagerly treated.”406 In Color and Meaning: Art, Science, and Symbolism, Gage
traces the artistic use of color through various time periods and locales and notes that by
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the time twentieth century artists had become intrigued with the idea of nonobjective
work, they possessed “a number of well-articulated colour-systems which allowed them
to consider colour as in the nature of a language.”407 Kandinsky, in particular, devoted
tremendous energy to explaining the affective power of color.
Kandinsky experienced some level of synesthesia, a condition Gage describes as
“the simultaneous response of two or more senses to a single stimulus,”408 and was also
influenced by the Theosophical Society,409 whose texts considered colors “as they are
experienced by the adept in auras, or ‘thought-forms.’”410 Kandinsky’s ideas about color,
particularly his “correspondence theory,” in which he suggested, “keen colours are well
suited by sharp forms (e.g., a yellow triangle), and soft, deep colours by round forms
(e.g., a blue circle),”411 were not universally supported by other artists,412 and have been
disproven by recent empirical testing,413 but his attempt to render a subjective sensory
experience into words nevertheless provides insight for the contemplation of
nonobjective paintings.
According to Kandinsky, paintings are composed of form and color, “Form alone,
even though totally abstract and geometrical, has a power of inner suggestion,”414 but if
an artist wishes to understand the spirit, “The starting point is the study of colour and its
effects on men.”415 The following is a sampling of Kandinsky’s writing on the universal
qualities of color:
Ibid., 248.
Ibid., 252.
409 Kandinsky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art, 13–14.
410 Gage, Color and Meaning: Art, Science, and Symbolism, 242.
411 Kandinsky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art, 29.
412 Gage, Color and Meaning: Art, Science, and Symbolism, 241.
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Yellow is the typically earthly colour. It can never have profound
meaning . . . The power of profound meaning is found in blue . . .
Green is the most restful colour that exists. . . Not without reason is
white taken as symbolizing joy and spotless purity, and black grief
and death. A blend of black and white produces gray . . . which is
silent and motionless . . . The varied powers of red are very striking
. . . brown, unemotional, disinclined for movement . . . Just as
orange is red brought nearer to humanity by yellow, so violet is red
withdrawn from humanity by blue.416
Clearly, not everyone will agree with Kandinsky’s color associations, but most
people acknowledge being soothed by some colors and stimulated by others, or at least
having an affinity for some colors over others, and this fact lends itself well to
contemplation. Epstein’s method for instilling attentive observation, critical curiosity,
presence, and informed flexibility provides an ideal framework for contemplating
Kandinsky’s Blue Painting in a classroom setting.
The first component of Epstein’s method for teaching mindfulness in medicine is
priming, which “involves setting the expectation that students will report on their own
mental processes.”417 When using this method in clinical practice Epstein requires
students to discuss the ways in which they prepare for seeing a patient and also to
examine their own thoughts and feelings during the clinical encounter. In this way,
Epstein asks students to go beyond clinical findings and the methodical ways in which
patient information is usually collected.418 When using Epstein’s method in the
classroom, we begin by asking students to discuss ideas they already hold about nonobjective art. Marc Rothko’s “multiform” paintings and Jackson Pollock’s “splatter”
paintings are useful aids in this discussion because students often dismiss them as lacking
skill or creative intention. In fact, a very frequent comment is, “I could do that myself.”
Ibid., 38–41.
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Students might then be asked to recognize the judgments they hold and, insofar as
possible, to release them and attempt to view Kandinsky’s work with a “beginner’s
mind.” Beginner’s mind refers to an attitude that allows, “open and unencumbered
inquiry . . . ‘In the beginner’s mind there are many possibilities, but in the expert’s mind
there are few.’”419
The second stage of Epstein’s method is being available, which he describes as
“creating quiet, uninterrupted spaces on a regular basis for rehearsal (such as a seminar,
reflection group, or retreat) as well as moments of contact during chaotic real-life
contexts.”420 When he speaks of rehearsal, Epstein is referring to the moments in which
we practice deliberate, non-judgmental attention. Quiet moments provide the best
opportunity for this, and the hope is that making use of quiet moments may develop a
habit that is also useful in the midst of chaos and struggle. As part of this step Epstein
suggests keeping a journal, and written reflections also work well when asking students
to consider Kandinsky’s work in a thoughtful, intentional way. Students may be asked to
write a one-page reflection on the painting, specifically discussing their observations
about color and line. This may be done in the classroom or as homework, but it is
important that students not seek any outside sources of information about the work and
rely instead on their own observations. At this point it is not necessary to discuss any sort
of emotional response to the work, although some may wish to do so. The purpose of
this assignment is to encourage focused, sustained attention. Having thoughts on paper
exponentially increases the potential of step three, asking reflective questions.
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“Reflective questions are designed not to edify, but rather to invite doubt and
ambiguity so that students can discover their own answers.”421 When using this method
in a healthcare setting Epstein points out, “clinical data gathering is commonly
conditioned by the expected diagnosis.”422 In other words, we see what we expect to see.
Engaging with Blue Painting, long enough and deeply enough to write a full page of
observations requires students to move past superficial examination. Reflective questions
begin simply enough with “What did you notice about this painting?” Responses
consistently reveal a fascinating variety of perceptions. Many students simply write
exactly what they see, yellow triangle, red square, green circle, etc., while others form
associations; “that looks like . . .” or “that reminds me of . . .” Epstein suggests the
following questions, “What did you observe?” “In what ways were you surprised?”
“How did you respond to that feeling of surprise?” “What interfered with your
observations?” The goal, he says, “is to help students internalize a habit of selfquestioning.”423
The discussion engendered by these questions as they relate to student
observations of Kandinsky’s work stands in testament to the efficacy of Epstein’s
method. Students are fascinated by the many ways of seeing expressed by their
classmates and appear to become more open-minded as a result of hearing them. There is
a natural connection, or cause and effect, between asking reflective questions and active
engagement, the fourth step in Epstein’s method. Students find ways of engaging with
the work they had not previously considered. At this point it is interesting to provide
students with some context for the painting by discussing Kandinsky’s color theories and
Ibid.
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his contention that a primary purpose of art is to express the innermost needs of the
artist.424
The fifth component of Epstein’s method is “Modeling. Thinking out loud and
encouraging the student to do the same . . . Thinking out loud makes it apparent that good
medical practice requires the constant effort of recognizing and correcting for errors,
rather than merely the linear pursuit of protocol.”425 Introducing Kandinsky’s ideas,
along with those of other color theorists, will give students some idea of the intentionality
with which artists make their decisions. By this point in the process, most students
should feel comfortable with ambiguity and multiple viewpoints and they should also be
willing to share their own thoughts, even if they find themselves disagreeing with others.
Modeling could take the form of statements such as, “Kandinsky believed yellow could
never have any sort of profound meaning, but I am not entirely sure what he meant by
‘meaning’.” This may seem a pointless esoteric statement, but it reflects a desire to
understand what is being expressed and an acceptance that thoughtful consideration is
being asked of the viewer.
Epstein’s next step for encouraging a habit of mindfulness is practice, which he
defines as, “disciplined repetition in controlled settings.”426 Here he is referring to the
active and intentional process of being aware of our own thoughts and reactions, which
sounds quite simple. It is deceptively difficult, however, to break habitual patterns of
thinking. As with the mindfulness breathing meditation, the objective when engaging
with Kandinsky’s work is to notice the patterns of our thoughts. An aesthetic response to
color is a near universal human tendency, but one that varies between individuals. At this
Kandinsky, Concerning the Spiritual in Art, 34–5.
Epstein, “Mindful Practice in Action (II),” 13–14.
426 Ibid., 14.
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point students should be asked to specifically consider the vibrant colors in Blue
Painting, thinking carefully about the associations and emotions that arise. This type of
deliberate metacognition is useful practice for future caregivers who will at times feel
overwhelmed and who may experience strong reactions to specific patients or situations.
Developing a practice of nonjudgmental awareness of our thoughts and emotions allows
us to understand and respond to them in ways that are helpful rather than impulsive.
Epstein suggests practicing curiosity.427 If we consider Kandinsky’s thoughts
about yellow and blue, we may feel we understand his color choice in this particular
painting where blue predominates and yellow appears in small, constrained forms. But
approaching the work with curiosity, or beginner’s mind, requires us to consider our own
responses to the painting. Are we, in fact, soothed by the green? What stands out and
draws our attention? What does it mean for a particular element in a painting to be
powerful? It is worth noting here that even Kandinsky sensed some ambiguity in
describing the power of color. He wrote, “Yellow, if steadily gazed at in any geometrical
form, has a disturbing influence, and reveals in the colour an insistent, aggressive
character,”428 but also, “Yellow is the typically earthly colour. It can never have
profound meaning.”429
Epstein’s seventh step, praxis, involves taking the habits of mind practiced in the
classroom and transferring them to lived experience.430 Our objectives in studying
Kandinsky’s work were to practice attentive observation, critical curiosity, informed
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flexibility, and engaged presence.431 Reviewing these habits of mind with students
suggests an alternate way of approaching both the familiar and the unfamiliar. Students
should be asked to reflect upon and discuss the ways in which these habits might be
brought to bear in relationships, schoolwork, leisure activities, and other aspects of their
lives. Nurturing these habits of mind is a lifelong process, but one that carries the
potential for improving both emotional well-being and the capacity for empathetic
engagement.
The final step in Epstein’s method is assessment and confirmation. In this step he
is referring primarily to mock clinical encounters in which medical students are observed
by their peers and mentors with everyone, including the student, subsequently completing
questionnaires designed to assess evidence of reflective questions, curiosity, and
presence.432 For students in an undergraduate classroom setting, the best method of
assessment is to have them complete an out of class experiment in which they are asked
to consider each of the objectives separately, make a conscious effort to apply at least one
of them in a real life setting, and note the results. For example, students might be asked
to devote their undivided attention to one particular task or conversation – no television
or music in the background, no cell phone, no internet. This can be surprisingly difficult
and enlightening for students accustomed to multitasking. Another possibility is to have
students write a short reflective essay on something about which they are passionately
curious. They are not to seek answers or attempt to satisfy their curiosity, but instead
should simply reflect on the nature of that curiosity. Where did it come from? What
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does it motivate them to ask, read, or think about? How has it, or will it, influence their
choices and behavior?
Encouraging students to examine their own patterns of thought and providing
exercises that allow them to do so, teaches a type of self-awareness that has proven useful
in combatting compassion fatigue, and it seems likely that such practices would be
equally useful in preventing it. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow includes
many of the same mental practices as mindfulness. Csikszentmihalyi notes that the desire
for happiness has always been a chief concern of mankind, and that this pursuit “is a
circuitous path that begins with achieving control over the contents of our
consciousness.”433 Csikszentmihalyi writes, “‘Flow’ is the way people describe their
state of mind when consciousness is harmoniously ordered, and they want to pursue
whatever they are doing for its own sake.”434 He goes on to say, “Everything we
experience – joy or pain, interest or boredom – is represented in the mind as information.
If we are able to control this information, we can decide what our lives will be like. The
optimal state of inner experience is one in which there is order in consciousness.”435
Csikszentmihalyi lists eight universal components of the state of flow:
First, the experience usually occurs when we confront tasks we
have a chance of completing. Second, we must be able to
concentrate on what we are doing. Third and fourth, the
concentration is usually possible because the task undertaken has
clear goals and provides immediate feedback. Fifth, one acts with
a deep but effortless involvement that removes from awareness the
worries and frustrations of everyday life. Sixth, enjoyable
experiences allow people to exercise a sense of control over their
actions. Seventh, concern for the self disappears, yet paradoxically
the sense of self emerges stronger after the flow experience is over.
Finally, the sense of the duration of time is altered; hours pass by
Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, 2.
Ibid., 6.
435 Ibid. Italics original.
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in minutes, and minutes can stretch out to seem like hours. The
combination of all these elements causes a sense of deep
enjoyment that is so rewarding people feel that expending a great
deal of energy is worthwhile simply to be able to feel it.436
According to Csikszentmihalyi, the activities and situations leading to this state of
flow are different for every individual, but “optimal experience,” and the psychological
conditions that make it possible, seem to be universal.437 Understanding the flow
experience, and working to find ways to bring such experiences into our lives creates a
beneficial state in which thoughts are well ordered and attention flows effortlessly. As
with the exercises that promote mindfulness, familiarity with the experience of flow
allows one to transfer the same constructive states of mind to other life experiences.
Encouraging students to create nonrepresentational works of art fulfills the most
important requirements for achieving a state of flow and will be described in the
following paragraphs. Prior to the creative assignment, students should be familiar with
the components and benefits of flow and should understand the purpose of the
assignment as an intentional attempt to create and experience this state.
For small groups, the instructor may provide materials. Tempera paints are
nontoxic and inexpensive. Providing the three primary colors as well as black and white
allows for the creation of multiple hues, tints, and shades. Basic white printer paper or
paper plates work well as supports, and inexpensive paint brushes in a variety of sizes can
be reused multiple times. For larger classes, a set of watercolor paints (Crayola 16 count
watercolor paint sets include black and white and are available for under five dollars in
many locations) may be included in the list of required materials.
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For this in-class assignment students are asked to create a fully abstract painting,
one that contains no recognizable objects. Possible prompts for the assignment are to
create a nonrepresentational painting of a favorite holiday, to create a painting that
expresses a particular theme or concept, or to try and paint a specific emotion such as
fear, boredom, or happiness. The idea behind the assignment is to have students work
with color and line only. Students should have a clear goal in mind before they start to
paint, and should thoughtfully consider the colors and forms that most closely represent
the ideas they are hoping to express. Students should be given thirty minutes to work on
their paintings, and they should be told that during this time nothing else is expected of
them; their work is theirs alone, there are no expectations other than their attention to the
project, and they will not be graded on their efforts.
Csikszentmihalyi notes that an optimal flow experience depends upon a “golden
ratio between challenges and skills” – if the challenge of an activity exceeds one’s skills,
the activity is likely to be frustrating rather than fulfilling. Conversely, if the skill level is
much higher than the activity demands, the activity will likely be boring and will not
command one’s full attention.438 A second impediment to flow is self-consciousness or
self-criticism.439 Asking students to create a fully abstract work helps remove the idea
that one must be “talented” or skilled at representational drawing.
Interestingly, I have had very few students who did not find this exercise
enjoyable, or at least relaxing. Most students report experiencing some level of flow,
particularly an altered sense of time passing and of being completely absorbed in their
work. It is important to allow for a period of discussion and reflection once the exercise
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is complete. Why were particular colors chosen? Were the colors appealing because of
their association with memories, cultural artifacts, or the natural world? What types of
line were used to express emotions or themes? What specifically enhanced or hampered
a student’s ability to experience the state of flow? Was there an impulse to compare
one’s work with others nearby? Was the inner critic present or absent?
Not all students will wish to make a habit of painting, of course, but what is
important is helping them become aware of the benefits of the state of flow and the
conditions that encourage such a state. This knowledge allows students to consciously
bring more of these experiences into their lives. As with mindfulness, the objective is to
recognize and practice a therapeutic state of mind. As Csikszentmihalyi notes, “Contrary
to what we tend to assume, the normal state of the mind is chaos. Without training, and
without an object in the external world that demands attention, people are unable to focus
their thoughts for more than a few minutes at a time.”440
It is possible that as a result of these practices of mindfulness and flow, some
students will develop a greater appreciation for visual art, or will find a kind of art that
captures their attention and awakens their curiosity. Some might even find the creation
of nonobjective art allows them to experience a state of flow that helps maintain optimal
habits of mind. But these are not the goals of the exercises. There is no expectation that
students will come to appreciate art or its creation. The goal is to help students
understand the importance of a particular state of mind in which they are present,
engaged, curious, and open minded. Becoming familiar with this state of mind will then
allow students to seek ways of maintaining it.
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Previous chapters of this dissertation have made clear the importance of
compassionate caregiver-patient relationships. Such compassion requires the consistent
expenditure of emotional energy, a giving of self that if not replenished, can intensify the
effects of burnout and lead to compassion fatigue. Caring for the body is important –
exercise, proper nutrition, and healthy sleep habits all contribute to emotional well-being,
but specific practices that maintain a healthy state of mind are also crucial for caregivers.
Mindfulness and flow are beneficial and restorative practices that equip future caregivers
for lifelong compassion.

Figure 2: Blue Painting
Wassily Kandinsky
1924
http://www.guggenheim.org/new-york/collections/collection-online/artwork/1943
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CHAPTER FIVE – THE IMPORTANCE OF MEDICAL HUMANITIES PEDAGOGY:
A CASE STUDY

“Might not the powers of medicine and nursing and therapy improve by virtue of our
education in hearing others tell of pain?”441
Rita Charon and Maura Spiegel
The ways in which we allow our patients to tell of pain and the quality of our
listening to their story has everything to do with whether or not we are able to mitigate
their suffering. As caregivers we must learn what it means to be compassionate, to offer
our undivided attention in a nonjudgmental way, and to protect our own mental and
emotional well-being in the process. As teachers, our job is to provide future caregivers
with the tools they will need to accomplish these tasks.
This dissertation suggests the primary objectives of medical humanities pedagogy
should be twofold: (1) To help future caregivers form compassionate, therapeutic
relationships with their patients, and (2) to help them care for themselves in ways that
prevent compassion fatigue. To that end, providing students with the tools to develop
and maintain a sense of compassion for patients and themselves is one of the most
Rita Charon and Maura Spiegel, “On Conveying Pain/On Conferring Form,” Literature and Medicine
24, no. 1 (Spring 2005): vi, doi:10.1353/lm.2005.0019.
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important goals for undergraduate medical humanities education. I have utilized the
following definition of compassion as put forth by researchers at Stanford University:
A complex multidimensional construct that is comprised of
four key components: (1) an awareness of suffering
(cognitive component), (2) sympathetic concern related to
being emotionally moved by suffering (affective
component), (3) a wish to see the relief of that suffering
(intentional component), and (4) a responsiveness or
readiness to help relieve that suffering (motivational
component).442
But, I have argued that the second component of compassion should reflect empathetic
concern, defined as feeling with another person and reflecting an interactive relationship,
rather than sympathetic concern, which alludes to feeling for another person and therefore
preferences the role of the observer or caregiver.443 I have proposed that, in order to
develop the skills necessary for practicing this type of compassion for their patients and
themselves, students must be taught the essentials of narrative medicine, bioethics, and
mindful self-care. Previous chapters have argued that literature and the visual arts offer
the best means of introducing and instilling these concepts and have suggested specific
pedagogical strategies for doing so. In this final chapter I present a case study, a
particular type of medical literature in which details of a specific case are presented as a
means of sharing knowledge, insights, or questions with other caregivers.444 Andrew
Marsh’s narrative and his art offer future caregivers a means of understanding why their
attention to narrative, ethics, and their own well-being is vital to the compassionate
practice of healthcare.
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Marsh is a gifted artist who suffers chronic pain as a result of damaged discs in
the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar regions of his spine. His experience with the
healthcare community demonstrates the profound necessity for medicine practiced with
narrative competence and compassion, particularly in the case of chronic pain and other
conditions for which traditional medicine still has surprisingly little to offer. Marsh’s
case also represents a situation in which caregivers are confronted with the dual
challenges of having few effective treatment options and attempting to create a mutually
therapeutic relationship with the infamous “noncompliant patient.” (More about this
designation later.) This is precisely the scenario in which many caregivers would feel the
need to become emotionally detached from the patient and/or to suppress their own
emotions, both of which are precursors to compassion fatigue.445 Marsh’s story thus
brilliantly exemplifies the importance of a medical humanities pedagogy that provides
tools for compassionate relationships and mindful self-care. In addition, his artwork
offers the viewer a brilliant visual representation of physical pain, thereby providing
some means of understanding an experience that “does not simply resist language, but
actively destroys it.”446
Each of Marsh’s wood and metal sculptures represents a creative confluence
of penetrating intellect and sheer brute force. They are magnificent in their power
and organic beauty, but in that beauty a sense of torment is evident: they bulge and
twist with sharp angles and broken lines. Marsh preserves the essence of his
medium – the strength and grandeur of a sycamore tree, for example – while
simultaneously contorting the form, suggesting the presence of some internal
445
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paroxysm. The effect is disconcerting, and it is meant to be so. For students of
medical humanities, it is worthwhile to explore the issues raised by Marsh’s work,
perhaps even to feel something of his anger, so as to avoid complacency in the face
of healthcare’s ongoing challenges.447
Marsh’s passion lies in creating large scale welded, cast metal, and wood
sculptures. A classically trained artist, Marsh earned an MFA from Southern Illinois
University in 2001, and hoped to enjoy a lifelong career in the arts. In December 2002
while working as the principle metal fabricator for the City Museum in St. Louis,
Missouri, Marsh was bending a large, flat, steel bar by hand. The bar was fifteen feet
long, four inches wide, and half an inch thick. One end of the bar was welded down and
Marsh was bending the other end into a complex twist that arched back on itself. He
worked section by section while an assistant welded each segment into place. At the
hardest part of the bend, Marsh’s feet slipped from under him and the bar recoiled,
throwing him into the air and hyperextending his back. Even though he was in pain,
Marsh continued working and later sought help from a chiropractor.448
In February 2003, after progressively worsening back pain, Marsh sought
traditional medical treatment. At that time an MRI revealed bulging discs in the lumbar,
thoracic, and cervical regions of his spine. Marsh was given narcotics, muscle relaxers,
anti-epileptics (used to treat nerve pain), and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs
(NSAIDs). He was limited to “light duty” at work, which, for Marsh, continued to
involve “strong man fabrication” – bending, twisting, lifting, climbing, crawling, and
being physically compressed into tight spaces as he designed and carried out construction
Lisa Shugoll, adapted from the curator’s statement for 1000 Cuts, an exhibit of Andrew Marsh’s
work. University of Louisville, September 2013 – February 2014.
448 Andrew Marsh, Personal Interview, November 25, 2012.
447

135

of MonstroCity, an enormous interactive sculpture and playground at the City Museum.
Marsh was also treated with physical therapy, but was released from the program in
August 2003, having reached “maximal medical improvement” according to his
physician and physical therapist. Marsh continued working in spite of “constant pain and
a litany of re-injuries.”449
On March 4th, 2004 while working on MonstroCity, Marsh lost movement and
sensation in both legs. He was taken to an urgent care facility and then transferred to a
hospital where an MRI showed no significant change in his injury. Physical therapy was
resumed but Marsh remained confined to a wheelchair until the following June. During
that time he was referred to a psychiatrist for “management of his medications.” He was
treated with opiate (narcotic) analgesics, anti-epileptics, anti-inflammatories, antipsychotics, and anti-depressants in addition to physical therapy and trigger point
injections with anesthetics and steroids. He reacquired the use of his legs in September
2004, but remained partially wheelchair bound. The pain worsened and his narcotic
medication was changed from fentanyl to the more powerful morphine. He was also
treated with epidural steroid injections and continued trigger point injections. In
February 2005 Marsh quit all medications “cold turkey.” He asserts,
I was mad at everything. Mad at the doctors. Mad at myself. Tired
of being controlled by meds that didn’t have the effects they were
supposed to and that complicated everything. I felt lost. I saw a
general practitioner every two months, a physical therapist three
times a week, a psychiatrist once a week, and the pain management
doctor three times a week. And I finally just told everyone I wasn’t
coming back. The meds were getting more extreme and I didn’t
feel like it was going anywhere. They offered no alternatives; this
was their program. The objective was to get me out of pain and
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they just kept increasing the pain meds. I was comatose for three
months.450
Never able to work more than a few hours at a time and often unable to work at
all, Marsh was fired from his job at City Museum in May 2005. He moved to Louisville,
Kentucky in December, and was referred to the pain management clinic at Norton
Hospital. He requested no narcotics or anti-depressants and was able to cope with his
pain without such medications until March 2006. At that time he began receiving
epidural steroid injections every six months at the site of the lumbar protrusion. The
injections provided moderate pain relief for two to four months, but he continued to
experience radiating pain from the other damaged areas. By late 2012 his medication
regimen included Relafen, an NSAID, twice a day, Tramadol, a non-narcotic pain
reliever twice a day, and a muscle relaxer he took about every two weeks. In 2012
Marsh’s strategy for pain control revolved around fortitude and stamina:
I have these long periods of endurance, to see how long I can go
without taking anything. My whole treatment now is based on
plateau pain medication, not an escalating schedule. I’m not gonna
do that again. So when the meds don’t work, they don’t work. To
help when they don’t work I usually drink bourbon. On a basic
pain scale I maintain about a seven. When I take a muscle relaxer
that drops to about a six and that’s how I exist.451
By medical standards, Marsh was considered a very high functioning chronic pain
patient, holding a full-time job as assistant director of the Conn Center for Renewable
Energy at the University of Louisville, frequently riding arduous trails on his bike, and
creating massive sculptures of wood and metal. When asked how he achieved this level
of functionality in spite of his pain, Marsh replied,
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I walk two miles every night. I also ride about five thousand miles
a year. It keeps me physically fit and helps my state of mind. I
pour metal. I make sculpture. I use my chainsaw. It’s an
expressive medium for trying to give form to how I feel. It’s an
outlet. I feel great while I’m doing it and I feel horrible afterward.
The subject matter is all body pain and injury. I work as much as I
can, then completely withdraw from it.452
Within the healthcare community, Marsh was considered a success story, but he
was also a “non-compliant patient,” a patient who refuses to follow medical advice. The
trail riding, the heavy lifting, and working with a chainsaw were all likely to worsen his
injury or create additional injuries, and thus were contraindicated, yet Marsh preferred to
take those risks rather than give up the things he most enjoyed doing. In 2012, Marsh’s
relationship with most of his healthcare providers was contentious, to say the least.
While acknowledging that medical treatment allows him to function in spite of his
pain, Marsh is resentful that it took years of suffering before he was able to achieve an
acceptable quality of life. Arriving at this point required repeated requests for an altered
treatment plan and finally a decision to discontinue all therapy and medications – an
extremely dangerous move considering the drugs he was taking at the time. When asked
via email what doctors could have done differently that might have prevented this risky
decision and provided help more quickly, Marsh replied,
I don’t know what they could have done. I’m not a doctor. I was
just tired of being drugged and semi-conscious, but still in pain.
My friends didn’t recognize me, my wife and son avoided me, and
I was totally miserable. The side effects of that much medication
really worried me, especially the morphine. I asked the pain doc
and the shrink about their choice of regimen, and both of them told
me I was going to be a long-term management case, and to prepare
for taking all these meds for a while. I found that unacceptable, so
I fired both of them, quit the meds, and reclaimed my life. If I was
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not going to be out of pain, I felt there was no reason for being
drugged. I still feel that way.453
Careful consideration of Andrew’s narrative is revealing. He intensely disliked
the sedation associated with his medication regimen. He felt isolated from his friends
and family. He was worried about the long-term effects of the medicine. He was lost
and miserable, suffering physically, yes, but also suffering emotionally. He felt disabled
by both the pain and the treatment regimen. His physicians conceded that Marsh’s pain
was intractable and likely to be chronic, (an unfortunate fact for many patients, and one
that will be discussed more fully later in this chapter). In spite of Marsh’s assertion that a
portion of his misery stemmed from the effects of the medication, which was doing very
little to relieve his pain or his emotional distress, his physician suggested he just get used
to being on the meds. Marsh makes it very clear he discussed all aspects of his misery
with his physicians, even sharing his personal journal with them at one point, but no one
heard his whole story.
In the world of healthcare there is perhaps no more vexing problem for caregivers
and their patients than that of chronic pain. In 2011 the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
published Relieving Pain in America: A Blueprint for Transforming Prevention, Care,
Education, and Research. According to this document, “Common chronic pain
conditions affect approximately 100 million U.S. adults . . . Many shortfalls in pain
assessment and treatment persist despite humanity’s intimate familiarity with pain
throughout history . . . In general, these shortfalls arise through gaps in policy, treatment,
attitudes, education and research.”454
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Patients in pain seek help from medical caregivers who, by virtue of their training
and experience, hopefully possess the knowledge and expertise necessary to provide
relief of suffering. The situation is complicated, however, because a person in pain often
has no readily available language with which to express the nature of his or her suffering.
In addition, the medical community generally relies on the presence of empirical
evidence, such as abnormalities in laboratory values, physical exam, or diagnostic
imaging to make a diagnosis and suggest a treatment plan, but for the patient in pain,
such evidence is often absent. Acute pain occurs when there is some form of injury to the
body that results in tissue damage. As a result of physiological processes that remain
very poorly understood, acute pain often becomes chronic, meaning it persists even after
the initial injury has healed.455 In addition, certain conditions such as fibromyalgia cause
pain and tenderness even though no initiating tissue damage has ever been present.456
Functional MRI scans show changes in the forebrains of patients experiencing pain even
in the absence of other physical indicators and can be a reliable clue to the presence of
pain and the efficacy of treatment,457 but such scans are unnecessary for most patients,
leaving them with no empirical means of proving they are in pain.
In the third edition of Essentials of Pain Management, Robert R. Edwards and
Charles B. Berde acknowledge, “By its very definition, pain is an internal, subjective
experience that cannot be directly observed by others or measured by the use of
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physiologic markers or bioassays.”458 And yet for the patient in pain, communicating the
nature of suffering is all too often relegated to forms from which data can be
standardized. The most commonly used pain assessment tools include the numeric pain
scale (NPS), the visual analog scale (VAS), and the McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ),
each of which is designed to allow patients in pain a way of conveying their
experience.459
The NPS is a verbal assessment tool in which the patient is asked to rate his or her
pain on a scale from zero to ten, with zero being no pain and ten being the worst possible
pain.460 The NPS has become the ubiquitous standard by which patients communicate
the intensity of their pain because it is quick, easy, can be used with non-literate patients,
requires no materials, and has proven a reliable indicator of the efficacy of treatment.461
It offers no means of describing the quality of pain and is generally only used to convey
severity, improvement, or worsening of pain.
The VAS is simply a line, usually ten centimeters in length, with pain qualifiers at
either end [Figure 3]. The line may be placed vertically or horizontally, and the qualifiers
are phrases such as “No pain” at one end and “Worst possible pain” at the other. The
patient is asked to place a mark on the line indicating his or her current level of pain. The
line may be segmented and numbered, and visual representations of simple facial
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expressions are often included for patients unable to read English. Like the NPS, this
scale is used to convey intensity of pain and changes in that intensity.

Figure 3 Visual Analog Pain Scale462

The most comprehensive of these three assessment tools is the McGill Pain
Questionnaire [Figure 4], which is designed to convey both intensity and quality of pain.
Ronald Melzack developed the MPQ in 1975 after conducting extensive research into the
words patients used to describe their pain. Melzack concluded, ”the pain descriptors (at
least a large number of them) could be classified into three major groups: sensory,
affective, and evaluative.”463 In order to complete the questionnaire, patients are asked to
circle one word in each section that best describes their pain. The test administrator
scores the responses based upon a predetermined numerical ranking for each word and
the sum of these values gives the pain rating index, or PRI. In addition, the patient is
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asked to describe the present pain intensity (PPI) by rating it on a scale of 0 - no pain, to
5 - excruciating pain.464
Marsh is familiar with all of these assessment tools and reports that he has been
asked to complete each of them on multiple occasions. He finds them all equally useless
in elucidating his experience, although it is notable that he, like most patients, continues
to rely on the numeric pain scale when attempting to describe the intensity of his pain.
He began filling out the MPQ during one of our interviews in 2012, but quickly became
frustrated [Figure 5].
I mean, how am I supposed to do this when every single one of
these words is applicable at any given time? It changes as I move,
how do I show that? There’s no way to represent the continuum of
time! If I had ten of these that I could fill out moment to moment
with different movements – it changes when I stand up, it changes
when I twist, it changes if I bend over. What is this supposed to
tell someone? They compare it with scans, which are based on me
holding completely still, in a fixed position; they don’t show what
it looks like when I bend over; no one’s ever seen that. What I
experience is far beyond this tool. [Referring to the human form on
which the patient is supposed to mark the location of his or her
pain] How do I show that it starts here, but it radiates through my
arms and down my legs and out my head? There’s nothing on here
that says ‘It feels like I’m being dipped in acid!’465
While standardized assessment forms are indispensible for research studies
attempting quantitative measurement of pain levels and pain control, they become
counterproductive when used as a primary means of gathering information from
individual patients. The principles of narrative medicine provide a much more useful
context through which the patient’s experience can be shared with a caregiver. The MPQ
may provide useful words for a patient attempting to convey an inexpressible sensory
experience, but it must be used to begin a conversation and not as an endpoint. Narrative
464
465
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practice requires a willingness to engage in a qualitative rather than quantitative approach
to diagnosis and treatment, and because it is the only means of understanding the
patient’s suffering, it is ethically mandated.
In his discussions of medical morality, Edmund Pellegrino observed, “To act in
the patient’s interests implies the promise that the physician will act in such a way that
the patient’s interpretation of the good life will be protected and that he will have an
opportunity to make the value choices that so often underlie the decisions about what
should be done.466 Allowing a patient to make his or her own value choices requires an
attitude of nonjudgment on the part of the caregiver. For patients with chronic pain this
is complicated by treatment practices that have traditionally relied on opioid medications.
According to Marsh, the fact that he was physically strong enough to continue
working for a time after his injury coupled with his “punk rocker” appearance (spiked
hair and piercings) often led doctors to conclude that he was seeking drugs he did not
physically need. “C’mon!!” he writes in an email discussing this experience, “I had
ridiculously free access to any number of illicit drugs, but instead chose to spend hours of
my life WAITING to be seen by a doctor, then being spoken to with utter disdain and
disbelief once seen.”467 Marsh’s perception is corroborated by the IOM report, which
notes a troublesome attitude within the healthcare community; “when pain could be
ascribed to an underlying disease, such as cancer, it was accepted as real and treated with
concern. [When] underlying disease was less well defined, the cultural perception of and
response to the pain by the health care community was dramatically different.”468
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The sheer number of patients in pain coupled with a shortage of caregivers trained
to manage chronic pain means that most patients are treated by primary care physicians
who attempt to alleviate the pain as best they can, often turning to narcotic
medications.469 Opioids have become a first line approach to pain management for
reasons including expediency, pressure from the patient for immediate pain relief, and
marketing by pharmaceutical companies.470 This rise in treatment with opioid
medications is associated with an increase in overdose and overdose related deaths.471
Writing in March 2015, Franklin et al., declare, “An epidemic of morbidity and mortality
has swept across the United States related to the use of prescription opioids for chronic
noncancer pain. More than 100 000 people have died from unintentional overdose,
making this one of the worst manmade epidemics in history.”472 Adding to this tragedy is
the fact that research has shown that although opioid analgesics are useful in the
treatment of acute pain, they are ineffective in treating chronic pain, and sometimes even
make it worse.473 According to Michael Schatman, Executive Director of the Foundation
for Ethics in Pain Care, the lack of education related to pain management and the risks of
opioids illuminates an enormous breach of medical ethics.474
Dr. Jerome Schofferman of the San Francisco Spine Institute notes that the
pharmaceutical industry currently funds forty to sixty percent of all continuing medical
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education offered to physicians.475 Schofferman acknowledges a mutually beneficial
relationship between pharmaceutical companies and physicians when it comes to “the
development and evaluation of new medications,” but also points out the inherent conflict
of interest when the biomedical industry actively markets drugs and devices at physician
education conferences.476 “Physicians attending a CME [continuing medical education]
conference supported by industry are more likely to use the sponsoring company’s
product . . . industry marketing strategies rely heavily on physician education in a variety
of formats to boost drug sales.”477 Schofferman recommends complete divestment
between physician medical associations and the pharmaceutical industry, but
acknowledges, “it may be difficult to accomplish and even to convince some educators
and leaders of its necessity, importance, and eventual value.”478 He also notes, “bias and
influence created by COI [conflict of interest] are not intentional, but are an unconscious
neuropsychosocial response to which everyone is susceptible.”479 It is beyond the scope
of this dissertation to address the myriad implications of Schofferman’s observations, but
they do illuminate the importance of diligent attention to both patient narrative and the
presence of outside influence. Marsh makes it clear that opioid medications did little to
relieve his pain and significantly worsened his quality of life, yet his physician continued
to prescribe them, perhaps because other options required more difficult and time
consuming conversations.
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A recent article in Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy notes, “The experience
and report of pain is a subjective and private one, which is composed of one’s perception
not only of the pain severity but also of the suffering related to the pain. Empirical
findings suggest that perceived disability, or one’s perception of his or her ability,
impacts medical and functional outcomes in those with CP [chronic pain]. In fact,
perceived disability is found to affect these outcomes regardless of the primary cause or
nociceptive origin, duration and severity of pain.”480 The importance of this finding in
mitigating the suffering of patients in pain cannot be overstated. Patients have better
outcomes, which is to say a better quality of life, if they do not feel disabled by their pain.
The article also notes, “high NA [negative affect] (particularly anger, anxiety, boredom
and sadness) was the most important predictor of higher current and subsequent pain
levels, followed by depressive mood.”481 In cases where physical pain cannot be
eliminated, it is imperative that physicians understand what brings enjoyment and
empowerment to their patient. To label Marsh “non-compliant,” or to insist on a
treatment regimen that would eliminate the activities he most enjoys is not compassionate
healthcare.
The process of restoring Marsh’s well-being might have started much earlier had
any of his physicians taken the time to determine what his pain actually meant to him and
what had been lost as a result of his accident. Marsh writes,
Perhaps the worst part of all is what has happened to my expectations of
medically supported health. I was assured my entire life up to this point
that if and when I became ill or injured, a doctor could be trusted to sort

Jessica C. Payne-Murphy and Abbie O. Beacham, “Revisiting Chronic Pain Patient Profiling: An
Acceptance-Based Approach in an Online Sample,” Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy 22, no. 3
(June 2015): 240, doi:10.1002/cpp.1886.
481 Ibid., 241.
480

147

me out. It came as a shock to find the callous disregard for my quality of
life or even for the fact that I had been injured at all!482
Marsh’s healing began when he insisted on a treatment plan that maintained a
quality of life he found acceptable. His refusal to be disabled or to take medications that
made him feel worse were healthy responses, the efficacy of which are born out by
current research, yet none of which were recommended by his clinicians. His arduous
path to recovery is filled with valuable insight for caregivers.
Marsh’s current large-scale sculptures and performance art had much smaller, but
equally provocative precursors. By 2007, Marsh was working full time as a grant writer
at the J. G. Brown Cancer Center, but was still physically unable to resume his previous
metalwork, and remained frustrated by the loss of this creative outlet. He began
extracting small bits and pieces of cardboard, plastic, and metal from his household
garbage and fabricating these into sculptures he called Pain Trophies [Figure 6]. As his
physical strength and emotional outlook improved, he created sand molds for the patterns
and with the help of friends, cast the sculptures in metal [Figure 7]. These twisted,
tortured sculptures are extraordinary visible expressions of pain, and their creation
marked a major milestone in his healing process.
From 2006-2015 Marsh continued a pain management regimen of Tramadol,
Relafen, and lumbar spinal steroid injections. His pain level was cyclical, temporarily
improving for a month or two after the steroid injection, but generally staying around a
six. The steroid injections triggered periods of internal rage that, while “hugely
productive for chainsaw wood carving,” created tension in his relationships. He
continued to work with a chainsaw, creating sculptures from very large felled trees, often
482
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in remote locations [Figure 8] and coped with the pain by creating a flat bench where he
could lie down, stretch, and readjust his spine [Figure 9].483
In January 2015, Marsh was working alone at a remote site, lifting heavy wood
and carving in snow. Although his pain was no greater than usual at the time, he later
noticed worsening pain in his left leg. He continued working although his sciatic route
pain increased to an eight or nine level, and assumed the steroid injection he had received
in December was wearing off early. His plan was simply to cope with the pain until his
next injection in June, a technique he had been using for years, and to discontinue large
scale carving until the pain subsided. In March 2015, he created Walking Wounded
[Figure 10], a site-specific installation and performance piece consisting of twenty-one
wood molds for iron casting, and three telephone pole sized torches used in the casting
performance.
When molten iron, heated to greater than three thousand degrees Fahrenheit, is
poured into molds carved in recently felled trees, the water content in the unseasoned
wood creates enormous steam explosions that expel the molten metal forty to fifty feet
high. The explosions may repeat two or three times from every mold [Figure 11]. For
Marsh, the molds represent vertebral discs, and the explosions give visual form to “the
constantly occurring set of sensations when living with the presence of chronic back pain.
They are visual representations of pain, inflammation, spasms.” Such variations on his
theme of pain-related artwork reflect his own ongoing misery and also create a
connection to the suffering of others. His work remains installed on the grounds of Sloss
Historical Furnaces in Birmingham, Alabama.484
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In December 2013, I helped curate an exhibit of Marsh’s sculptures in Ekstrom
Library on the University of Louisville campus. My goal was to expose my own students
and the university community to the expressive power of Marsh’s work and to help them
understand the artist’s drive to create even in the face of physical pain. Marsh’s artist’s
statement for the exhibit reveals both his inspiration and his hope for the work:
A product of boundless enthusiasm tempered with chronic pain,
each sculpture rises from a series of decisions based on imperfect
information and questionable motives in a moving spectrum of
experience. My abstract carving with a chainsaw starts with a
battle plan full of contingencies and unknowns. Chaos and disorder
of the unimaginable are balanced with desire and skill to generate
expressions that resonate, rendering that which is unseen, but felt,
experienced, and endured . . . I am unwilling to succumb to
laziness, indifference, or misanthropy, and am determined to live
well. As much as the twisting pain urges otherwise, I am
compelled to instill a balance between its brutal exorcism,
eruptions of maniacal happiness, and the glow of sanity
retained.485
Marsh continued to find emotional comfort in creating large-scale sculptures, but
notes, “At the time of creating and pouring Walking Wounded, the sciatic pain was the
worst it had ever been and I was having trouble walking. My left leg was dragging.”486
After the show, Marsh visited his physical therapist for a massage, but the therapist
recognized a potentially serious situation and instructed him to call his physician, who
scheduled an MRI for the next morning. After viewing the results of the MRI, which
showed a herniated lumbar disc, Marsh’s pain management physician scheduled an
appointment for Marsh with a neurosurgeon. Ten days later Marsh had a surgical repair
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of the herniated disc and now, for the first time in years, his pain level is usually about a
three.487
Marsh and his neurosurgeon are currently working to wean him off both the
Tramadol and the NSAID, and Marsh is restricted to “normal” activity – riding his bike
on the road, but not trails, walking up to five miles per day, and light weight lifting in the
gym at the physical therapy complex. Emotionally, Marsh is working to regain some
sense of equilibrium in his life. Although his pain levels decrease with daily activity, he
still wakes with a level of five or six, which can trigger depression. His relationships
remain strained after years of dealing with the consequences of constant pain and pain
medications.
Marsh relates that his neurosurgeon predicts re-injuries in the future, given the
fragility of Marsh’s spine and the type of activities he enjoys; yet the surgeon respects
Marsh’s decisions. Marsh considers this relationship the best he has ever had with a
caregiver because he does not feel judged or ridiculed for the choices he makes and
because his own goals and desires are given consideration and respect. Marsh favorably
refers to the anesthesiologist who managed his pain medications and steroid injections
prior to surgery as a “pill pushing and needles kind of guy.”488 Ironically, caregivers
whose focus is entirely upon the relief of physical pain are often ineffective as healers.
The IOM considers effective pain management “a moral imperative, a
professional responsibility, and the duty of people in the healing profession,” but also
acknowledges the complexity of chronic pain and the need for an interdisciplinary
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approach to its treatment.489 Since 2004, psychological treatment for patients with
chronic pain has focused on cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) designed to encourage
acceptance and commitment, “living with pain without reaction, disapproval or attempts
to avoid it . . . a disengagement from struggling with pain, a realistic approach to pain and
pain-related circumstances, and an engagement in positive everyday activities.”490 For
some patients, the very things that give their lives joy and meaning are the things that put
their physical bodies in jeopardy. Being unable, or fearing that one will become unable
to participate in these activities often causes more suffering than physical pain. The
affective and motivational components of compassion come from an attitude of nonjudgment in which the caregiver respects the patient’s self-knowledge. Unfortunately,
multimodal treatment and narrative based medical care are not available for many
patients suffering chronic pain.
In a position paper published in 2009, Pain Medicine attempted to address the
myriad problems associated with chronic pain treatment in the US and noted, “no single
physician trained in pain medicine possesses the full scope of medical training an
knowledge that has become necessary in the modern treatment of pain conditions.”491
The authors recommend development of a two-year residency program following
graduation from medical school that would “train physicians to treat the most complex
pain conditions, assuring competence in the biopsychosocial ‘whole person’ perspective
and the development of the interdisciplinary approach to pain care that is so lacking in
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today’s treatment environment.”492 To the best of my knowledge, no such programs have
yet been implemented. Interdisciplinary care is still possible, of course, and is imperative
in the management of chronic pain. Peppin et al., note the difference between
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary care; “Multidisciplinary care consists of care
provided by several disciplines and typically is not coordinated nor having [sic] shared
treatment goals. Interdisciplinary pain care relies upon a team of health care providers
that possess unique skills and knowledge that compliment each other.”493 Marsh
received care from a variety of specialists over the course of his treatment, but it was
multidisciplinary, rather than interdisciplinary in approach, and left him as the primary
manager of his own condition.
The twenty-first century development of specialty journals such as Pain Medicine
and the recent publication of the position papers and other documents referenced in this
chapter as well as the multitude of research studies dedicated to understanding the
complex causes of chronic pain are encouraging, but the necessary “cultural
transformation in the way pain is understood, assessed, and treated”494 remains a hope for
the future rather than an present day reality. For this reason, cases like Andrew Marsh’s
represent one of the most difficult challenges for both caregiver and patient.
Marsh experienced near constant moderate to severe pain for over a decade and
continues to experience pain at a lower degree of intensity. Treatment of such pain
continues to rely heavily on opioid medications that destroy quality of life and carry
enormous risks for dependency and death, creating an ethical dilemma that pits the risks
of such medications against the “moral outrage” of persistent pain. A larger scale ethical
Ibid., 991.
Peppin et al., “The Complexity Model,” 654.
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dilemma is created by the conflict of interest in allowing pharmaceutical companies to
fund a great deal of education and research related to chronic pain.
The best hope for restoring quality of life to patients with chronic pain is therapy
that focuses on accepting pain while reducing disability, a very difficult thing for many
patients and caregivers to concede. Compassionate care in such difficult circumstances
mandates narrative practice so all causes of suffering can be identified and addressed. In
order to prevent compassion fatigue, caregivers must be skilled in habits of mind that
allow sustained attention and nonjudgment. Marsh’s case highlights the necessity of a
medical humanities pedagogy that trains caregivers to understand the virtue of
compassion and to safeguard their ability to provide compassionate care to their patients
and themselves.
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Figure 4 McGill Pain Questionnaire495
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Figure 5, McGill Pain Questionnaire completed by Andrew Marsh on 11/25/12
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Figure 6 Pain Trophy 13 - Pattern in Progress Andrew Marsh 2007
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Figure 7
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13’ x 3’ x 4’

Figure 9 Andrew Marsh, Back Bench, 2013, 7’ x 3’ x 3’, maple & locust

Figure 10 Andrew Marsh, Walking Wounded, 2015, pine, maple, sweet gum, iron
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Figure 11
Andrew Marsh (visible at base of explosion)
Walking Wounded Casting Performance 2015
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University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky
• Golden Key International Honour Society Member
• Certificate in Medieval/Renaissance Studies
MA Directed Study Project: Designed an undergraduate Medical Humanities course
focused on the study and interpretation of illness narratives in art and literature.
Bachelor of Science in Nursing
The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

May 1983

Academic & Teaching Experience:
University of Louisville – Graduate Teaching Assistant
2011 - 2014
Solo designed and taught all courses
• Humanities 151: Creativity and the Arts – An introduction to the fundamental
principles, processes, and styles of the creative arts, both visual and performing.
• Humanities 152: Cultures of America – An interdisciplinary study of the arts and
humanities of African, Indigenous, Asian, Latino, and Appalachian cultures within
the United States.
• Humanities 361: Humanities and Healthcare – A Medical Humanities course in
which literature and the visual arts are used to introduce undergraduate students to
the principles of Narrative Medicine, Bioethics, and Mindfulness.
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Exhibitions Curated:
• 1000 Cuts: An Exhibition of Sculpture by Andrew Marsh
University of Louisville, Ekstrom Library

September 2013

ATA College – Adjunct Faculty
May 2010 - July 2011
Courses taught:
• Medical Law and Ethics – An overview of past and current healthcare legislation
and an introduction to the study of biomedical ethics.
• Success Skills for College – An intensive course covering time management,
study skills, written and verbal communication techniques - designed for new
college students and adults returning to school.
Kentucky Center for the Performing Arts
Summer 2011
Intern – Arts in Healing Program
• Assisted with the development and implementation of Arts in Healing programs
at The Nazareth Home and Our Lady of Peace Hospital in Louisville, Kentucky
• Created a video presentation to be used for promotion and education:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FaH36JSgAfU
• Presented a research proposal evaluating major pharmaceutical corporations as
possible funding sources
Transports de l’Agglomération de Montpellier, Montpellier, France June/July 2008
• Lived and worked in Montpellier, France as an international work exchange
student
• Office assistant duties included data entry, filing, and some translation
Conference Presentations:
“Caring for Caregivers: Using Abstraction to Deal with Distraction”
April 11, 2014
Global Alliance for Arts and Healthcare, Houston Texas (CME credit granted for
attendance)
“Teaching Medical Humanities to Undergraduates”
Humanities Education and Research Association, Washington, DC

February 27, 2014

“Visual Arts and the Promotion of Empathy in Medical Caregivers,”
June 2012
International Conference on New Directions in the Humanities, Montréal, Canada
“The Rhetoric of Race in Riddle 12 of The Exeter Book,”
The Kentucky Philological Association, Frankfort, Kentucky

March 2011

Nursing Experience:
Crawford Long Hospital of Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia
1983 – 1990
Critical Care Registered Nurse/Charge Nurse
1983 - 1988
• Cared for critically ill patients in a medical/surgical intensive care unit
• Patient teaching included wound and stoma care, diabetic health, nutrition,
pulmonary therapies
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•
•

Staff nurse teaching included peritoneal dialysis, decubitus ulcer care, performing
physical exams
Wrote and administered patient care plans, supervised staff nurses, coordinated
work assignments

Quality Assurance Coordinator
1988 - 1990
• Chaired Quality Assurance Committee for the Department of Surgery
• Evaluated trends in patient outcomes following surgical procedures
• Monitored patient records for completeness and accuracy

Service:
Association of Humanities Academics, University of Louisville
2010 - present
• Conference organizer
Kentucky Country Day School, Louisville, Kentucky
1996 - 2009
• Diversity Committee member
• Drama Society volunteer for Middle and Upper School theatrical productions
• Library assistant
Habitat for Humanity, Louisville, Kentucky
1990 - 1992
• Site nurse – provided first aid for minor injuries
• Recruited and scheduled volunteers to provide continuous first aid coverage
• Wrote manual for first aid providers and medical volunteers

Memberships:
• Inclusive Teaching Circle, University of Louisville
• Association of Humanities Academics
• Global Alliance for Arts & Health
• College Art Association
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